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Abstract 
Decision-making is a routine in our daily life, constituting one of the most prominent differential 
features of each human being. Several psychiatric disorders, including obsessive compulsive 
spectrum disorders, schizophrenia and depression, present significant impairments of decision-
making abilities. Decision-making requires complex cognitive processes, modulated by a variety 
of intrinsic and environmental elements, including stress. Indeed, the brain networks involved in 
decision-making, have been found to be targeted by chronic stress exposure. 
In the present series of studies, we have thoroughly characterized how decision-making 
processes, namely pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) processes and risk-based decision-
making, can be influenced by chronic stress, detailing some neurochemical, neuroanatomical 
and neurophysiologic mechanisms underlying these changes and proposing therapeutic 
interventions to revert stress-induced impairments. We also explored the relationship between 
stress and features of obsessive compulsive disorder and analyzed risk-based decision-making in 
a cohort of patients with this psychiatric pathology. 
We show that chronic stress transiently impairs PIT, reducing the ability of environmental cues to 
influence instrumental actions, and induces a risk-aversive behavior in a novel decision making 
task. Using c-fos labeling techniques we found that stress-induced risk-aversion was related with 
an overactivation of the orbitofrontal and insula cortices. Chronic stress also induced an 
hypertrophy of apical dendritic trees of layer II/III pyramidal neurons of the orbitofrontal cortex, 
an effect that was also observed in neurons activated during the decision-making task. Finally, we 
reveal that stress induces a hypodompaminergic status in the orbitofrontal cortex, characterized 
not only by decreased dopamine levels, but also by an increased expression of the D2 receptor, 
and show that stress-induced changes in risk-based behavior can be reverted by systemic 
administration of the D2/D3 agonist quinpirole. In a separate set of experiments, we found that 
obsessive compulsive patients displayed higher levels of perceived stress and cortisol, when 
compared with age and sex-matched healthy controls, and had difficulties in risk-based decision-
making that correlated with decreased activity in the dorsal striatum when deciding, 
hypoactivation of the amygdala before making high-risk choices and increased activity in several 
areas of the (orbito)fronto-striato-thalamic circuit implicated in decision upon loosing. 
x 
In this thesis we show that chronic stress profoundly influences decisions, biasing behavior to 
risk-aversion, and impairing PIT. We further revealed that stress is also associated with 
symptoms in obsessive compulsive disorder patients, who present impairments in risk-based 
decision-making. We conclude by suggesting that decision-making deficits are key in obsessive 
compulsive disorders clinical presentation and might be used as diagnosis and/or prognosis 
markers and finally hypothesize that the neurochemical mechanisms and therapeutic approaches 
identified in the study of chronic stress effects can be translated to obsessive-compulsive 
spectrum disorders and challenge our current knowledge, paving the way for new treatments. 
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Resumo 
A forma como tomamos decisões é uma das características mais diferenciadoras dos indivíduos. 
Alterações dos processos de tomada de decisão são frequentes em várias doenças psiquiátricas, 
incluindo as doenças do espectro obsessivo-compulsivo, a esquizofrenia e a depressão. A 
tomada de decisão envolve processos cognitivos complexos que são modulados por uma 
panóplia de elementos internos e externos dos indivíduos, incluindo o stresse. Sabe ainda que 
este último, sobretudo em situações de exposição prolongada, modula as áreas e as redes 
cerebrais que se sabe estarem implicadas nos processos de tomada de decisão. 
Nos estudos apresentados nesta tese, caracterizamos a forma como os processos de tomada de 
decisão, nomeadamente os processos de transferência pavloviano-instrumental (PIT) e a decisão 
baseada no risco, podem ser influenciados pelo stresse crónico. Adicionalmente, detalhamos 
alguns dos mecanismos neuroquímicos, neuroanatómicos e neurofisiológicos subjacentes às 
alterações encontradas e propomos intervenções terapêuticas capazes de reverter as 
consequências negativas induzidas pelo stresse crónico nos processos de tomada de decisão. As 
relações entre o stresse e a doença obsessivo compulsiva foram também exploradas e 
analisámos os processos de tomada de decisão de risco num grupo de doentes com esta 
patologia. 
Os nossos resultados demonstraram que o stresse crónico provoca alterações reversíveis no PIT, 
prejudicando a forma como as pistas ambientais influenciam as acções instrumentais. 
Verificámos também,  numa nova tarefa de tomada de decisão de risco em roedores, que o 
stresse crónico induz um padrão de comportamento aversivo ao risco. A utilização de técnicas 
de marcação com c-fos permitiu demonstrar que a aversão ao risco está relacionada com uma 
hiperactivação dos córtices orbitofrontal e insular. Verificámos também que o stresse crónico 
induz uma hipertrofia das dendrites apicais dos neurónios piramidais das camadas II e III do 
córtex orbitofrontal, um efeito que também foi observado em neurónios activados durante a 
tarefa de tomada de decisão descrita. Concomitantemente, demonstrámos que o stresse crónico 
induz um estado hipodopaminérgico no córtex orbitofrontal, caracterizado tanto pela diminuição 
dos níveis de dopamina como pelo aumento da expressão do mRNA dos receptores de 
dopamina D2. Por último, demonstrámos que as alterações induzidas pelo stresse podem ser 
xii 
revertidas pela administração sistémica do agonista selectivo dos receptores da dopamina 
D2/D3, quinpirole. 
No contexto dos nossos trabalhos clínicos, demonstrámos que os doentes com perturbação 
obsessivo compulsiva apresentam níveis mais elevados de stresse percebido e de cortisol, 
quando comparados com voluntários saudáveis, emparelhados para sexo, idade e nível 
educacional. Verificámos também que apresentam dificuldades nos processos de tomada de 
decisão de risco que estão relacionadas com uma diminuição da actividade do estriado dorsal no 
momento da decisão, uma activação paradoxal da amígdala antes da tomada de decisões de 
risco e um aumento da actividade em várias áreas cerebrais do circuito (orbito)fronto-estriato-
talâmico nas decisões que implicam perdas. 
Em síntese, ao longo desta tese demonstrámos que o stresse crónico influencia profundamente 
os processos de tomada de decisão, prejudicando o PIT e induzindo comportamentos de aversão 
ao risco. Adicionalmente demonstrámos que o stresse está associado com sintomas da doença 
obsessivo-compulsiva, cujos pacientes apresentam défices nos mecanismos de tomada de 
decisão. No seu conjunto, estes dados permitem afirmar que os défices da tomada de decisão 
são fundamentais no fenótipo das doenças do espectro obsessivo-compulsivo e podem ser 
utilizados como ferramentas diagnósticas e/ou como marcadores do prognóstico. Por último, 
propomos que os mecanismos neuroquímicos e as estratégias terapêuticas identificados no 
estudo dos efeitos do stresse crónico podem ser extrapolados para as doenças do espectro 
obsessivo, desafiando o conhecimento actual acerca da doença e suportando novas abordagens 
para o desenvolvimento de tratamentos mais efectivos. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. General 
During last decades, different fields of knowledge, including psychology, economics and 
neurosciences, have focused on decision making process, highlighting its broad impact and huge 
complexity and contributing to the raise of a new area devoted to the study of brain computations 
implicated on valued decisions. Making decisions based on the probability of future events is 
routine in everyday life; it occurs whenever individuals select an option from several alternatives, 
each one associated with a specific value. To manage its limited resources, living organisms have 
to make critical decisions that have survival value, which means that being a good decider has 
selective and evolutionary impact. Conversely, impaired/poor decision making can have 
catastrophic impact and constitutes an important feature of several neuropsychiatric disorders, 
such as schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, substance abuse disorders, obsessive compulsive 
disorder and pathological gambling. 
Most times individuals have to decide knowing the precise outcomes of each option, but 
sometimes they have to bet unknowing the consequences of it. ‘Uncertainty’ refers to lack of 
knowledge of what outcome will follow a specific choice. Uncertain events can be categorized by 
the confidence in the probability assignment of each outcome: ‘ambiguity’ refers to situations 
when the outcomes cannot be specified and the variance of its occurrence is completely 
unknown and ‘risk’ refers to situations when the distribution (or probability) of each possible 
outcome is (at least partially) known. Interestingly, it is believed that ambiguity and risk 
processing are supported by distinct neural mechanisms, involving different brain regions 
(Huettel et al, 2006); whether value and probability shared common neuronal 
circuits/mechanisms is still an open question. 
For comprehensive purposes, the process of decision making can be divided into five steps: first, 
the representation of present situation (or state); second, the assessment and valuation of 
available options culminating in formation of preference; third, the selection and execution of an 
action; fourth, the outcome evaluation and processing; and fifth, the learning phase, when a new 
value is reassigned to each option according to the experience of completed action-outcome 
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sequence. These steps are not rigid, as they often intermingle; however, they are highly 
integrated and, as a consequence, impairments in one can lead to a several disruption of 
decision making processes and promote maladaptive behaviors (Rangel, 2008). 
 
1.2. A Computational Model of Decision-Making 
In the next lines we summarize the critical steps to get to a decision (Figure 1). It should be 
highlighted that in many occasions some of these steps are not sequential, nor even mandatory. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of decision-making processes (adapted from Rangel, 2008). 
Firstly individuals had a mental representation of each option available that is subsequently valuated 
concerning amount (a), delay (d) and probability (p). After action selection and execution, individuals 
can evaluate the outcome obtained which encompasses somewhat learning that can influence 
internal representations and further decisions. 
 
Representation. When it is necessary to make a decision, individuals have to compose a 
mental imagery about the present and forthcoming situation, considering inner and outer states. 
Perception of condition and its variables are critical for subsequent steps and, thus, an erroneous 
perception can profoundly affect the decision-making process. Such impairments can result from 
mere sensory deficits or from more complex deficits as a result of poor processing of sensory 
inputs in the brain. 
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Valuation of Options. The formation of values is a critical step for decisions and involves 
cognitive and emotional processes that culminate with the assignment of a subjective value to 
each option. In general, the expected value (v) of an outcome is given by a function of reward 
amount (a), delay (d) and probability (p) (Doya, 2008). However, valuation has strong modulators 
such as type of uncertainity, cost and effort involved and social modulators that turn the process 
excessively complex to be translated into a simple equation. Additionally, human and animal 
behavioral observations lead to the establishment of three distinct valuating systems: a goal-
directed learning system that associates an action to a specific outcome; a habit-based system 
that assign values to repeated actions; and a stimulus-triggered conditioning system (pavlovian) 
that associates stimulus to specific responses (Rangel, 2008). 
Action Selection and Execution. During this phase, subjects select the most valuable option 
according to previously valuation of different possible outcomes, initiating, performing and 
completing an action. This step is highly modulated by motivation and arousal and is the phase 
implied in behavioral disruptions such as impulsive disorders or motivational deficits. 
Outcome Evaluation. Subjective evaluation of action outcome is performed and somatic states 
induced by outcomes are coded. Values are attributed to outcome experiences. 
Learning. Previous expected value is replaced by actual value and individuals learn to assign 
the more accurate value to actions, influencing future experiences. Neuronal networks, 
particularly the ones implicated in these steps, compute the difference between expected and 
actual value, that is, the degree of surprise that outcome elicited, which is called predictive error. 
 
1.2.1. Variables influencing decision-making 
The relevance of the different steps described above is influenced by several variables that 
include risk and uncertainty, cost and effort, motivation and social modulators. 
Risk and uncertainty. In order to make good decisions, the decision-making systems have to 
estimate likelihood and value of different reward assigned to each option. As virtually all events 
involve some degree of uncertainty, comprehension of probabilistic computations is critical to 
understand the risk-based decision making. 
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Regarding uncertain events, Blaise Pascal proposed the notion of ‘expected value’, which account 
a combination of value (v) and probability (p) of different outcomes (v x p). According with this 
notion, if a decision is adaptive, subjects select the option that has the greater relationship 
between value and probability. If one has to decide between an option A that gives 100€ with 
100% probability and an option B that rewards 300€ with 50% probability, according with Pascal 
principles, the subject would choose option B because it has higher expected value. However, if 
the gambler is a hungry homeless, choosing the option that surely warrants money to buy food 
would be the most appropriate option. Based on observations like that, Daniel Bernoulli 
recognized that choice depends on personal needs and feelings, which encompasses the 
subjective value, or utility, of goods (u) and introduced the notion of ‘expected utility’ (u x p) 
(Bernoulli, 1738). A behavior that deviates from simple linear evolution of this equation can be 
regarded as ´risk-averse’ or ‘risk-prone’ behavior. Interestingly, in real life situations, our 
behavior often deviates from this model whether when we buy insurance or when we play lottery 
(in both situations, at the long-term, probability of obtain any gain is really low). 
Additionally, the expected utility models are useful as a framework to understand decision under 
uncertainty but are subjected to frequent violations across a wide range of common situations 
(Platt and Huettel, 2008). Uncertainty is the main factor that accounts to that, not only because 
the probability of outcomes is commonly unknown in real life, but also due to limitations in 
human’s capacity of estimate probabilities. These limitations are easily recognized in pathological 
gamblers and included overvalue winning outcomes and undervalue loosing outcomes, 
overrepresentation of rare events, overgeneralization based on sparse data and superstitiously 
believe on controlling game outcomes. 
Cost and effort. Motivational theories often focus on the influence of incentive value of the goal 
or outcome and strength of reinforcement to explain behavior. However, making good decisions 
implicates estimate not only the value and the likelihood of each reward but also the costs and 
efforts implied in its obtaining. This valuation integrates the hedonic properties of a stimulus 
(“liking”), characteristics that remain constant besides changes in motivation or devaluation 
procedures, and the disposition to overcome costs in order to obtain a goal (“wanting”) 
(Kurniawan et al, 2011). Animals (including humans) experience effort as a burden and tend to 
avoid effortful actions when reward magnitude is kept constant (Kool et al, 2010). Furthermore, 
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to reach a desired goal, animals are ready to expend efforts which encompass an accurate 
integration of costs and benefits of each action.  
Despite it has been observed that rodents use a constant ratio to decide between two options 
with different variable amounts of effort and rewards (van den Bos et al, 2006), human studies 
have shown that probabilities are not always weighted by an absolute numerical value; in fact, 
they are rather weighted relatively to a reference point  (Camerer et al, 2008). Additionally, 
animals are able to recognize changes in punishment and risks involved and there is correlational 
evidence suggesting that rats with a preference for large, risky reward in decision-making tasks 
also demonstrate preference for the large reward in the probability-discounting task (Simon et al, 
2009). 
Time-discount. Another relevant factor for decisions that had been extensively studied over 
recent years is the delay to get the outcome. Along with risk and effort, individuals usually include 
time lag to get the reward in the decision algorithm. In our daily life, there are many situations in 
which it is required a long delay to obtain the best outcome but, sometimes, we prefer get less 
immediately than wait for more. Preference for small rewards delivered immediately over larger 
rewards delivered after a delay is commonly known as delay discounting. Interestingly, this 
pattern of behavior is explored commercially with increased frequency. Higher rates of delay 
discounting resulting in a pattern of impulsive choice and are associated with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Barkley et al., 2001), addictive disorders (Kirby and Petry, 2004) 
and pathological gambling (Madden et al., 2009), disorders in which the ability to delay 
gratification is significantly impaired. 
Social factors. Decisions are commonly made into social contexts and are frequently subjected 
to judgment by others; this is, namely in humans, an important modulator of decision-making 
behaviors. When deciding, individual desires and social expectations are carefully balanced, but 
the specific inputs and the relative value of social factors to the valuation network remain 
unknown. Some studies focused on game theory explored neurobiological correlates of reciprocal 
exchange, altruism and mutual cooperation which contribute to identify aberrant neural 
substrates underlying social abnormalities associated with some psychiatric disorders such as 
antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder and schizophrenia (for review see 
Rilling et al., 2008). 
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1.3. Neuronal networks implicated in decision-making 
Decision-making processes are mediated by parallel circuits linking cerebral cortex and the basal 
ganglia, which encode three distinct (and, somehow, conflicting) valuating systems: goal-directed, 
habit-based and pavlovian/conditioning systems. 
Goal-directed system involves a lot of top-down processing of numerical and abstract concepts 
which encompasses consistency of choices, being modulated by variables related to cognition, 
attention and expertise. The medial pre-frontal cortex (mPFC), in particular the prelimbic region, 
and the dorsomedial striatum (caudate in humans) are key components of the associative 
network, the neural corticostriatal circuit regulating goal-directed choice (Balleine and O’Doherty, 
2010). The dorsomedial striatum is central in this circuit, receiving inputs directly from 
association cortices, and projecting to areas known to participate in motor control, such as 
substancia nigra reticulata and mediodorsal thalamus. Other areas such as basolateral amygdala 
(BLA) and ventral tegmental area (VTA) were also found to influence this circuit. Importantly, the 
dorsomedial striatum is crucial either to learning and expressing goal-directed behaviors (Yin et al 
2005), but also for the valuating system (Balleine, 2005). Interestingly, learning of goal-directed 
behaviors encompasses the assignment of predicted values for each possible outcome, a 
process dependent on integrity of prelimbic cortex which does not appear to be crucial to goal-
directed action (Ostlund and Balleine, 2005). Prelimbic cortex was found to be one target of 
dopaminergic signal arising from VTA which encompasses the adaptation to reward 
contingencies in goal-directed learning (Naneix et al., 2009). Consequently, prelimbic cortex is 
crucial to the updating of the value when outcome changes, a specific feature of goal-directed 
behavior. 
Additionally, other cortical and subcortical areas also play a role in goal-directed decision-making. 
Amongst these are the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) - including areas of mPFC and 
medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) – that encodes the expected future reward attributable to 
chosen action (Gläscher et al, 2009) associated with action-outcome but not stimulus-response 
decision (Valentin et al, 2007). The anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) is another area involved in 
goal-directed decision by monitoring conflicts related to actions and balancing costs and benefits 
associated with different options. Its activation increases as a function of cognitive control 
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demanded by the task (Brown and Braver, 2005). In contrast, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) was 
found critically involved in goal-directed behaviors by holding on information on relationships 
between environmental patterns and somatic states induced by those patterns. Interacting 
reciprocally with the OFC, the BLA plays an important role on forming representations linking 
cues to outcome expectancies (Pickens et al, 2003) and promoting the assignment of incentive 
value to predicted outcome (Balleine et al, 2003), a function that seems to be mediated by local 
opioid receptors (Wassum et al, 2009). Interestingly, OFC seems to be essential to keep these 
representations updated and stored in memory (Pickens et al, 2003). Additionally, the BLA, by its 
known connections with hypothalamus, seems to be responsible for processing affective and 
motivational properties of outcomes. The BLA influences corticostriatal circuit through its direct 
projections to prelimbic cortex, dorsomedial striatum and dorsomedial thalamus and its indirect 
projections to ventral striatum via insular cortex. Moreover, the ventral striatum, namely the core 
part of nucleus accumbens, had been found crucial for instrumental performance, participating 
in translating motivation into actions (for revision see Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010). 
With intensive training and repetition, control of actions can be transferred to the Habit-based 
system. Habitual actions, involve an ordered, structured action sequence that can be quickly 
elicited by particular rewards (Graybiel, 2008), and can be neutral, desirable or undesirable. The 
sensorimotor network, a circuit that includes sensorimotor cortex and the dorsolateral striatum 
(putamen in humans) as key components, was found to be implicated in habit formation. It is 
known that the habitual stimulus-response learning is modulated by dopaminergic projections 
from substancia nigra and VTA into dorsolateral striatum, encoding the assignment of a specific 
value for each action and promoting the acquisition of a response to conditioning stimulus by 
striatal neurons (Aosaki et al, 1994). Furthermore, the mPFC was found to be of relevance for 
coordinating shifts between goal-directed actions and habits (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). This 
observations support the hypothesis of dynamic hierarchical interplay between goal-directed 
(associative) and habit based (sensoriomotor) networks and as well with pavlovian learning 
(limbic) circuit (for revision see Yin and Knowlton, 2006). 
In Pavlovian conditioning system, individuals learn to associate a particular cue/stimulus 
with a reward. This is an innate passive learning procedure, associated with a limited number of 
behaviors that include automatic behaviors such as preparing for eat when approaching a table 
with food or consummating the approach to the reward magazine when outcome is delivered in a 
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decision-making apparatus (Rangel et al, 2008). Neural basis of Pavlovian system includes 
responses to stimuli with specific spatial organization in dorsal periaqueductal grey (Keay et al, 
2001) and is encoded in a neural network involving OFC, ventral striatum and BLA (Gottfriend et 
al., 2003; Ostlund and Balleine, 2007). As stated before, the OFC stores information on the 
relationships between environmental cues and somatic states induced by those; thus, it is crucial 
not only to action-outcome learning but also stimulus-response conditioning. Interestingly, lateral 
and central parts of OFC, receiving inputs from sensory areas, are involved in pavlovian valuing 
while medial parts participate in associative learning networks. 
 
1.3.1. Neural networks implicated in risk and ambiguity 
Humans are intrinsically averse to risk and, even more, to ambiguity. Even when risky options 
have a positive expected value, subjects preferred to take it safer, avoiding risky options (Platt 
and Huettell, 2008). Therefore, whenever decisions are preferably risky, this is likely to be viewed 
as inappropriate. Several studies have tried to understand how this mis-processment occurred at 
the neurobiological mechanisms. Previous studies have highlighted the role of distinct brain 
regions in these biased events. As examples, individuals with decision-making impairments that 
lead to increased risk displayed high insular activation when compared with controls, which is 
consistent with increased insular activation seen when healthy individuals choose higher-risk 
outcomes (Paulus et al, 2003). Moreover, there is an increased insular activation with higher risk 
outcomes, which might contribute to natural risk-aversive pattern of choice by its putative role in 
representing somatic states related with potential negative consequences of risk and losses 
(Paulus et al., 2003; Damasio 1996). Using also neuroimaging tools, a recent work examined the 
effects of different types of uncertainty on neural processes of decision-making; when compared 
with risk, ambiguous conditions produced higher activation on OFC, amygdala and dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex, while the dorsal striatum (caudate nucleus) and precunneus cortex were less 
activated during risk condition (Hsu et al, 2005). 
Another point of interest is the internal assessment of gains and losses during outcome 
evaluation. Usually, losses are valued about twice as large as equal-sized gains, which reflect a 
natural pattern of aversion to loss. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, Tom 
and colleagues (2007) observed that gains and losses promote changes in similar regions, 
11 
 
including striatum, ventral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex, with putative gains 
enhancing activation and putative losses decreasing activation. However, decreased activity 
induced by losses on striatum and vmPFC was greater than increased activity induced by similar 
gains in such regions of interest. Additionally, the same study found an interesting correlation 
between behavioral and neural loss aversion in several regions such as ventral striatum and 
vmPFC. Interestingly, the valuation of efforts and delays seems to be processed in distinct brain 
circuits. The anterior cingulate cortex (Walton et al, 2003) and ventral striatum (Salamone et al, 
1994) may be involved in choices encompassing barriers as effort, whereas ventral striatum is 
involved in choices involving delays as effort (Cardinal et al, 2001). Likewise, other functional 
imaging studies identified several regions of interest for delay discounting; in fact, while the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal premotor cortex, parietal cortex and insula were found 
activated when high time-delay were expected (Tanaka, 2004; Tanaka, 2006), the ventral 
striatum, medial OFC, ACC and posterior cingulate cortex were found activated in situations 
related with immediate delivery of outcomes (McClure, 2004, 2007). 
 
1.4. The role of dopamine in risky-based decision-making  
There are certainly several neurotransmitters implicated in the process of decision-making. Yet, 
here we will focus on the role of dopamine, due to its critical relevance in the process of decision-
making, particularly when risk is involved. It is important to highlight, though, that other 
neurotransmitters, namely other cathecolamines such as serotonin and norepinephrin, are also 
known to be determinant in these processes (for review, see Rogers, 2011). 
Dopamine exerts a myriad of functions along mesolimbic, striatal and cortical pathways, playing a 
critical role in decision-making processes. The specificity of its contribution to decision making 
have been extensively studied nowadays. Dopamine signalling within the mesolimbic system is 
initially triggered by the receipt of reward but, after associative learning, it will be initiated by the 
cue that predicts the reward (Schulz 1997). Redgrave et al. (1999) proposed that dopamine 
signalizes stimulus salience, which includes the novelty and unpredictability of events, but recent 
theories highlight dopamine role in predicting rewards in Pavlovian, habit-based and goal-directed 
learning, updating the value of different options available (Costa et al., 2007). Interestingly, it has 
been found that phasic activity of dopaminergic along midbrain neurons is increased by delivery 
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of unexpected rewards (positive prediction errors) and decreased by omissions of expected 
outcomes (negative prediction errors) (Schulz, 2007), encoding discrepancies between received 
and predicted rewards. 
Direct evidence of the role of dopaminergic agents on estimation of prediction errors on 
instrumental learning was provided by Pessiglione et al (2006). In this study, differential 
contribution of dopaminergic agonists (L-Dopa) and antagonists (haloperidol) was probed using a 
task involving both monetary gains and losses. Young healthy individuals treated with L-Dopa 
earned more money than ones treated with haloperidol and, importantly, this was related with 
the enhanced magnitude of positive and negative prediction errors among ventral striatum and 
putamen. Similar observations were provided by Menon et al (2007) measuring participants’ 
prediction errors as BOLD responses within ventral striatum during an aversive conditioning 
procedure. As expected, BOLD activity was enhanced by amphetamine and abolished by 
haloperidol treatment. Dopamine is also proposed to mediate specific features of motivated 
behavior such as vigor control and effort, playing a role in overcoming “costs” of each choice (for 
review, see Kurniawan 2011). Experiments conducted by Salamone and colleagues (1994) 
clearly shown the role of dopamine in maintaining instrumental responses that require physical 
efforts (such as climbing a barrier), but not in keeping reward preference. Aside from a role in 
motivated behavior and prediction errors, dopamine is also required to flexibly initiate goal-
directed behaviors. In a recent paper, Nicola (2010) shown that ability of rats in which dopamine 
was depleted in the nucleus accumbens to reinitiate an instrumental task is dependent on 
duration of inter-trial interval; in other words, dopamine depleted animals can keep an 
instrumental task but is unable to flexibly reinitiate it if engaged in another behaviors. 
Altogether these results raised the question about which dopamine receptors sub-types might 
mediate these effects. Frank et al. (2004) proposed a model of action control by dopamine 
centered on basal ganglia, a set of subcortical nuclei comprising dorsal (putamen and caudate 
nucleus) and ventral striatum (synonymous with nucleus accumbens), globus pallidus, 
substancia nigra and subthalamic nucleus. Basal ganglia integrate a complex network, receiving 
information in input nuclei (striatum) from all cortical areas, especially the frontal cortex, and 
projecting to the thalamus, mainly via internal segment of globus pallidus and substancia nigra 
pars reticulata. These networks work with parallel loops and are known to play a critical role in 
almost all cognitive and motor functions. Information received in striatum is transmitted by two 
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different pathways: a direct pathway, that expresses dopamine receptors type 1 (D1) and 
promotes cell activity and long-term potentiation (LTP), facilitating the execution of responses 
identified in cortex (‘Go Signals’); and an indirect pathway, that expresses dopamine receptors 
type 2 (D2) and promotes cell inhibition and long-term depression (LTD), suppressing responses 
(‘No-Go Signals’). Thus, increased dopaminergic activity promoted by positive reinforcers 
facilitates response mediated by D1 receptors on direct pathway and inhibits activity within 
indirect pathway (by D2 receptors), whereas decrease in dopamine activity promotes the 
opposite pattern of responses. This theory was supported by observations showing that 
dopamine depleted non-treated Parkinson patients exhibit impairments on learning from positive 
outcomes, but enhanced learning from negative reinforcers (Frank et al., 2004). Additionally, 
treatment with small doses of pramipexole, a D2/D3 receptor agonist, impaired the acquisition of 
a biased response toward the most rewarded choice (Pizzagalli et al., 2008), which emphasizes 
the relevance of D2 receptors in learning from decision outcomes (for review, see Rogers 2011). 
Interestingly, healthy volunteers treated with pramipexole make riskier choices following high wins 
than ones taking placebo which can be related with a lower activation of ventral striatum after 
unexpected high wins in those individuals (Riba et al., 2008). Analogous hypoactivation of reward 
system is observed in pathological gamblers not suffering from neurological disorders (Reuter et 
al, 2005; Riba et al, 2008). . 
Aside its relevance on striatum, dopamine also plays a critical role in PFC, by monitoring changes 
in reward probability and, consequently, in adjusting behaviors. While PFC D1 signaling seems to 
stabilize the representation of relative long-term value of the risky option, PFC D2 receptors may 
facilitate and update modifications in value representations (Onge et al, 2011). Indeed, the role of 
D1 signaling has been associated to the ability to overcome costs that may be associated with 
larger rewards (keep “eye on the prize”) and, thus, maximize long-term gains. D2 receptors play 
a crucial role in the ability of animals to inhibit a pre-potent learned response, whereas the 
dopamine receptors type 3 (D3) are more likely involved in the modulation of the learning 
process during changing reward contingencies (Boulougouris et al, 2009).  Importantly, 
stimulation of D1 or D2 receptors increased risk choice, whereas activation of D3 reduced risk 
choice (Onge et al, 2009). Interestingly, however, in another work using a rat gambling task 
similar to human Iowa Gambling Task, no changes were induced by acute administration of 
quinpirole or SKF 81297 (dopamine agonists) (Zeeb et al, 2009). These contrasting observations 
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highlight the differences between decision-making processes based solely on differences in 
reward probability and those incorporating more complex punishment signals. 
In addition to dopamine other neurotransmitters seems to be involved in the decision-making 
processes. One example is serotonin that although during decades had been conceptualized as 
working in an apparent antagonism with dopamine, recent data pointed out that these 
neurotransmitters often work synergistically in decision-making systems (Aronson et al., 1995). 
Nakamura and colleagues (2008) proposed that tonic activity of serotoninergic neurons of dorsal 
raphe nucleus code magnitude of rewards while, as stated before, dopaminergic activity encodes 
differences between predicted and received outcomes. There is also a general agreement of the 
involvement of serotonin in time-dependent decisions and participation on coding reward value 
across different time delays (Winstaley et al., 2006). Aside from a role in the integration of time 
value, serotonin is also proposed to mediate critical aspects of risky decisions, namely in loss 
aversion (Long et al. 2009; Murphy et al., 2009). Finally, several studies demonstrate the 
relevance of serotoninergic system in affective modulation of motivated behaviors (Hollander and 
Rosen, 2000; Crockett et al., 2008), facilitation of reward processing by dopamine (Nakamura et 
al., 2008) and influencing cooperative responding and mutual cooperation (Wood et al., 2006). 
In addition, also norepinephrine has been generally neglected on decision-making processes. 
However, some observations ruled out relevant functions for a possible role for adrenergic system 
on decision-making. It has been proposed that phasic noradrenergic activity within locus 
coeruleus might mediate outcome coding, exploratory choices and behavioral flexibility, crucial 
abilities to update learning processes in changing conditions (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; 
Dayan and Yu, 2006; Yu and Dayan, 2005). Norepinephrine is also proposed to mediate learning 
and enhance memory under stress (Kerfoot et al., 2008) as well as the somatic feedback that 
can influence high brain cognitive and executive processes, proposed by Damasio (1996) in the 
Somatic Markers Hypothesis. 
 
1.5. Maladaptive Choice Behavior as a Model for Neuropsychiatric Disorders 
Impairments in decision making processes can have deleterious consequences for the personal 
and social well-being. Of notice, they can be recognized in patients affected by prevalent 
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neuropsychiatric disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorders, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, schizophrenia, substance abuse, depression, anxiety disorders, pathological gambling 
or Parkinson’s disease. 
Stress exposure is known to influence emotional and cognitive processes, which are crucial 
determinants of decision making processes. Exposure to stress elicits neuroendocrine and 
autonomic adaptive responses that promote coping strategies when dealing with acute 
conditions. However, when the stressors are extreme or prolonged these responses may have 
deleterious consequences, affecting the behavior and triggering neuropsychiatric disorders, such 
as anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression or dementias (McEwen, 2004). 
The stress-induced behavioral impairments arise as a consequence of alterations in the brain 
structure, including the PFC, the hippocampus, the amygdala, the nucleus accumbens and the 
OFC (Sousa et al., 1998; Kim and Diamond, 2002; Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Bessa et al., 
2009). Preclinical studies from our group started to unravel the mechanisms through which 
stress can alter instrumental behavior (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009), biasing choices from a goal 
directed to a habit-based pattern. Additionally, recent studies have focused on effects of acute 
stress on decision making (Table 1), presenting contradictory data (Porcelli et al., 2010; Koot et 
al., 2013; Pabst et al., 2013; Reynolds et al., 2013) about risk-based decision. 
 
Table 1. Recent studies on stress and decision-making. 
Original 
References 
Animal Age Task(s) Reward 
(Punishment) 
Type of 
Stressor 
Duration 
of Stress 
Behavioral 
effect of 
stress 
Dias 
Ferreira et 
al., 2009 
Rat Adult Outcome 
devaluation 
and 
Contingency 
degradation 
Sucrose pellets 
and Sucrose 
solution 
Chronic 
unpredictable 
stress 
Chronic 
(28 days) 
Habit-based 
behavior 
Porcelli et 
al., 2010 
Human Adult Card guessing 
task 
Money Cold pressure 
task 
Acute (2 
min.) 
No effects 
Koot et al., 
2013 
Rat Adult Rat gambling 
task 
Sucrose pellets 
(Quinine 
pellets) 
Corticosterone 
injection 
Acute 
(3 days) 
More risky, 
less 
advantageo
us choices 
Pabst et 
al., 2013 
Human Adult Game of Dice 
Task 
Money Trier Social 
Stress Test 
(TSST) 
Acute 
(18 min.) 
Less risky 
(5 and 18 
min); More 
risky 
(28 min 
after) 
Reynolds et 
al., 2013 
Human Adole
scent 
Balloon 
Analogue Risk 
Task 
Money Trier Social 
Stress Test 
(TSST) 
Acute 
(18 min.) 
More risky 
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Despite these findings, relatively little is known about the effect of chronic stress on the decision-
making processes that involve risk. Furthermore, knowledge about the behavioral changes 
induced by stress and the neuronal mechanisms underlying those patterns could be of interest 
since individuals often have to take relevant decisions under high levels of stress. 
 
1.6. Aims  
The central question addressed in this thesis is whether decision-making processes are affected 
as a result of exposure to chronic stress, either analyzing animals’ models of chronic 
unpredictable stress or using psychiatric disorders related with stress. Specifically, the 
experimental work undertaken aimed at:  
1. Analyzing the influence of exposure to chronic unpredictable stress (CUS) on pavlovian to 
instrumental transferring (Chapter 2.1); 
2. Characterizing the behavioral, neurochemical and structural effects of stress exposure in 
decision making processes using an animal model of risk-based decision (Chapter 2.2); 
3. Studying whether treatment with dopaminergic agents contributes to reversion of behavioral 
changes induced by chronic stress on risk-based decisions (Chapter 2.2); 
4. Analyzing stress response in patients suffering by Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
(Chapter 2.3); 
5. Characterizing neural mechanisms of decision-making in OCD patients using a fMRI paradigm 
of risk-based decision-making (Chapter 2.4). 
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Stress has a strong impact in the brain, impairing decision-making processes as a result of
changes in circuits involving the prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortices and the striatum. Given
that these same circuits are key for action control and outcome encoding, we hypothesized
that adaptive responses to which these are essential functions, could also be targeted
by stress. To test this hypothesis we herein assessed the impact of chronic stress in a
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) paradigm, a model of an adaptive response in which
a previously conditioned cue biases an instrumental goal-directed action. Data reveals that
rats submitted to chronic unpredictable stress did not display deficits in pavlovian condition-
ing nor on the learning of the instrumental task, but were impaired in PIT; importantly, after
a stress-free period the PIT deficits were no longer observed.These results are relevant to
understand how stress biases multiple incentive processes that contribute to instrumental
performance.
Keywords: stress, conditioning, pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, choices
INTRODUCTION
Exposure to a stressful stimulus activates a physiological response
intended to restore the organism’s homeostasis. However, when
stressors are maintained for long periods of time, this response
becomes maladaptive and results in several disruptions at the level
of the regulatory systems, of which the brain is a key element.
Thus, it is not surprising that chronic stress exposure is associated
with significant behavioral impairments such as deficits in spatial
reference and working memory (Mizoguchi et al., 2000; Cerqueira
et al., 2007), behavioral flexibility (Cerqueira et al., 2007), anxiety
(Pêgo et al., 2006), and mood (Bessa et al., 2009). Such func-
tional deficits are paralleled by structural changes in several brain
regions (Sousa and Almeida, 2002), that render chronic stress as an
important risk-factor for the development of several neuropsychi-
atric disorders. Importantly, several studies have also shown that
the behavioral and structural effects of stress are transient, and
important plastic phenomena take place after the removal of the
stressful stimuli (Sousa et al., 2000; Bloss et al., 2010).
Recent studies from our laboratory show that chronic stress
bias decision-making processes, by favoring the shift from goal-
directed actions to habit based behaviors (Dias-Ferreira et al.,
2009). These alterations in instrumental behavior are correlated
with changes in neuronal circuits involving different areas of the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) [including the medial PFC (mPFC) and
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)] and dorsal striatum (Dias-Ferreira
et al., 2009). Given that these regions are implicated in action
control (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010) and outcome encoding
necessary for adaptive responses (Chudasama and Robbins, 2003;
Hornak et al., 2004), we hypothesized that stress-induced changes
in neuronal circuits involving the PFC and the striatum could
lead to outcome encoding deficits and to changes in the multiple
incentive processes that contribute to instrumental performance.
One of these processes is Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer
(PIT; Estes, 1948; Colwill and Rescorla, 1986). PIT encompasses
three distinct components:(1) Pavlovian learning, in which stim-
uli are associated with rewards; (2) instrumental conditioning, in
which associations between actions and out comes are learned;
and (3) a test phase, in which the impact of previous cues on
instrumental response is assessed. The associative value of cue
and its motivational significance are determinants found crucial
to proper transfer, a phenomenon which resembles cue-mediated
increased drive seeking for drugs seen in drug abusers (Dickinson
et al., 2000; Corbit and Janak, 2007). Because of that, PIT has been
used as a useful model of maladaptive learning observed in several
conditions, namely addictive disorders.
The neural basis of PIT is not completely established but sev-
eral studies implicate regions associated with emotional processing
[amygdala and nucleus accumbens (NAc)], executive commands
(dorsal striatum), and their integration (mPFC and OFC); impor-
tantly, it is known that key regions involved in PIT operate in
parallel. In fact, lesion studies in the amygdala and NAc have
demonstrated that these brain regions are necessary for the behav-
ioral expression of PIT (Corbit et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2001; de
Borchgrave et al., 2002; Holland and Gallagher, 2004). Moreover,
it is relevant to note that different regions of the amygdala and NAc
display different roles in this process. While the amygdala baso-
lateral nucleus (BLA) mediates the association between specific
sensory and emotional features of stimulus and the responses that
are elicited by each one (consummatory conditioning), the central
nucleus (CN) mediates the association between cues and affective
properties of stimuli (preparatory conditioning; Killcross et al.,
1997; Balleine and Killcross, 2006). In what concerns the NAc, the
core mediates the general excitatory effects of reward-related cues,
whereas the shell mediates the effect of outcome-specific reward
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predictions on instrumental performance (Corbit and Balleine,
2011). In addition, these regions are known to regulate the activity
of cortical sites integrating affective stimuli with executive com-
mands, such as the mPFC and the OFC (Christakou et al., 2004;
Kelley, 2004; Pasupathy and Miller, 2005; Saddoris et al., 2005;
Stalnaker et al., 2007).
Surprisingly, given the fact that stress influences many of the
above mentioned areas involved in PIT, the impact of stress in
PIT is largely unknown. Indeed, while acute stress was shown
to enhance Pavlovian learning (Shors et al., 2000) and chronic
stress failed to influence instrumental learning (Dias-Ferreira et al.,
2009), no study addressed the effect of either acute or chronic stress
on the interaction between these two key processes and thus on
the impact of conditioned clues in goal-directed behavior. Thus,
in the present study, we tested the impact of chronic stress in the
modulation of instrumental behavior according to cues previously
associated with rewards by studying the behavior of control and
stressed rats in a PIT paradigm using a two-lever operant chamber.
Moreover, to assess whether the impairments are reversible after
chronic exposure to stress, PIT was also assessed after a period free
of exposure to stressful stimuli.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
ANIMALS
All experiments were conducted in accordance with local reg-
ulations (European Union Directive 86/609/EEC) and National
Institutes of Health guidelines on animal care and experimentation
and approved by Direção Geral Veterinária (DGV; the Portuguese
National Institute of Veterinary).
Thirty-two adult male Wistar rats (Charles River Laborato-
ries, Barcelona, Spain; 250–300 g at the start of the experiment),
aged 3 months and weighing 400–500 g, were housed in groups of
two under standard laboratory conditions with an artificial light-
dark cycle of 12:12 h (lights on from 8:00 a.m. to 8.00 p.m.) in a
temperature- and humidity-controlled room. Animals were given
2 weeks to acclimate to the housing conditions with ad libitum
access to food and water. A food deprivation regimen was initiated
24 h before the initiation of training and testing to maintain the
subjects at approximately 90% of their free-feeding body weight.
Rats had free access to water while in the home cage.
CHRONIC UNPREDICTABLE STRESS PARADIGM
Animals assigned to the chronic unpredictable stress (CUS) group
were exposed during 60 min once a day to one of five different
stressors: cold water (18˚C), vibration, restraint, overcrowding,
and exposure to a hot air stream. Stressors were randomly dis-
tributed throughout a 28-day period. This type of chronic stress
paradigm, mixing different stressors (including physical and psy-
chological components) presented in an unpredictable schedule,
was shown previously to result in persistently elevated plasma lev-
els of corticosterone (for details, see Sousa et al., 1998) and is
thought to better mimic the variability of stressors encountered in
daily life (Sousa et al., 1998). Controls were handled daily during
the same period.
To assess the impact of chronic stress exposure in Pavlovian-
instrumental transfer but also ascertain its reversibility, a first
group of animals (eight stressed and eight controls) were behav-
iorally characterized immediately after stress while a similar group
(eight stressed and eight controls) was left to recover for 6 weeks
before being tested. This recovery period was set-up in light of
previous studies showing that, at least, 4 weeks are necessary to
complete reversion of behavioral and structural changes induced
by CUS treatment (Sousa et al., 2000). Importantly, animals were
randomly allocated to each of the four groups before the beginning
of stress exposure.
PAVLOVIAN-INSTRUMENTAL TRANSFER
Behavior was assessed using the Pavlovian-instrumental transfer
protocol as described by Ostlund and Balleine (2007). This task
took place in operant chambers (30.5 cm L× 24.1 cm W× 21.0 cm
H, MedAssociates, CA, USA) housed within sound attenuating
cubicles. Each chamber was equipped with two retractable levers
on either side of the food magazine and a house light (3W, 24V)
mounted on the opposite side of the chamber. Reinforcers were
delivered into the magazine through a pellet dispenser that deliv-
ered 45 mg regular “chow” pellets or a liquid dipper that delivered
0.1 ml of 20% sucrose solution. A computer equipped with MED-
PC IV software controlled the equipment and recorded lever
presses and head entries. As described previously, animals were
placed in a food deprivation schedule, having access to food dur-
ing 1 h per day after the training or testing session, allowing them
to maintain a body weight above 90% of their baseline weight.
Water was removed for 2 h before each daily session.
Training began with eight daily sessions of Pavlovian condi-
tioning in which each of two auditory conditioned stimuli (tone
and white noise) were paired with a different outcome (pellets
and sucrose). Each CS was presented four times per session using
a pseudo-randomized order and a variable ITI (mean 5 min). In
the ninth day, animals were submitted to an outcome devaluation
to ensure they were able to associate each outcome to the condi-
tioned stimulus; this was assessed by comparing the number of
head entries into the food dispenser during stimuli presentation
and during ITI.
Animals were then trained to obtain two different outcomes
(pellets and sucrose) by pressing left and right levers. Training was
performed in two separate daily sessions and the order of training
was alternated during days (average interval between the two daily
sessions was 3 h). Each session finished after 15 outcome deliver-
ies or 30 min. In the first 2 days, lever pressing was continuously
reinforced (CRF) which means that each action resulted in one
outcome delivered (p= 1.0). The probability of getting a reward
decreased according the following sequence: days 3–4,p= 0.2; days
5–6, p= 0.1; and days 7–9, p= 0.05.
Two sessions of outcome devaluation (by free access to the
reward until satiety) were then performed, 48 h apart. In order
to do this, one of the two outcomes (pellets or sucrose) was given
ad libitum during 1 h before each session. Then the rats were placed
during 5 min into the testing operant chamber where both levers
were inserted but no outcome was delivered.
Forty-eight hours later, subjects were placed in the operant
chamber to test Pavlovian-instrumental transfer with both levers
inserted. After an initial period of response extinction that lasts
for 8 min, four blocks of each auditory conditioned stimulus were
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presented randomly over the next 40 min and lever presses were
registered. During each stimulus presentation, lever presses where
considered correct if encoded the same reward as the audible
sound. When different, actions were considered incorrect.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Results are expressed as group means± SE. Pavlovian, instrumen-
tal behavior and results of transfer test were compared between
and within groups using two-way ANOVA. Differences were
considered to be significant if p< 0.05.
RESULTS
Pavlovian training resulted in conditioning of animals both in
control and stress groups. Comparison of head entries on CS pre-
sentation and on ITI during Pavlovian training (Figure 1) shows
that all animals associate the stimuli to the outcome[head entries:
F (1,28)= 88.762, p< 0.001] without differences between experi-
mental groups [stress exposure: F (1,28)= 0.163, p= 0.689], thus
implying that CUS does not affect Pavlovian conditioning.
In what regards to instrumental training, the number of lever
presses per minute increased during the task indicating that ani-
mals in both groups can learn it equally well (Figure 2). This is con-
firmed by the results of the outcome devaluation test performed
at the end of instrumental conditioning, in which animals of both
groups [stress exposure: F (1,28)= 1.019, p= 0.321]could correctly
associate each reward to a specific lever[lever: F (1,28)= 25.787,
p< 0.001; Figure 2. These results are in accordance with our pre-
vious data (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009) showing that CUS does not
impair outcome devaluation when performed early during the
period of training.
Subsequently, we assessed the Pavlovian-instrumental trans-
fer. Figure 3 displays the number of lever presses per minute
when the conditioned sound predicted the same outcome as the
response (same) and the number of lever presses per minute
when the conditioned sound predicted a different outcome
(diff). Our results (Figure 3A) show that stress significantly
impairs the transfer [stress exposure: F (1,28)= 5.397, p= 0.028],
preventing exposed animals, contrary to controls, [interaction:
F (1,28)= 7.558, p= 0.010] from associating levers to the corre-
sponding sound cues [lever: F (1,28)= 7.630, p= 0.010].
Importantly, we also assessed whether these stress-induced
effects were sustainable in time after the end of the exposure to
stress and found that these effects of stress were reversible. In
fact, a similar assessment of stressed-recovered animals and con-
trols (Figure 3B) failed to show any difference between groups
[stress-recovery exposure: F (1,28)= 0.976, p= 0.332], with all ani-
mals from both groups [interaction: F (1,28)= 0.178, p= 0.676]
being able to associate conditioned sound and appropriate
responses[matching vs. non-matching lever: F (1,28)= 18.217,
p< 0.001].
DISCUSSION
The present results show for the first time that chronic stress dis-
rupts the modulation of instrumental responses by conditioned
cues and that these stress-induced impairments are transient,
being absent after a 6-weeks recovery period. This is of rele-
vance for decision-making, as it is well established that environ-
mental cues can have a strong modulatory effect upon instru-
mental responses (Estes, 1948), which are the basis of most
decision-making processes.
Chronic stress has a strong modulatory influence (either nega-
tive or positive) on learning processes, including spatial memory
(Sousa et al., 2000), working memory (Mizoguchi et al., 2000;
Cerqueira et al., 2007), and behavioral flexibility (Cerqueira et al.,
2007), but also in decision-making processes by biasing instru-
mental actions to habits (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). In the present
study we show that chronic stress does not affect Pavlovian condi-
tioning nor instrumental learning. Although the effects of chronic
stress upon Pavlovian conditioning have never been reported, the
latter finding is in accordance with a previous report showing that
chronic stress promotes the transfer from goal-directed actions
to habit based behaviors without affecting instrumental learning
per se (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). Indeed, in that study, when tested
on a devaluation paradigm after 8 days of training (similar to the
FIGURE 1 | Pavlovian conditioning.There were no differences between
groups, with all animals increasing the number of head entries during
conditioned stimulus exposure. ITI – intertrial interval between presentations
of conditioned stimuli CS – conditioned stimulus.*p< 0.05.
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FIGURE 2 | Instrumental conditioning. Both experimental groups acquired the lever pressing task and were able to correctly distinguish devalued from valued
levers.*p<0.05.
FIGURE 3 | Stress-induced impairment of
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer is reversible. Stress exposure
resulted in an impairment of the association between Pavlovian and
instrumental behavior (A), which was no longer observed after a
6-week period without exposure to stressful stimuli (B).
Same – conditioned stimulus (sound) predicted the same outcome as
the lever pressed; Diff – conditioned stimulus (sound) predicted a
different outcome as the lever pressed. *p<0.05.
present protocol), stressed animals were still able to effectively sup-
press the devaluated response, which was not the case when the test
was performed later during training (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009).
Since neither Pavlovian conditioning nor instrumental learning
are affected by chronic stress, the most likely explanation for the
herein observed stress-induced impairment of PIT seems to be a
deficit in the transfer between the two networks. The precise neu-
ronal networks implicated in PIT are still being described. As stated
before, several regions that are known to be susceptible to chronic
stress are crucial to PIT. In fact, several studies demonstrate that
the mPFC and OFC encode distinct components of both Pavlov-
ian and instrumental processes (Gallagher et al., 1999; Chudasama
and Robbins, 2003; Ostlund and Balleine, 2007; Homayoun and
Moghaddam, 2008) and a recent study reveals that the OFC and
mPFC orchestrate the integration of Pavlovian and instrumental
processes during PIT (Homayoun and Moghaddam, 2009). This
integration involves distinct operations as mPFC and OFC display
predominantly inhibitory and excitatory phasic responses to the
same events, respectively. Taken into account our previous obser-
vations that stress triggers atrophy in the mPFC and hypertrophy
in the OFC (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009), we suggest the existence
of an imbalance in these inhibitory/excitatory responses and, as
a consequence, a failure in the reinforcement of goal-directed
actions by conditioned stimuli.
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While the excitatory response of lateral OFC neurons may sig-
nify a positive motivational signal associated with the expected
reward (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Schoenbaum et al., 2003),
the inhibitory response of mPFC neurons evokes their pattern
of activity in goal-directed actions (Homayoun and Moghaddam,
2006; Moghaddam and Homayoun, 2008). The fact that there is a
re-emergence of inhibitory pattern in prelimbic mPFC neurons re-
activates its representation of instrumental action under the influ-
ence of the Pavlovian incentives (Homayoun and Moghaddam,
2009). This integration of Pavlovian and instrumental processes,
where cue-evoked incentives recruit instrumental representations,
may provide a mechanism for the prelimbic mPFC, to execute
motivational control over goal-directed behavior; importantly,
this re-activation is likely to be compromised after chronic stress
as the present results demonstrate. Of course, other regions tar-
geted by stress, such as the striatum, could also be implicated
in the stress-induced PIT impairment; in fact, there are stud-
ies demonstrating that the dorsolateral striatum is critical for
the formation of specific stimulus-outcome associations, whereas
the dorsomedial striatum is involved in the formation of spe-
cific response-outcome associations. Disruption of either form of
learning impairs PIT (Corbit and Janak, 2010) and stress is known
to influence the structure and function of both divisions of the
dorsal striatum (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). In the same vein, ven-
tral striatal areas could also play an important role in the observed
impairments as integrity of NAc shell was found to be critical
to the transfer effect (Corbit et al., 2001). In fact, previous stud-
ies of our lab showed that stress reduces the total volume of this
region, impairing its function (Leão et al., 2007). These reported
alterations could underlie impairments we have found.
Additionally, current evidence suggests that BLA is involved
in the formation of stimulus-reward associations by assigning
an affective value to associated rewards (Everitt et al., 1991) and
in the production and direction of instrumental actions (Everitt
and Robbins, 1992). Although BLA lesions completely abolish
both outcome-selective PIT and outcome devaluation, this area
integrates different circuits that connect differently with other rel-
evant brain structures. Anterior BLA connects with OFC and shell
NAc and posterior BLA connects with prelimbic cortex, medial
accumbens core, and key components of instrumental condition-
ing circuitry (Balleine, 2005). Structural stress-induced alterations
described by Vyas et al. (2002) could configure an interesting
possibility to explain our results.
Stress has a strong impact in hippocampal structure and func-
tion, impairing the learning and storage of newly acquired infor-
mation (Sousa et al., 2000). In this regard, the herein observed
PIT deficits could be due to a disruption of these hippocampal
functions, interfering with the consolidation of stimulus-outcome
associations. Alternatively, the stress-induced hippocampal dys-
function could also interfere with the hippocampal role in appet-
itive Pavlovian conditioning (Ito et al., 2005). However, neither of
these hypotheses is supported by the fact that chronic stress did
not impair Pavlovian conditioning.
Importantly, the stress-induced impairment of PIT was no
longer evident after a stress-free period. This reversibility of stress
effects is in accordance with previous studies showing the recov-
ery of other stress-induced deficits, including spatial memory
(Sousa et al., 2000), and behavioral flexibility (Bloss et al., 2010),
after similar stress-free periods. Of note, recovery of these func-
tions is paralleled by synaptic regrowth and reorganization on the
hippocampus and the mPFC, which are also involved in PIT. Alto-
gether, these results highlight the extreme plastic capabilities of
areas involved in PIT and explain why most stress-induced deficits,
including those described in the present paper, are, at least in
part, reversible. A better knowledge of the mechanisms underlying
these events, to be pursued in future studies, is crucial to optimize
therapeutic interventions in altered cue-controlled behaviors, par-
ticularly in those situations in which spontaneous recovery is not
likely.
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Abstract 
Exposure to stress can lead to cognitive and behavioral impairments that can influence the 
decision-making processes. Risk-based decisions require complex processes that are known to 
be mediated by the mesocorticolimbic dopamine (DA) system through brain areas sensible to 
deleterious effects of chronic stress. Using a new behavioral decision-making task, we shown that 
chronic stress bias risk-based decision-making to safer options which could be related with 
hyperactivation of lateral part orbitofrontal and insular cortices. Additionally, chronic stress 
induced morphological changes in orbitofrontal pyramidal neurons, specifically recruited by this 
task, and a hypodopaminergic status with low DA levels and high mRNA levels of dopamine 
receptor type 2 (Drd2). Treatment with D2/D3 agonist quinpirole reverted behavioral 
impairments induced by stress on decision-making. These data suggests that risk-aversion 
induced by stress is mediated by dopaminergic orbitofrontal dysfunction, a link that could support 
new perspectives in the field of neuroeconomics and challenge current therapeutic approaches to 
neuropsychiatric disorders with known several decision-making impairments such as obsessive 
compulsive and related disorders. 
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1. Introduction 
Decision-making processes are complex and influenced by multiple factors, but can be described 
as a basic algorithm consisting of representation, valuation and action selection steps, in which 
computation of the value associated with each potential action is the determinant element 
(Rangel et al., 2008). Research in both animal models and humans has revealed that the 
attribution of value, factoring expectation (the balance between value and effort), predictability 
(the waiting time until an outcome is attained) and uncertainty (the probability of a given 
outcome), is carried by a network comprising the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), as well as subcortical limbic regions, including the dorsal striatum and 
nucleus accumbens (Doya, 2008). In addition, manipulations of the dopamine (DA) system, the 
main neurotransmitter modulating mPFC/OFC activity, have also been shown to impair decision-
making processes (St Onge et al., 2011; Simon et al., 2009; St Onge et al., 2010; Zeeb et al., 
2009), including those involving risk (St Onge et al., 2009). 
Chronic stress exposure triggers plastic changes in the brain, particularly targeting the areas 
involved in valuation and decision-making (Cerqueira et al., 2007, Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, we have shown that prolonged stress alters decisions by promoting the shift from 
goal-directed to habit-based choices (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009) and impairing pavlovian-to-
instrumental transfer (Morgado et al., 2012). Interestingly, while initially chronic stress induced 
hypodopaminergic status has been correlated with prefrontal cortical dysfunction (Mizoguchi et 
al., 2000), there is presently a growing body of evidence suggesting that stress-induced 
dopaminergic dysfunction also interferes with the cognitive processes involved in valuation 
(Rodrigues et al., 2011). However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has addressed the 
impact of chronic stress on decisions involving risk.  
In the present work we investigated the impact of chronic stress exposure on risk-taking behavior 
and explored its neuronal substrate, focusing on changes in the corticostriatal circuits and their 
dopaminergic innervation. In particular, we were interested in exploring the valuation of 
uncertainty, independently of expectation and predictability. To achieve these objectives, we first 
established a new risk-based decision-making paradigm in which rats choose between certain 
(safe) and uncertain (risky) options, with similar overall expectations and predictability, and 
mapped the brain regions it activates; subsequently, we assessed stress-induced changes in task 
performance and correlated them with alterations in structure and dopaminergic content of 
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regions differentially activated between stressed and control animals; finally, we tested whether 
treatment with a DA agonist was able to pharmacologically revert the behavioral changes induced 
by stress. 
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2. Materials and Methods 
Animals 
Sixty adult male Wistar rats (Charles River Laboratories, Barcelona, Spain), aged 2 months and 
weighting 250-300g at the start of the experiment, were housed in groups of two under standard 
laboratory conditions with an artificial light–dark cycle of 12:12 h (lights on from 8:00 A.M. to 
8.00 P.M.) in a temperature- and humidity-controlled room. Animals were given 2 weeks to 
acclimate to the housing conditions with ad libitum access to food and water. A food deprivation 
regimen was initiated twenty-four hours before the initiation of behavioral training and testing to 
maintain the subjects at approximately 90% of their free-feeding body weight. Rats had free 
access to water while in the home cage. 
All experiments were conducted in accordance with local regulations (European Union Directive 
86⁄609⁄EEC) and National Institutes of Health guidelines on animal care and experimentation 
and approved by Direção Geral Veterinária (DGV; the Portuguese National Institute of Veterinary). 
 
Chronic unpredictable stress 
Animals assigned to the stress group were exposed during sixty minutes once a day to one of five 
different stressors: cold water (18°C), vibration, restraint, overcrowding and exposure to a hot air 
stream. Stressors were randomly distributed throughout a 28 day period. This type of chronic 
stress paradigm, mixing different stressors (including physical and psychological components) 
presented in an unpredictable schedule, was shown previously to result in persistently elevated 
plasma levels of corticosterone (for details, see Sousa et al., 1998) and is thought to better 
mimic the variability of stressors encountered in daily life (Sousa et al., 1998; Joels et al., 2004). 
Controls were carefully handled daily during the same period. 
 
Biometric parameters 
To assess stress treatment efficacy, corticosterone levels were measured in serum. For that 
blood was collected via tail venipuncture at least 8 h after the last stress exposure (4 h before 
“lights off”) and before initiation of food deprivation. The collected blood was centrifuged at 
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13.000 rpm for 10 min and supernatant removed and stored at -80ºC until use. Serum total 
corticosteroids levels were measured by radioimmunoassay using a commercial kit (R&D 
Systems, Minneapolis, MN, USA), according to manufacturer’s instructions. 
Risk-based decision-making paradigm 
Behavioral training and testing took place in 5-hole operant chambers (30.5 cm L × 24.1 cm W × 
21.0 cm H) housed within sound attenuating cubicles. Each chamber has five apertures 
mounted into a curved wall, each hole equipped with a light and crossed by an infra-red detector 
that monitored animal nose pokes. In the opposite side, one pellet dispenser is used to deliver 
rewards into a hole crossed by an infra-red detector to check pellet dispenser entries. 
The decision-making paradigm is presented in Figure 1A. Each daily session was initiated by 
switching the home light on, five seconds after the animal was placed in the chamber, and lasted 
for 30 minutes or 100 trials, whichever occurred first. In each trial, rats could choose between a 
“safe” hole (resulting in the delivery of 1 pellet with 100% probability) and 4 “risk” holes 
(resulting in the delivery of 4 pellets with 25% probability); light was used to cue risk options, 
which were randomly allocated to 4 of the 5 apertures. Importantly, this design of risky and safe 
choices evens the overall outcome of either option, allowing an analysis of risk-taking behaviors 
independently of reward value or delay. After each choice, animals had to check the amount of 
reward received at the pellet dispenser (they were taught to do it by applying a 10s “lights off, 
holes inactive” penalty if they failed to do so), home cage light was switched off and a new trial 
started 5 seconds later. Number of trials completed, total time spent, animals’ choices and 
omissions as well as pellets received in each trial were automatically registered by the software 
and analyzed. 
 
c-Fos immunohistochemistry 
Animals were sacrificed 90 minutes after the end of the behavioral task with a lethal injection 
with pentobarbital and then were transcardially perfused with PBS followed by 4% 
paraformaldehyde. Control animals were exposed to the same conditions with the sole exception 
of the behavioral task. Brains were removed and post-fixed in PFA for 4h and then transferred to 
an 8% sucrose solution and kept at 4ºC. 50 µm coronal sections of the forebrain were serially cut 
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on a vibrotome (Microm HM-650V, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA) at and collected 
in phosphate buffer (PBS; 0.1M; pH7.2). For c-fos immunohistochemistry, sections were firstly 
incubated in H2O2 (3.3% in PBS) solution for 30 minutes and then sequentially washed in PBS 
and PBS-T (0.3% triton X-100; Sigma-Aldrich). Sections were first incubated in 2.5% (in PBS-T) of 
fetal bovine serum for 2h and then in anti-Fos primary antibody (1:2000 in the same solution; 
PC38 Anti-c-Fos (Ab-5), Calbiochem, Darmstadt, Germany) overnight. After several washes in 
PBS-T, sections were incubated with secondary antibody (1:200 in PBS-T; polyclonal swine anti-
rabbit E0353, DAKO) for 1h, again washed in PBS-T and incubated in avidin-biotin complex (ABC, 
1:200, Vector Laboratories) for 1h. Sections were then sequentially washed with PBS-T, PBS and 
Tris-HCl (0.05M, pH 7.6) and incubated in 0.0125% diaminobezidine tetrahydrochloride (DAB; 
Sigma, St. Louis, USA) and 0.02% H2O2 in Tris-HCl for 3-5 minutes to reveal the labeling. All 
procedures were performed at room temperature. Sections were placed on SuperFrost Plus 
slides (Braunschweig, Germany), dehydrated, counterstained with hematoxylin. 
The number of c-fos positive cells was counted within the boundaries of the medial prefrontal 
cortex [prelimbic cortex (PrL), infralimbic cortex (IL) and cingulate cortex (Cg1)], OFC [medial 
(MO), ventral (VO) and lateral (LO) parts], somatosensory cortex (SSC), motor cortex (MC), insula, 
dorsal striatum [dorsolateral striatum (DLS) and dorsomedial striatum (DMS)] and nucleus 
accumbens [shell (NAcS) and core (NAcC)] as defined by the Paxinos and Watson atlas (1998). 
c-fos positive cells densities (number of positive cells / cross sectional area of the region of 
interest) were calculated for comparisons between groups. Cross sectional area of each region 
was calculated according to the Cavalieri principle (Gundersen, 1988). For this, we randomly 
superimposed onto each area a test point grid in which the interpoint distance, at tissue level, 
was: 100 µm for IL and MO; 150 µm for PL, VO and LO; 350 µm for MC, SSC, NAcS and NAcC; 
and 500 µm for DLS and DMS, and counted the points that fell into the boundaries of the region 
of interest. These procedures were done using using StereoInvestigator software 
(MicroBrightField Bioscience, Magdeburg, Germany) and a camera attached to a motorized 
microscope.  
 
Gene expression measurements by quantitative Real time PCR (qRT-PCR) 
Total RNA was isolated from the OFC using Trizol reagent (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA). The 
isolated total RNA was reverse transcribed using the iScript cDNA Synthesis Kit for RT-PCR (Bio-
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Rad, Laboratories, Hercules, CA, USA). Primers used to measure the expression levels of 
selected mRNA transcripts by qRT-PCR were designed using the Primer3 software (Rozen and 
Skaletsky, 2000), on the basis of the respective GenBank sequences. qRT-PCR analysis was used 
to measure the mRNA levels of the following genes: dopamine receptor D1A (Drd1a), dopamine 
receptor D2 (Drd2) and dopamine receptor 3 (Drd3). The reference gene for hypoxanthine 
guanine phosphoribosyl transferase (Hprt) (accession number from GenBank: NM_012583) was 
used as an internal standard for the normalization of the expression of selected transcripts, since 
we have first confirmed that its expression is not influenced by the experimental conditions. All 
accession numbers and primer sequences are available on request. qRT-PCR was performed on 
a CFX 96TM real time system instrument (Bio-Rad), with the QuantiTect SYBR Green RT-PCR 
reagent kit (Qiagen, Hamburg, Germany) according to the manufacturer’s instructions, using 
equal amounts of RNA from each one of the samples. Product fluorescence was detected at the 
end of the elongation cycle. All melting curves exhibited a single sharp peak at the expected 
temperature. 
 
Dopamine quantification by high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) 
Following decapitation, the brains were rapidly removed and discrete brain regions, specifically 
the OFC and insula were dissected. The dissected tissues were weighted, homogenized and 
deproteinized in 500 µl of 0.2 N perchloric acid solution (Merck KgaA, Darmstadt, Germany) 
containing 7.9 mM Na2S2O5 and 1.3 mM Na2EDTA (both by Riedel-de Haën AG, Seelze, 
Germany). The homogenate was centrifuged at 14,000 rpm for 30 min in 4°C and the 
supernatant was stored at −80°C, until analysis. The analytical measurements were performed 
using a Pharmacia-LKB 2248 high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) pump coupled 
with a BAS LC4B electrochemical detector (Bioanalytical Systems Inc., West Lafayette, IN, USA), 
as described by Dalla et al (2004). All samples were analyzed within one month after 
homogenization. The mobile phase consisted of a 50 mM phosphate buffer regulated at pH 3.0, 
containing 5-octylsulfate sodium salt at a concentration of 300 mg/L as the ion pair reagent and 
Na2EDTA at a concentration of 20 mg/L (both by Riedel-de Haën AG, Seelze, Germany). Further 
on, acetonitrile (Merck &Co., Darmstadt, Germany) was added at a 7–10% concentration. The 
reference standards were prepared in 0.2 N perchloric acid (Merck KgaA, Darmstadt, Germany) 
solution containing 7.9 mM Na2S2O5 and 1.3 mM Na2EDTA (both by Riedel-de Haën AG, 
45 
 
Seelze, Germany). The sensitivity of the assay was tested for each series of samples using 
external standards. The working electrode was glassy carbon and the reference one was 
Ag/AgCl; the columns were Thermo Hypersil-Keystone, 150× 2.1 mm 5 μ Hypersil, Elite C18 
(Thermo Electron, Cheshire, UK). Sampleswere quantified by comparison of the area under the 
curve (AUC) against reference standards using a PC compatible HPLC software package 
(Chromatography Station for Windows ver.17 Data Apex Ltd). The limit of detection was 1 pg/27 
μl (volume of HPLC injection loop) and the signal to noise ratio was more than 3:1. 
 
Neuronal 3D-dendritic structure analysis 
Pyramidal neurons of lateral part of OFC (lOFC) cortex and of insula (Zilles and Wree 1995) were 
analyzed. Within the lOFC and insula, layers II-III are readily identifiable in Golgi-stained material 
on the basis of its characteristic cytoarchitecture. It is positioned immediately ventral to the 
relatively cell-poor layer I (which also contains the distal dendritic tufts of layer II/III pyramidal 
cells) and immediately superficial to layer V; this boundary is pronounced because of the greater 
cell-packing density and smaller somata of pyramidal cells in layers II-III relative to layer V in this 
region of the brain (Van Eden and Uylings 1985; Cajal 1995; Zilles and Wree 1995). Golgi-
impregnated pyramidal neurons of the lOFC and insula were readily identified by their 
characteristic triangular soma, apical dendrites extending toward the pial surface, and numerous 
dendritic spines. The criteria used to select neurons for reconstruction were those described by 
Uylings et al. (1986): 1) location of the cell soma in layer II-III of the lOFC, approximately in the 
middle third of the section; 2) full impregnation of the neurons; 3) apical dendrite without 
truncated branches (except on the most superficial layer); 4) presence of at least 3 primary basal 
dendritic shafts, each of which branched at least once; and 5) no morphological changes 
attributable to incomplete dendritic impregnation of Golgi-Cox staining. In order to minimize 
selection bias, slices containing the region of interest were randomly searched and the first 10 
neurons fulfilling the above criteria (maximum of 3 neurons per slice) were selected. For each 
selected neuron, all branches of the dendritic tree were reconstructed at 6003 magnification 
using a motorized microscope (Axioplan 2, Carl Zeiss, Germany), with oil objectives, and attached 
to a camera (DXC-390, Sony Corporation, Tokyo, Japan) and Neurolucida software 
(MicroBrightField Bioscience). A 3D analysis of the reconstructed neurons was performed using 
NeuroExplorer software (MicroBrightField Bioscience). 
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Imuno-golgi staining 
Stressed and control rats were sacrificed 90 minutes after the end of the behavioral task and 
were transcardially perfused with 0.9% saline under deep pentobarbital anesthesia and processed 
according to the protocol described by Pinto et al. (2012). 
Brains were removed, dropped into Golgi-Cox solution and kept in the dark for 15 days. Next, 
they were transferred to a 30% sucrose solution and kept in the refrigerator for 2 to 5 days in the 
dark until they sink. Sections (200 µm) were obtained in a vibratome (Microm HM-650V) and 
transferred to 24-well multiwell plate filled with distilled water for 15 min and then dipped in 
ammonium hydroxide (Sigma) for 5 min in the dark. Sections were washed with distilled water 
twice, 10 min each, and dipped in Kodak Fix solution (Rapid fixer; Sigma) for 20 min. After 
washes in distilled water, 10 min each, sections were dipped in PBS, and kept cool in the 
refrigerator. 
After Golgi-Cox staining, sections were transferred to 6-well multi-well plates with citrate buffer 
(10 mM; pH = 6). For antigen retrieval sections were heated for 5 min in the microwave to near 
100° to expose the cFOS epitope in the tissue. Sections were then rinsed in PBS-T (0,3 % of 
Triton®-X 100) 3 times, for 10 min and blocked during 1h with 2,5 % FBS in PBS-T and 
incubated with primary cFOS antibody (1:1000 in PBS-T and 2 % of fetal bovine serum; 
Calbiochem) overnight at 4 °C. The next day, sections were rinsed with PBS-T and incubated 
with secondary antibody anti-rabbit Alexa Fluor 594 (1:500 in PBS-T; Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, 
USA) for 2 h at RT. Finally, sections were incubated in DAPI (1 µg/ml) for 10 min at RT and then 
rinsed in PBS. Sections were mounted in superfrost slides using Vectashield mounting medium 
(Vector Labs, Burlingame, CA, USA) 
 
Treatment with the D2/D3 agonist 
Quinpirole hydrochloride (0.15 mg/kg; Sigma), dissolved in 0.9% sterile saline to a volume of 1 
ml/Kg, was administered intraperitoneally. Injections were given 15 minutes before behavioral 
testing and dose was selected in accordance with previous reports showing behavioral effects of 
the drug (Kurylo and Tanguay S, 2003; Boulougouris et al., 2009).  
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Animals were trained for 20 days in the risk-based decision-making paradigm and then half of 
animals were submitted to a chronic unpredictable stress protocol during 4 weeks while others 
were carefully handled. At this point, 5 animals of each group were sacrificed to perform c-fos 
expression, HPLC, rT-PCR and structural analysis. The remaining 40 animals were then tested in 
3 consecutive 8-day decision-making paradigms: in the first, safe and risk choices were rewarded 
with 1 and 4 pellets, respectively, resulting in no net gain; in the second, only the risk choice 
reward was doubled (8 instead of 4), resulting in an average long-term profit for those who risk; 
in the third, only the reward in safe choices was doubled (2 instead of 1), resulting in a long-term 
profit for those who tend to choose safe. Thirty minutes before each daily session, half of the 
animals of each group (controls and stressed) received i.p. injections of the DA D2/D3 agonist 
quinpirole (0.15 mg/kg) while the remainder received vehicle. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
Data was analyzed using SPSS (version 19.0; IBM). Results are expressed as group means ± SE. 
Control and stress groups were compared using paired Student’s t test. To test for the effects of 
stress and quinpirole two-way ANOVA was used; groups comparisons were determined using 
Tukey’s honestly significant difference post hoc analysis. For all analysis, differences were 
considered to be significant if p < 0.05. 
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3. Results 
Acquisition of the Risk-Based Decision-Making Task 
As expected, during training, animals increased the number of completed trials in each session, 
inversely decreasing total time spent to do so (Figure 1, panel B); total completed trials were 
achieved by all animals on the 8th day of training. Animals performing the task did not display any 
preference between safe and risk options, as they choose approximately 20% of times the safe 
hole and 80% of times the four risk holes. This pattern was established relatively early and 
maintained during the entire protocol (Figure 1, panel C). 
When rewards, for either the risk or the safe options, were increased (risk favorable or safe 
favorable conditions, respectively), animals switched their pattern of choices accordingly, 
decreasing (-15.3% ± 6.68) or increasing (16.0% ± 8.70) the percentage of safe choices relative 
to the baseline (Figure 1, panel D).  
The analysis of c-fos expression, a marker of cell activation, by performance of the task, revealed 
significant activation of several brain areas, including the medial prefrontal cortex (Prelimbic 
cortex: t = -3.61, P  ˂0.05; Infralimbic cortex: t = -1.58, P  ˂0.05; Cingulate cortex: t = -2.22, P  ˂
0.05), OFC (Medial OFC: t = -3.14, P  ˂0.05; Ventral OFC: t = -3.97, P  ˂0.05; Lateral OFC: t = -
7.28, P  ˂0.05), insular cortex (t = -4.45, P  ˂0.05), dorsal striatum (DLS: t = -5.45, P  ˂0.05; 
DMS: t = -2.86, P  ˂0.05) and nucleus accumbens (NAcc Shell: t = -2.41, P  ˂0.05; NAcc Core: t 
= -3.76, P  ˂ 0.05), when compared with animals that were not exposed to the task but were 
placed in the chamber. Interestingly, no differences were found in principal somatosensory (t = -
0.88, P = 0.40) and motor cortices (t = -1.78, P = 0.09) (Figure 1, panel E). 
 
Stress bias to safe options and is associated with changes in the orbitofrontal and 
insular cortices 
Chronic unpredictable stress significantly altered the pattern of choices, leading to an increased 
preference for safe options in all three different paradigms (basal: t = -6.206, P  ˂ 0.05; risk 
favorable: t = -3.43, P  ˂0.05 and safe-favorable: t = -4.03, P  ˂0.05) (Figure 2, panel A). 
This altered pattern of choice was accompanied by differential c-fos activation during the task. 
Chronic stressed animals displayed significantly increased activation on the lateral part of the 
OFC (t = -2.32, P  ˂ 0.05) and on the insula (t = -2.50, P  ˂ 0.05) when compared to controls; 
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interestingly, no other significant differences were found in any of the brain regions analyzed 
(Figure 2, panel B). 
Given the over-activation observed on orbitofrontal and insular cortices, we measured DA levels in 
these regions by HPLC. Data shows a significant decrease on DA concentration after chronic 
stress in the OFC (t = 3.32, P  ˂0.05). In contrast, no significant differences were found in insular 
cortex (t = -1.30, P = 0.24) (Figure 3, panel A). 
Subsequently, we quantified the different DA receptors in the OFC. Expression levels of the 
mRNAs encoding the Drd1 (t = -0.04, P = 0.97) and Drd3 (-0.49, P = 0.64) receptors did not 
differ between controls and stressed animals. However, there was a significant up-regulation of 
Drd2 mRNA in this brain region (t = -3.42, P  ˂0.05) (Figure 3, panel B). 
Finally, we performed a three-dimensional morphometric analysis of pyramidal neurons from the 
lateral part of the OFC and insular cortex. When compared with controls, chronically stressed 
animals displayed a significant increase in the length of apical dendrites (t = -2.96, P  ˂0.05), but 
no differences were found in basal dendrites (t = -1.59, P = 0.15) (Figure 3, panel D) of lOFC 
neither in apical and basal dendrites of insula (Figure 3, panel C). To test whether the neurons 
activated by the behavioral task also displayed the same morphological changes, we performed 
the immuno-golgi staining that revealed that similar differences in the apical dendrites of lOFC 
were present when considering only those cells activated by performance of the task (c-fos 
positive cells: t = -2.60, P  ˂0.05) (Figure 3, panel C).  
  
D2/D3 agonist quinpirole reverts stress effects on behavior 
Given our prior observations, but also other studies (Onge and Floresco, 2008; Zeeb et al., 2009; 
Onge et al., 2010), we decided to test the effect of quinpirole, a D2/D3 agonist, on risk-based 
decision-making behavior. As mentioned before, chronically stressed animals displayed an 
increased preference for safe choices in all three different paradigms. Interestingly, 
administration of quinpirole reverted this bias; indeed, the D2/D3 agonist reverted the risk-
aversion induced by stress in all three different conditions [Basal: F(3,39) = 7.26, P<0.01; 
stress+quinpirole vs stress, P<0.01; Risk favorable: F(3,39) = 4.30, P<0.01; stress+quinpirole vs 
stress P<0.05; Safe favorable: F(3,39) = 4.45, P<0.01; stress+quinpirole vs stress, P<0.05], 
making their pattern of choices undistinguishable from that of untreated controls (Basal: 
untreated controls vs stress+quinpirole, P=0.80; Risk favorable:  untreated controls vs 
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stress+quinpirole, P=0.95; Safe favorable: untreated controls vs stress+quinpirole, P=0.63) 
(Figure 4). Of notice, continued treatment with quinpirole had no effect on the choices of non-
stressed animals in any of the paradigms (Basal:  non-stressed+quinpirole vs untreated controls, 
P=0.96; Risk favorable: non-stressed+quinpirole vs untreated controls, P=0.99; Safe favorable: 
non-stressed+quinpirole vs untreated controls, P=0.97) (Figure 4). 
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4. Discussion 
The present study shows, for the first time, that risk-aversion induced by chronic stress exposure 
correlates with overactivation, increased dendritic arborization and decreased dopaminergic 
activity in the OFC; more importantly, we also show that this behavioral change can be corrected 
by administration of the D2/D3 agonist quinpirole, leading to a complete restoration of risk-taking 
preferences.  
In order to analyze the impact of chronic stress on risk-taking behaviors and dissect its correlates, 
we developed a new decision-making task in which animals are given the choice between 1 
certain option and 4 uncertain but otherwise similar options, the latter resulting in a ¼ probability 
of receiving a 4 times bigger reward, all rewards being delivered simultaneously.  By leveling the 
expectations (balance between value and effort) and predictability (time until reward delivery) of 
the task, and contrary to previously published risky-behavior tasks (Cardinal and Howes 2005, 
den Bos et al., 2006, Simon et al., 2009, Boulougouris et al., 2009, Zeeb et al., 2009), the 
design of the herein described paradigm makes the choice between a certain (safe) and an 
uncertain (risky) reward to be dependent only of “risk-taking behavior”, and thus a better readout 
of the latter. In the initial characterization of the task, we found out that, in basal conditions, 
animals had a performance at chance level (1 out of 5) and thus did not show a preference for 
either option. Importantly, this allowed us, in subsequent experiments, to assess the impact of 
chronic stress and/or pharmacological manipulations on risk-taking behavior, by quantifying the 
preference shift from this baseline condition. In addition, we also showed that this baseline 
behavior could be manipulated by modifying the expectations associated with each option, thus 
highlighting the importance of independently manipulating each variable.  
The next step, involved the topographical analysis of the corticostriatal regions engaged in this 
task. As expected, this analysis revealed activation in almost all key areas known to be involved in 
decision making processes, including the orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortices, the insular 
cortex, the dorsal striatum and the nucleus accumbens; of notice, areas not usually associated 
with such processes, such as the somatosensory and the motor cortices, were also not activated 
by our task, increasing the specificity of the activated areas. All together, these features suggest 
this new behavioral task to be highly valuable in exploring animal preferences based on certainty 
of different options available and in the study of mechanisms underlying the modulations of such 
behaviors. 
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As we have previously shown, chronic stress has a strong impact on behaviors and can 
profoundly alter decision-making, impairing behavioral flexibility (Cerqueira et al., 2007) and 
biasing decisions to habits (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). Surprisingly, however, no study to our 
knowledge has explored the impact of chronic stress on the willingness to take risks, as we have 
done in the present work. A recent paper by Pabst et al. (2013) has shown that, in humans, 
acute stress exposure before the task increases the preference for risky options, which can be 
correlated with an increase in salivary cortisol reflecting the activation of the hypothalamus-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. Interestingly, these data are in line with results by Koot and 
collaborators (2013) revealing that acute corticosterone administration, which partially mimics 
HPA axis activation, promotes the choice of unfavorable conditions. However, both studies seem 
to be in contradiction with the present findings that chronic stress increases the preference for 
safe options. These contrasting and opposing effects of acute versus chronic stress have been 
described in other behavioral domains (more importantly in cognition, where acute stress 
enhances while chronic stress impairs memory, see Lupien 2009 for a review) and might 
represent a key feature of its action. Indeed, while acute stress can be considered adaptive 
(Diamond et al., 1992), chronic or prolonged stress becomes maladaptive, in line with its 
negative impact in memory (Cerqueira et al., 2007), executive function (Sousa and Almeida, 
2012), goal-directed behaviors (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009) and, herein, risk preference.  
Despite these considerations, our observations suggest that animals submitted to chronic stress 
change their valuating systems, overrating losses and, subsequently, avoiding ‘risk’ options that 
imply the possibility of not receiving any reward. Importantly, in the present paper we also show, 
using the expression of the c-fos protein, that this behavioral effect seems to be mediated by an 
over-activation of lateral part of OFC and insular cortex. Intriguingly, but significantly, these are 
exactly the same two regions that mediate the effect of acute corticosterone administration on a 
rodent Iowa gambling task described above (Kloot et al., 2013), which strongly suggests these 
areas to be key to the impact of stress and glucocorticoids on such tasks involving risk. The OFC 
is critically involved on assigning and updating reward values, encoding a wide range of other 
variables indispensable for decision-making, including expected outcomes (Schoenbaum et al., 
1998), effort associated to each option (Roesch and Olson, 2005; Kennerley et al., 2009), 
confidence in the decision (Kepecs et al., 2008) and the probability of win (Kennerley et al., 
2008). Interestingly, rodent lesion studies have highlighted that the OFC encodes specific 
information about the outcome rather than its general affective value (Burke et al., 2008). 
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Additionally, we had previously shown that chronic stress biased behavior from goal-directed to 
habit based choices, which was mediated by a shift from an atrophied medial prefrontal loop to a 
hypertrophied orbitofrontal network (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). In accordance with this finding, 
we have also identified a deleterious impact of chronic stress in pavlovian to instrumental 
transfer, an ability highly dependent on the integrity of the OFC (Morgado et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the insular cortex was also over-activated during the task in stressed animals. This 
brain region is involved in representations of bodily internal states and needs (Naqvi and Bechara 
2009) and in risk-aversion signaling (Clarke et al., 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2008). The first is 
crucial in chronic stress, where body states and bodily perception are significantly altered, and 
the second is of relevance in the context of this specific task. Insula lesion studies have shown an 
increased in risk non-advantageous choices (Clarke et al., 2008), which made expectable that 
insular over-activation could lead to a risk-aversion pattern of choice. 
Significant DA depletion was found in OFC, but not in the insular cortex, associated with over 
expression of Drd2 mRNA, suggesting that DA depletion and subsequent overregulation of Drd2 
are the underlying mechanisms of OFC over-activation. This is in line with previous studies 
revealing a role for a stress-induced hypodopaminergic status in the PFC in the genesis of 
working memory (Mizoguchi K et al., 2000) and decision making deficits (Tseng and O’Donnell 
2004, Gruber et al., 2010); of notice, the latter were ascribed to a lack of inhibitory actions of D2 
receptors on NMDA-induced responses (Tseng and O’Donnell, 2004). Irrespective of the 
underlying mechanism, our observation that the stress-induced bias on risk-based decision-
making can be pharmacologically reverted by a D2/D3 agonist quinpirole clearly proves their role 
in this process. These observations are in accordance with the hypothesis that stress induced 
hypodopaminergic state could mediate its behavioral effects on risk-based decision-making 
through hyperactivation of OFC. Indeed, two recent papers pointed out the role of dopaminergic 
system in stress resilience (Zurawek et al., 2013) and social aversion induced by chronic stress 
(Barik et al., 2013). 
Previous studies have reported effects of dopaminergic agents on decision-making behaviors, 
associating dopaminergic agonists with increased rates of risk choices (Onge and Floresco, 
2008; Riba et al., 2008; Onge et al., 2010). As chronic stressed animals were risk-aversive, it 
could be argued that quinpirole effects observed in our study could be explained by an unspecific 
increasing of risk-prone behavior induced by dopaminergic activation. However, if it was a non-
specific effect of dopaminergic activation it would be expectable that non-stressed animals 
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treated with quinpirole also increased their frequency of risk choices, which was not verified 
herein. Additionally, contradictory data on literature reported impaired performance on gambling 
tasks induced by dopaminergic agonists (Zeeb et al., 2009) and related lower dopaminergic 
levels with higher risk choices in IGT (Sevy et al., 2006) which supports the idea that effects of 
dopaminergic drugs on decision-making cannot be explained in an oversimplistic way and could 
be dependent on basal levels of DA, available dopaminergic receptors, specific features of 
decision-making tasks and duration of treatment. 
Our results suggest, for the first time, that risk-aversion induced by chronic stress is due to 
reduced DA levels in OFC and that this impairments on decision-making can be reverted with 
dopaminergic agents. These findings can have a strong impact not only for unveiling specific 
mechanisms underlying stress-induced decision-making impairments but also for proposing a 
pharmacological intervention that can restore risk-based decision-making. Since decision-making 
impairments are core symptoms in several neuropsychiatric disorders such as gambling, 
obsessive and impulsive disorders, our data could support the possibility of explore alternative 
pathological mechanisms and develop new and more effective treatments and interventions. 
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Figure 1. Risk-taking task. (A) Flow-chart of one trial in the neutral condition, in which the 
overall gain is the same for risky or safe choices; each daily session consisted of 100 trials or 30 
minutes of testing. (B) Animals significantly decreased the total session time and increased the 
number of trials per session until the maximum of 100 in the first two weeks. (C) Under the 
neutral condition, animals stabilize their performance at around 20% of safe choices, without a 
net preference for risk or safe. (D) Increases (doubling) in the amount of reward of the risky 
A 
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choices (risk favourable condition) or the safe choices (safe favourable condition) lead to a 
reduction (risk favourable) or increase (safe favourable) in the % of safe choices, compared with 
the neutral condition, which is of similar magnitude. *p<0,05 vs neutral condition. (E) Increase 
(in %) in the density of c-fos positive cells in several brain areas in animals that performed the 
task, as compared with home cage controls. Areas activated by the task include the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC), the insula, the prefrontal cortex (PFC), the Nucleus accumberns (Nacc) and the 
dorsal striatum (DS). L/V/MOFC (lateral/ventral/medial OFC), PrL (Prelimbic cortex), IL 
(infralimbic cortex), Cg1 (cingulate cortex), NaccC/S (Nacc Core/Shell), DLS/DMS 
(Dorsomedial/lateral striatum). *p<0,05 vs home cage controls.  
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Figure 2. Effects of chronic stress on risk-taking behavior. (A) Chronic stress 
significantly decreased risk choices among the three different protocols tested. *p<0,05 vs non-
stressed controls. (B) Increased (in %) in the density of c-fos positive cells in orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) and insular cortex in chronically stressed animals performing the task when compared with 
non-stressed controls. No significant differences were found in other brain areas examined. 
*p<0,05 vs non-stressed controls. 
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Figure 3. Neurochemical and neural effects of chronic stress. (A) The effects of chronic 
stress on HPLC DA levels in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and insula as compared with non-stressed 
controls. *p<0,05 vs non-stressed controls. (B) The effects of chronic unpredictable stress on 
dopamine D1, D2 and D3 receptors mRNA levels (in %) in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) when 
compared with non-stress controls. *p<0,05 vs non-stressed controls. (C) Morphometric analysis 
of apical and basal dendrites in the insular pyramidal neurons in animals submitted to chronic 
stress when compared with non-stressed controls. (D) Morphometric analysis of apical and basal 
dendrites in the OFC pyramidal neurons in animals submitted to chronic stress when compared 
with non-stressed controls. Neurons specifically recruited by the task were assessed with 
imunogolgi staining (golgi+c-fos). *p<0,05 vs non-stressed controls. 
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Figure 4. Quinpirole effects on decision-making. Chronic stress significantly increases 
frequency of safe choices (in %) as compared with non-stressed controls, an effect that is reverted 
by D2/D3 agonist quinpirole. *p<0,05 vs non-stressed controls. 
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Obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) is achronic psychiatric disorder characterized by
recurrent intrusive thoughts and/or repetitive compulsory behaviors. This psychiatric disor-
der is known to be stress responsive, as symptoms increase during periods of stress
but also because stressful events may precede the onset of OCD. However, only a
few and inconsistent reports have been published about the stress perception and the
stress-response in these patients. Herein, we have characterized the correlations of OCD
symptoms with basal serum cortisol levels and scores in a stress perceived question-
naire (PSS-10). The present data reveals that cortisol levels and the stress scores in the
PSS-10 were significantly higher in OCD patients that in controls. Moreover, stress levels
self-reported by patients using the PSS-10 correlated positively with OCD severity in the
Yale–Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale (Y–BOCS). Interestingly, PSS-10 scores corre-
lated with the obsessive component, but not with the compulsive component, ofY–BOCS.
These results confirm that stress is relevant in the context of OCD, particularly for the
obsessive symptomatology.
Keywords: obsessive–compulsive disorder, stress, cortisol,Y–BOCS, PSS-10
INTRODUCTION
Obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychiatric disorder
that affects 2–3% of population worldwide (Ruscio et al., 2010)
and carries high levels of morbidity (Murray and Lopez, 1996;
Hollander et al., 2010). It is characterized by obsessions (persis-
tent, intrusive, and inappropriate thoughts, as well as impulses or
images that cause anxiety) and compulsions (repetitive behaviors
or thoughts performed in order to decrease the anxiety caused by
the obsessions). Although genetic factors play an important role
in the etiology of disease, several reports implicate environmental
influences such as relevant life events and traumatic events in the
onset of the disease (Zohar et al., 2007; Forray et al., 2010). Ana-
lyzing a group of 74 female OCD patients, Lochner et al. (2002)
found them to have higher rates of childhood trauma than healthy
controls. Interestingly, subsequent studies demonstrated that fre-
quency, clinical pattern, and severity of OCD symptoms correlated
not only with a history of one or more traumatic life events (Ger-
shuny et al., 2003; Cromer et al., 2007; Real et al., 2011) but also
with their intensity (Jordan et al., 1991).
Importantly, the stress-response and the activity of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis have been shown to
be relevant in the context of several psychiatric disorders (Hols-
boer, 1983). This also holds true for OCD as it is known that
stressful events may precede the onset of OCD (Toro et al., 1992)
and that, in addition, OCD symptoms increase at times of stress
(Findley et al., 2003). Nevertheless, it is also true that core symp-
toms of the disease, namely obsessions, cause significant distress,
and as a consequence, may trigger physiological stress-related sys-
tems such as the HPA axis. However, the characterization of the
activity of the HPA axis in OCD is still a matter of dispute, with
some studies reporting normal levels of cortisol (Kulog˘lu et al.,
2007) and a normal dexamethasone suppression response (Mon-
teiro et al., 1986; Jenike et al., 1987), while others observe high
levels of cortisol (Gehris et al., 1990; Kluge et al., 2007) and non-
suppression of cortisol during suppression tests (Cottraux et al.,
1984; Catapano et al., 1990). Yet, the discrepancies extend beyond
the measurement of cortisol levels; in fact, while one study showed
increased corticotrophin releasing hormone (CRH) levels in the
cerebrospinal fluid (Altemus et al., 1992) of OCD patients, which
might be indicative of hyperactivation of stress-response systems,
another found a decreased pituitary volume in OCD patients
(Jung et al., 2009), which is suggestive of hypofunction of the
adenohypophysis.
In light of such controversy, we thought of interest to further
characterize the link between OCD and stress. In order to achieve
this aim, we measured basal serum cortisol levels and assessed
the perception of stress using a validated perceived stress scale 10
(PSS-10) in a group of OCD patients (without depression) and
in a cohort of age- and sex-matched controls. In patients, such
measurements were subsequently correlated with OCD symp-
toms, namely by discriminating the obsessive and compulsive
components using the Yale–Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale
(Y–BOCS).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The cohort under analysis comprised 18 patients with OCD and
18 healthy controls. Patients were admitted to the Psychiatric
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Department of Hospital de Braga as outpatients with a diagnosis
of OCD. All patients were aged>18 years and able to communicate
in Portuguese. Diagnosis was established by experienced psychi-
atrists with a semi-structured interview based on Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-
IV)-TR and corroborated by a severity score of 7 or greater on
the Y–BOCS. Exclusion criteria included: any other mental disor-
der revealed by the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview
(MINI Plus; except for OCD), any acute and/or chronic medical
illness as assessed by a physical examination and routine laboratory
examination, females who are pregnant or lactating and substance
dependence within the previous 12 months. From 21 patients ini-
tially enrolled, 3 dropped out and thus only 18 were analyzed (2
patients were not included because they did not attend for blood
collection and in the remainder case, blood sample was not col-
lected properly). The three matching controls were also excluded
from the analysis.
Healthy controls were carefully recruited to match OCD
patients for age, sex, educational level, ethnical origin, and dom-
inance. Exclusion criteria included previous history of neuropsy-
chiatric disorder, any present mental disorder revealed by MINI
Plus and use of any medication (excluding oral contraceptives).
All subjects provided written informed consent following a
description of the procedures. The study protocol was approved by
the Ethics Committee of the Hospital of Braga, Portugal. The study
was performed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
INSTRUMENTS
Sociodemographic form
All subjects were evaluated by a semi-structured questionnaire
form in order to characterize gender, age, marital status, edu-
cational level, professional status, ethnical origin, and previous
medical history of the cohorts. OCD patients were also evaluated
in terms of duration of illness, type of obsessions, and compulsions
and medication taken. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of
patients and healthy controls.
Mini-international neuropsychiatric interview
Patients were assessed with MINI Plus, a short structured diag-
nostic interview (Sheehan et al., 1998), design to screen for
neuropsychiatric diagnosis according to the DSM-IV.
Yale–Brown obsessive–compulsive scale
Yale–Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale was used to assess
the severity of OCD and to discriminate the symptoms sub-
components of the disorder. The Y–BOCS is composed of 10-
items, half related with obsessions and the other half related with
compulsions. Each item is assessed by a clinician and rated on a
five-point likert-type scale from 0 to 4 (Goodman et al., 1989).
Perceived stress scale 10
The Portuguese version of the 10-items Perceived Stress Scale,
filled-out on the same day of blood collection, was used to assess
perception of stress (Cohen et al., 1983). Items were classified on
a five-point likert-type scale from 0 (never) to 4 (very often), and
refer to the last month. The higher the total score, the greater the
intensity of stress perceived by the subject.
Hamilton depression rating scale
This 17-items scale is used to rate the severity of depression
(Hamilton, 1960). Scores higher than 25 indicate severe depression
while scores below 7 indicate no depression.
Hamilton anxiety rating scale
Fourteen-items scale used to evaluate severity of anxiety (Hamil-
ton, 1959). Each item is scored on a scale of 0 (not present) to 4
(severe). Scores higher than 25 indicate moderate/severe anxiety
while scores below 17 indicate mild symptoms.
Blood sampling
Venous blood samples from left forearm vein were collected into
5 mL tubes containing potassium EDTA, between 1:00 and 4:00
p.m. Precise instructions about sleep and alimentation were given
to volunteers that should not have any food neither drink except
water in the 6-h prior the blood collection. Plasma was sepa-
rated by centrifugation and stored at −70˚C. Serum cortisol was
determined by standard radioimmuno assays.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Data was analyzed using SPSS (version 19.0; IBM). Demograph-
ics, clinical measures, psychometric scales, and laboratory values
were reported using descriptive statistics (frequencies, means, and
standard deviation). Group comparisons were carried out by non-
parametric Mann–WhitneyU test to compare means. For correla-
tion evaluations, the Pearson correlation test was used. Differences
were considered to be significant if p< 0.05.
RESULTS
No significant differences in age, gender, education, or body mass
index were found between the OCD group and controls (Table 1).
Three OCD patients and four healthy controls were taking oral
contraceptives, but no major differences/trends were observed
between those on and without them.
The mean OCD severity was 25.61 as measured by Y–BOCS;
there was no significant difference between the obsessive and
the compulsive sub-scores in OCD patients (Table 1). The mean
depression score [measured by Hamilton Depression Rating Scale
(HDRS)] was 3.83; importantly, no subject displayed values above
7. The mean anxiety score [measured by Hamilton Anxiety Rat-
ing Scale (HARS)] was 4.33. The mean age of onset of the disease
was 21.61 years and mean duration of illness was 5.72 years. All
patients were medicated at the time of study, 77.8% with fluvox-
amine alone (200–300 mg/day) and 22.2% with fluvoxamine and
clomipramine (200–300 and 75–150 mg/day, respectively). The
clinical characteristics of patients are summarized in Table 1.
The basal serum concentration of cortisol was significantly
higher in OCD patients than in healthy controls (P = 0.011)
(Figure 1A). Stress perception, as assessed by PSS-10, was signifi-
cantly higher in OCD patients than in control subjects (P ≤ 0.001)
(Figure 1B). Importantly, we found a positive correlation between
these two measurements of response to stress in our entire popu-
lation (r = 0.385, P = 0.020) (Figure 1C) that was only replicated
in control subjects (r = 0.717, P = 0.001) (Figure 1D) but not in
OCD patients (r = 0.040, P = 0.874) (Figure 1E).
Stress self-reported by patients using PSS-10 positively cor-
related with OCD severity as assessed by Y–BOCS (r = 0.596,
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Table 1 | Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder and healthy comparison subjects.
Characteristics Subjects with
OCD (n=18)
Healthy comparison
subjects (n=18)
Statistics
Age, years [mean±SD (range)] 27.33±6.11 (21–38) 26.28±5.21 (20–38) P =0.691
Male/female 12/6 12/6
Education, years [mean±SD (range)] 13.22±1.99 (12–18) 14.06±3.37 (12–18) P =0.346
Body mass Index [mean±SD (range)] 23.70±4.18 (17–31) 22.78±2.18 (19–29) P =1.000
Age of onset [mean±SD (range)] 21.61±7.05 (9–35)
Duration of illness [mean±SD (range)] 5.72±6.70 (0–21)
Y–BOCS (total score) 25.61±5.90 (12–30)
Y–BOCS (obsession score) 13.50±3.17 (7–20)
Y–BOCS (compulsion score) 12.11±3.27 (5–17)
HDRS (global score) 3.83±2.53 (0–7)
HARS (global score) 4.33±3.20 (0–16)
Medication Only SSRI – 14 (77.8%);
SSRI with TCA – 4 (22.2%)
OCD, obsessive–compulsive disorder;Y–BOCS,Yale–Brown obsessive–compulsive scale; HDRS, Hamilton depression rating scale; SSRI, serotonin selective reuptake
inhibitors; TCA, tricyclic antidepressant; HARS, Hamilton anxiety rating scale.
FIGURE 1 | Stress response in OCD patients and controls. OCD
patients shown high basal levels of serum cortisol (12.98±5.77 mg/dL)
when compared with healthy controls (8.28± 3.60 mg/dL) (A). In
accordance, OCD patients score higher in the perceived stress scale
(PSS-10) questionnaire (B). Importantly, these two measurements were
positively correlated (C). Looking at each group separately, cortisol and
PSS-10 score correlate in healthy controls (D) but not in OCD patients (E)
*p< 0.05.
P = 0.009) (Figure 2A). Interestingly, no significant correlation
was found between cortisol levels and OCD severity as assessed
by Y–BOCS (r = 0.222, P = 0.376) (Figure 2B). Importantly, the
score on the PSS-10 correlated significantly with obsessive compo-
nent of Y–BOCS (r = 0.669, P = 0.002) (Figure 2C), but not with
the compulsive sub-score (r = 0.326, P = 0.187) (Figure 2D).
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FIGURE 2 | Obsessive–compulsive disorder severity and stress-related
measures. OCD severity, as measured by Y–BOCS, positively correlate with
PSS-10 score (A), but not with serum cortisol levels (B). Looking at each
dimension of the Y–BOCS scale separately, there is a positive correlation
between perceived stress and the obsessive score (C) but not with the
compulsive score (D) *p<0.05.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we show that OCD patients report significantly
higher levels of perceived stress than healthy controls, and that
these are accompanied with higher serum cortisol levels. These
findings support the hypothesis that dysregulated stress-response
mechanisms are of relevance to this disorder. In this regard, it is
important to note that, in our study, self-reported perceived stress
levels also correlated positively with global severity of OCD, fur-
ther strengthening the relevance of our data. Interestingly, these
results are in line with a study by Jordan et al. (1991) in which
previous traumatic events correlated with the intensity of OCD
symptoms. Our data also shows that perceived stress is significantly
correlated with the intensity of obsessive symptoms, but not with
the intensity of compulsions. Indeed, while obsessions are highly
stressful and anxiogenic ideas, compulsive actions are usually per-
ceived as stress relieving. Of note, this finding is in accordance with
previous studies that reports that OCD patients suffer significantly
more stress by daily events (Coles et al., 2005) and that there is an
important relationship between distress tolerance and obsessions
(Cougle et al., 2011).
Although self-reported stress was highly correlated with illness
severity and obsessive component of Y–BOCS, this study fails to
demonstrate correlations between cortisol levels and OCD global
severity or each OCD specific component. These can be explained
by the recruitment of alternative systems of stress-response but
also by the dynamic balance between obsessions and compulsions.
High levels of cortisol were reported in previous studies (Gehris
et al., 1990; Kluge et al., 2007), even though one study has observed
that cortisol elevation was only related with co-morbid depres-
sive symptoms (Kulog˘lu et al., 2007). Despite these inconsistent
reports, several findings such as non-suppression on dexametha-
sone test (Cottraux et al., 1984; Catapano et al., 1990), elevation
of nocturnal ACTH (Kluge et al., 2007), and reduced pituitary
volumes in non-treated OCD patients (Jung et al., 2009) support
the altered functioning of HPA axis. Additionally, results from
a study that analyzes therapeutic effects and hormonal changes
induced by intravenous citalopram treatment suggest that the drug
effects are dependent on cortisol response to SSRI (Corregiari et al.,
2007) which can be related with cortisol modulation of 5-HT1A
post-synaptic activity (Karten et al., 1999; Bijak et al., 2001). Inter-
estingly,we report significant elevations of cortisol levels in a group
of OCD patients that are receiving treatment for more than 6 weeks
but remain with significant symptoms of disease.
The stress-related findings pointed out by this work are not
specific of OCD and can be found in other psychiatric disorders
such as depression. However, dysfunction in orbitofronto-striatal
circuits has been the most common finding in the pathophys-
iology of OCD and previous animal and human studies have
shown that these circuits are highly sensitive and can be disrupted
by chronic stress, inducing a shift in observed decision-making
behaviors through habits (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Soares et al.,
2012) and impairing ability of associate environmental cues to
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goal-directed behaviors (Morgado et al., 2012). Altogether, these
observations support a possible role for chronic stress in the
etiology of OCD.
By using a significantly homogeneous group of patients that did
not display any comorbidity, we eliminate some frequent biases
observed in other studies. However, this study has some method-
ological limitations that should be taken into account: first, we
included only medicated patients with OCD, which might bias
results; second, this study has a cross-sectional design; and finally,
the size of the sample is relatively small.
In summary, this work highlights the dysfunction of stress
perception and stress-response systems in the OCD. However,
more studies are necessary to clarify whether these findings are
implicated in the onset of the symptomatology or are a mere
consequence of the symptoms.
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Abstract 
Decision-making processes are affected in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Previous studies 
have shown decision-making impairments in tasks with implicit rules, but not in those in which 
explicit and stable rules are provided. Using a gambling task, herein we explored risk-based 
decision-making in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study, 20 OCD patients and 20 
healthy controls, matched for gender, age and educational level. Data revealed that patients with 
OCD showed higher levels of indecisiveness as assessed by longer times to decide and 
decreased differential reaction times throughout the experimental paradigm; interestingly, this 
pattern of altered temporal dynamics in decision-making was not associated with differences in 
choice preferences between OCD patients and controls. Noticeably, when compared with 
controls, OCD subjects displayed an inverse pattern of amygdalar activation: on one hand, there 
was a significant deactivation of the amygdala before high-risk choices and on the other hand, an 
increased activation of this brain region before low-risk choices. Moreover, in the decision phase 
of the paradigm there was lower activity on the caudate nucleus in OCD patients. Finally, upon 
receiving a negative outcome, OCD patients showed an increased activation of (orbito)fronto-
striatal regions and the anterior cingulate cortex. These results contribute for the comprehension 
of decision-making impairments among OCD patients, although more studies are needed to 
detail the brain circuits involved. 
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Introduction 
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is psychiatric characterized by intrusive and repetitive 
thoughts that cause anxiety (obsessions) and repetitive behaviors or mental acts driven to reduce 
anxiety induced by obsessions (compulsions) (Abramowitz et al., 2009). OCD is also known as 
the disorder of doubt (Janet, 1903) as a result of severe decision-making impairments. In fact, 
OCD patients are unable to decide when an action has been satisfactorily executed resulting in 
repetitive rituals like washing or checking, or they are unable to choose among different 
alternatives leading to endless ruminations. Interestingly, this inability to take decisions is 
typically observed in tasks with implicit rules, such as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), but not in 
tasks with explicit and stable rules such as in the Game of Dice Task (GDT) (Starke et al., 2010). 
As in other neuropsychiatric conditions, a combination of structural and functional abnormalities 
is known to underlie the disruption of real life decision-making strategies in OCD patients. While 
the former involve particularly the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), basal ganglia and parts of the limbic 
system (Graybiel and Rauch, 2000), the later range from changes in neurotransmitters systems 
(namely in serotoninergic and dopaminergic systems (Westenberg, et al., 2007) to metabolic 
activity both in resting and symptom provocation conditions. Yet, there is a paucity of studies 
combining multimodal approaches that characterize, in parallel, the structural and functional 
changes observed in OCD patients in risky decision-making conditions.  
Herein, we designed a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study to contrast the 
behavior of OCD patients with that of a cohort of controls on a decision-making paradigm in 
which explicit rules for rewards and losses, and obvious probabilities were provided (decisions 
under risk conditions). The activation patterns in brain regions relevant for these behaviors were 
analyzed as well as their volumes in order to better understand the morphofunctional correlates 
of decision-making deficits in OCD patients. 
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Materials and methods 
Participants 
The study sample consisted of 20 OCD patients and 20 healthy controls. Patients were recruited 
for this study thorough their ongoing contact as outpatients with Psychiatric Department of 
Hospital de Braga. All patients were aged >18 and required to satisfy Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV) TR diagnostic criteria for OCD. Diagnosis 
was established by experienced psychiatrists with a semi-structured interview based on DSM-IV 
TR and corroborated by a severity score of 7 or greater on the Y–BOCS (Goodman et al., 1989). 
Comorbid symptoms of depression and anxiety were measured by Hamilton Depression 
(Hamilton, 1960) and Anxiety (Hamilton, 1959) Rating Scales (HDRS and HARS, respectively). 
Exclusion criteria included: any other mental disorder revealed by the Mini-International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI Plus; except for OCD) (Sheehan et al., 1998), any acute and/or 
chronic medical illness as assessed by a physical examination and routine laboratory 
examination, females who are pregnant or lactating and substance dependence within the 
previous 12 months. From 26 patients initially enrolled, 3 dropped out, 3 were not considered 
due to technical issues related with images acquisition and thus only 20 were analyzed. The 
three matching controls were also excluded from the analysis. 
Healthy controls were carefully recruited to match OCD patients for age, sex, educational level, 
ethnical origin, and dominance. Exclusion criteria included previous history of neuropsychiatric 
disorder, any present mental disorder revealed by MINI Plus and use of any medication 
(excluding oral contraceptives). 
The present study was conducted in accordance with principles expressed in the Declaration of 
Helsinki and the Ethics Committee of Hospital de Braga (Braga, Portugal) approved it. The study 
goals and tests were previously explained to all participants and all gave informed written 
consent. 
 
fMRI Paradigm: Gambling Task 
During fMRI participants performed a gambling task (Figure 1), adapted from Macoveanu and 
colleagues (2013), that required subjects to make a choice between two sets of playing cards 
displayed face down. The choice was made using a response box on the right hand by clicking on 
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the left button with the index finger to choose the set on the left side of the screen or clicking on 
the right button with the middle finger to choose the set on the right side of the screen. One of 
the sets included the “ace of hearts” and subjects were required to choose in which set it was 
hidden. If the subject chose correctly they won the associated reward. If not, they lost the bet. 
The objective was to maximize the overall profit. 
Each gamble had a stable trial structure consisting of an information, decision and outcome 
phase (Figure 1A). In the information phase, participants were provided with information about 
their total amount, which started with 0.50€ (approx. 0.4 USD) and a fixed bet of 5. In the 
decision phase, two sets of cards were presented face down together with the associated reward 
and subjects made their choice. The outcome phase revealed the “ace of hearts”, giving the 
subjects feedback about whether they had won or lost. In each gambling trial, seven cards were 
divided in two sets (Figure 1B), resulting in six possible risk scenarios with a parametric variation 
of the odds, ranging from 1/7 (low probability to win) to 6/7 (high probability to win). Choosing 
the set with the lower number of cards was associated with a higher risk but also with a 
correspondingly higher reward when the subjects had chosen correctly. Thus, participants would 
repeatedly choose between a larger set of cards associated with a smaller, likely reward and a 
smaller set associated with a larger, but less likely reward. For choices with winning probability of 
more than 50% (i.e., odds of 6/7, 5/7 or 4/7), the reward was matched to the amount of the 
bet. For choices with a winning probability of less than 50%, the possible reward exceeded the 
bet by the factor 11 for a winning probability of 1/7, 4 for bets with a winning probability of 2/7, 
or 1.66 for a winning probability of 3/7. The magnitude of losses was matched to the bet 
independent of the chosen risk. The gambling task was performed in two sessions each lasting 
11 min. In each of the two sessions there were 28 choices between one and six cards, 28 
choices between two and five cards, 28 choices between three and four cards and 28 null events 
of the same length as a real event where a fixation cross was presented instead of the task 
screen. The events were pseudo-randomized across the two sessions that only differed in their 
event randomization. The task was tuned to stimulate an even distribution of choices across all 
risk levels by varying the reward value with the size of the assumed risk so that the expected 
value (i.e., the sum of probabilistically weighted wins and losses) would match across all possible 
choices. The experimental design enabled us to associate neural activity related to negative or 
positive outcomes to the riskiness of choice behavior. In particular, we were able to assess 
differential outcome related activity depending on whether the decision preceding it was risk-
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averse (i.e., playing it safe but being punished for it) or risk-taking (i.e., taking a risk and being 
punished for it). 
 
MRI aquistion 
All subjects were scanned on a clinical approved 1.5 T Siemens Magnetom Avanto scanner 
(Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) using a12-channel receive-only head array coil 
was used. The same acquisition protocol was used in all participants and included, among 
others, the following acquisitions: Siemens Auto Align scout protocol in order to minimize 
alterations in head positioning; high-resolution whole-brain 3D T1-weighted Magnetization 
Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) acquisition with 176 sagittal slices (repetition time (TR) 
= 2730 ms, echo time (TE) = 3.5 ms, field of view (FoV) = 256 x 256 mm2, flip angle (FA) = 7°, 
in-plane resolution = 1 x 1 mm2 and slice thickness of 1 mm); T2* weighted echo-planar imaging 
(EPI) acquisition (38 interleaved axial slices, TR = 2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, FoV = 250 x 250 mm2 
, FA = 90°, in-plane resolution = 3 x 3 mm 2, slice thickness = 3 mm, between-slice gap = 0.9 
mm ). 315 volumes with BOLD contrast were acquired using the T2* acquisition in two separate 
runs, making a total of 630 volumes acquired during the gambling task. The task stimuli were 
presented using the fully integrated fMIR system IFIS-SA (Invivo Corporation, Orlando, FL, USA) 
and the same system was used to record the subject key-press responses.  
 
Volumetric Analysis 
Estimation of gray and white matter structures’ volumes from the T1-weighted structural MRI 
data was performed using the freely available Freesurfer toolkit version 5.1 
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu). The pipeline and procedures employed were improved over 
the last decade and have been validated across sessions, scanner platforms, updates and field 
strengths. The data was initially converted to to Freesurfer’s MGZ (compressed Massachusetts 
General Hospital file) file format and then processed with the standard pipeline. Briefly, the 
pipeline involves the following steps: pre-processing of MRI images; non-uniform intensity 
normalization; normalization to the standard Talairach space using a twelve degrees of freedom 
afﬁne transformation; intensity normalization with corrections of fluctuations in scan intensity; 
skull stripping; linear and non-linear registrations of the patient volume to the FreeSurfer atlas 
when applying segmentation labels cortical and subcortical structures; reconstruction of cortical 
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surfaces and tessellation of the GM and WM boundary and pial surfaces; inflation of each 
tessellated cortical surf and registration to a spherical atlas; parcellation according to gyri-sulci 
folding patterns.  
Manual adjustments and visual inspection in the normalization procedure, skull stripping, WM 
segmentation and pial surface boundary, were performed whenever necessary. Estimated 
intracranial volume (ICV) was used to correct the volumetric data. 
 
Functional Analysis 
Before statistical analysis, functional data from all participants was preprocessed using the 
Statistical Parametric Mapping version 8 (SPM8) software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). 
The preprocessing procedures included: slice-timing correction using the first volume as 
reference; field-map reconstruction in order to obtain the corresponding voxel displacement maps 
(VDMs); realignment to the first volume of the acquisition and unwarping using the corresponding 
VDM to correct for geometric distortions; spatial normalization to Montreal Neurologic Institute 
(MNI) standard space and resampling to 2x2x2 mm3 voxel size; spatial smoothing with a 8 mm 
full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel; high pass temporal filtering at 128 s.  
Each subject’s dataset was then analyzed in the context of the General Linear Model (GLM). For 
the first level GLMs, the 6 risk-levels were grouped: odds of 1/7 and 2/7 formed the high-risk 
group, odds of 3/7 and 4/7 were modeled as medium-risk and odds of 5/7 and 6/7 formed the 
low-risk group. These risk-groups were modeled in 3 conditions: during the decision-making 
stage, when receiving negative outcomes and when the bets resulted in positive outcomes. As so, 
9 regressors of interest were modeled, one for each combination of risk-level and condition. 
Moreover, 8 additional regressors were included (1 for the information phase, 1 for the missed 
bets and 6 for the motion parameters). The two runs were analyzed in the same GLM, modeling 
the 17 regressors for each run and 2 additional regressors, one for each session. In total 36 
regressors were included for each participant. 
For the second level (group level) random-effects analysis, the average contrasts of the first level 
across both runs were considered for the 9 regressors of interest. These contrasts were analyzed 
in three different group (2: controls vs OCD) x condition (3: high vs medium vs low risk) ANOVA 
models: one for the decision phase, one for negative outcomes and one for positive outcomes. 
For each model overall effect (one-sample t-test), group effect, risk effect and group by risk 
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interaction were analyzed. These models were implemented with GLMFlex 
(http://nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/harvardagingbrain/People/AaronSchultz/GLM_Flex.html), which 
uses partitioned error terms for within-group and between-group comparisons, thus enabling the 
estimation of all the effects of interest with a single model. 
The one-sample t-test results were considered significant at a height threshold of p < 0.05 after 
Family wise Error (correction). For the remaining comparisons, all results were considered 
significant at p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons using a combination of an uncorrected 
height threshold of p<0.005 with a minimum cluster size. The cluster size was determined over 
1000 Monte Carlo simulations using AlphaSim program distributed with REST software tool 
(http://resting-fmri.sourceforge.net/). This resulted in a minimum cluster size of 952 mm3 for 
between-group comparisons and 1040 mm3 for within-group comparisons. The different cluster 
size requirements result from differences on the estimated smoothness of the residuals of those 
models. 
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Results 
Behavioral correlates of indecisiveness in risky decision-making 
Data shows that patients with OCD take longer time to decide their options in a risky decision-
making paradigm, particularly when high risky is involved (High Risk: P < 0.05, Intermediate 
Risk: P=0.08; Low Risk: P=0.12 Figure 2; Panel B). Moreover, the differential response times 
from the first to the last block of options decreased less in OCD patients that in controls (High 
Risk: P=0.25, Intermediate Risk: P=0.52; Low Risk: P<0.05, Figure 2, Panel C). This pattern of 
altered temporal dynamics reveals an impairment in deciding in OCD patients. 
Interestingly, no differences in choice preferences between OCD patients and controls (Odd 1/7: 
P=0.84; Odd 2/7: P=0.36; Odd 3/7: P=0.86; Odd 4/7: P=0.73; Odd 5/7: 0.43; Odd 6/7: 0.55, 
Figure 2, Panel A).  
 
OCD patients display abnormal amygdala activation during risky options and are 
more sensitive to losses 
As shown in Table 2, the task used herein triggered in all subjects activations in regions in the 
(orbito)fronto-striato-thalamic circuit as well as areas outside this loop, such as anterior cingulate 
cortex, when choosing high risk options. Additionally, we also show that receiving a positive 
outcome after a high risk choice (versus a low risk choice) was associated with higher activation 
of insular, orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortical areas (Table 3). 
In OCD patients, the decision phase of the paradigm triggered a significant lower activity on the 
caudate nucleus, a striatal area known to be disrupted in the disorder [t(19)=4.89, P<0.005, 
Figure 4, panel A] and critical for goal-directed actions. Additionally, when compared with 
controls, OCD subjects displayed an inverse pattern of amygdalar activation: on one hand, there 
was a significant deactivation of the amygdala before high risk choices and on the other hand, an 
increased activation of this brain region before low risk choices [F(1,19)=15.42, Figure 4, panel 
B). 
Importantly, upon receiving a negative outcome, OCD patients showed an increased activation of 
(orbito)fronto-striatal regions and the anterior cingulate cortex (Table 4) (Figure 5). No significant 
differences were found between OCD subjects and controls in positive outcomes. 
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Finally, the a volumetric analysis revealed that OCD patients have a significant atrophy on 
relevant brain areas for decision-making such as the left insula, the right pars triangularis and the 
right pars opercularis (P<0.05, Figure 3). 
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Discussion 
Doubt is a central feature in OCD. The underlying mechanisms for this difficulty to decide at still 
being unraveled. Conceptually, decision situations which provide explicit rules for rewards and 
punishments, and obvious probabilities (decisions under risk conditions), can be differentiated 
from situations in which information about contingencies and gains and losses is not available 
(decisions under ambiguity) (see Bechara, 2004 and Brand et al., 2006). Interestingly, OCD 
patients were described to be affected on the latter, but not to display deficits on the former 
(REFS). Herein, we show that is only partially true: while OCD patients did not differ from controls 
in the pattern of risky choices, they reveal signs of indecisiveness, a characteristic of the disease, 
that does not seem to disappear with the short-term repetition of the task. Interestingly, our 
finding of decreased caudate activation in OCD patients points to a hypoactivation of the 
associative network that rules goal-directed behaviors, which hints to the possibility that these 
individual develop a bias for habitual actions. 
This bias to habits has been shown to be influence by several factors, including stress exposure 
(Soares et al., 2013). Importantly, we have previously demonstrated that OCD patients display 
traces of increased stress and anxiety that correlate with behavioral symptoms. The stress-
induced deficits in instrumental decision-making have been proved to be dependent on 
alterations in corticostriatal networks that are also implicated in OCD. This is probably not a mere 
coincidence but rather the confirmation that the same neuronal networks are involved and that 
the decision impairments are central in the ethipathogenesis of this disorder. Interestingly, this 
study has also revealed a pattern of cortical atrophy in the left insula, the right pars triangularis 
and pars opercularis.  
The insula is known to be involved in both early and late effects of subject-specific risk 
preferences, suggestive of a role in both risk assessment and risk anticipation during choice 
(Symmonds et al., 2013). While the early effect indicates a possible role in a risk-processing 
network, the later insula response is consistent with an affective component in risky choice, 
particularly as it follows rather than precedes choice-sensitive premotor activity. Thus, the finding 
of structural abnormalities in this brain region is likely to produce different risk preference profiles 
in OCD. In addition, the structural changes in pars opercularis and triangularis are probably 
related to the inhibition of responses that are critical for response selection (Mostofsky and 
Simmonds, 2008; Picard and Strick, 2001; Rizzolatti et al., 2002); interestingly, this may be 
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particularly relevant if the emotional processing is disturbed. Nowadays a growing interest in the 
mechanisms by which the limbic substrates for emotion perception influence the inferior frontal 
inhibitory circuits, has converged on the amygdala, which receives extensive sensory input (Price, 
2003), and in turn, has bidirectional functional connections with the prefrontal cortex (Hampton 
et al., 2007; Herwig et al., 2007). The amygdala is believed to encode the emotional value of 
stimuli (Dolan, 2007; Pego and Sousa, 2013) and is consistently engaged by affective stimuli 
(Costafreda et al., 2008; Phan et al., 2002). Noticeable, the present study reveals abnormal 
amygdalar activation in OCD patients that probably influences the substantial differences in the 
sensitivity to losses, but not to gains, displayed by our OCD patients. The differential sensitivity to 
the outcome is relevant, in as much as it helps understanding the genesis of the conflict in the 
decision-making process – a fear to loose - and points for future areas of therapeutic 
interventions.  
We hypothesize that the indecisiveness displayed by OCD patients might be correlated with the 
differential activation pattern of the amygdala, a key-region for decision-making as it pre-emptively 
signals good and bad choices. In addition, the increased activation of the orbito-fronto-striatal 
loop upon receiving a negative outcome suggests that OCD patients are more sensible to losses, 
which may mediate their previously described risk-aversion. These results contribute for the 
comprehension of decision-making impairments among OCD patients, although more studies are 
needed to detail the brain circuits involved. 
 
  
87 
 
References 
 
Abramowitz JS, Taylor S, McKay D. (2009). Obsessive-compulsive disorder. Lancet. 374: 491–
99. 
Bechara A. (2004). The role of emotion in decision-making: evidence from neurological patients 
with orbitofrontal damage. Brain Cogn. 55(1):30-40. 
Brand M, Labudda K, Kalbe E, Hilker R, Emmans D, Fuchs G, Kessler J, Markowitsch HJ. 
(2004). Decision-making impairments in patients with Parkinson's disease. Behav 
Neurol. 15(3-4): 77-85. 
Cavallaro R, Cavedini P, Mistretta P, Basso T, Angelone SM, Ubbiali A, Bellodi L, 2003. Basal-
corticofrontal circuits in schizophrenia and obsessive–compulsive disorder: a 
controlled double dissociation study. Biological Psychiatry 54, 437–443. 
Cavedini P, Riboldi G, D'Annucci A, Bellotti P, Fisima M, Bellodi L. 2002. Decision-making 
heterogeneity in obsessive–compulsive disorder: ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
function predicts different treatment outcomes. Neuropsychologia40, 205–211 
Costafreda SG, Brammer MJ, David AS, Fu CH. (2008). Predictors of amygdala activation during 
the processing of emotional stimuli: a meta-analysis of 385 PET and fMRI studies. 
Brain Res Rev.  58(1):57-70. 
Dolan RJ. (2007), The human amygdala and orbital prefrontal cortex in behavioural regulation. 
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 362(1481): 787-99. 
Goodman WK, Price LH, Rasmussen SA, Mazure C, Fleischmann RL, Hill CL. (1989). The Yale-
Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale. I. Development, use, and reliability. Arch Gen 
Psychiatry 46, 1006–11. 
Graybiel AM, Rauch SL. Toward a neurobiology of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Neuron. 2000; 
28(2):343-347. 
Hamilton M. A rating scale for depression. (1960). J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiat 23, 50-5. 
88 
Hamilton M.The assessment of anxiety states by rating. (1959). Br J Med Psychol 32, 50–55. 
Hampton AN, Adolphs R, Tyszka MJ, O'Doherty JP. (2007). Contributions of the amygdala to 
reward expectancy and choice signals in human prefrontal cortex. Neuron. 55(4):545-
55. 
Herwig U, Baumgartner T, Kaffenberger T, Brühl A, Kottlow M, Schreiter-Gasser U, Abler B, 
Jäncke L, Rufer M. (2007). Modulation of anticipatory emotion and perception 
processing by cognitive control. Neuroimage. 37(2):652-62. 
Janet, P. (1903). Les Obsessions et La Psychasthenie Paris: Felix Alcan. 
Lagemann, T, Rentzsch J, Montag C, Gallinat J, Jockers-Scherübl M, Winter C, Reischies FM. 
2012. Early orbitofrontal hyperactivation in obsessive–compulsive disorder, Psychiatry 
Research: Neuroimaging. 
Macoveanu J, Rowe JB, Hornboll B, Elliott R, Paulson OB, Knudsen GM, Siebner HR. (2013). 
Playing it safe but losing anyway - Serotonergic signaling of negative outcomes in 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in the context of risk-aversion. Eur 
Neuropsychopharmacol. 23(8): 919-30. 
Mostofsky SH, Simmonds DJ. (2008). Response inhibition and response selection: two sides of 
the same coin. J Cogn Neurosci. 20(5):751-61. 
Pêgo JM, Sousa N. (2013). How repeated and unpredictable experiences turn into fear-
memories. Front Neurosci. 7:17. 
Phan KL, Wager T, Taylor SF, Liberzon I. (2002). Functional neuroanatomy of emotion: a meta-
analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI. Neuroimage. 16(2):331-48. 
Picard N, Strick PL. Imaging the premotor areas. Curr Opin Neurobiol. 11(6):663-72. 
Price JL. (2003). Comparative aspects of amygdala connectivity. Ann N Y Acad Sci. 985:50-8. 
Rizzolatti G, Fogassi L, Gallese V. (2002). Motor and cognitive functions of the ventral premotor 
cortex. Curr Opin Neurobiol. 12(2):149-54. 
89 
 
Saxena, S., Brody, A.L., Schwartz, J.M., Baxter, L.R., 1998. Neuroimaging and frontal– 
subcortical circuitry in obsessive–compulsive disorder. British Journal of Psychiatry 
(Suppl 35), 26–37 
Sheehan DV, Lecrubier Y, Sheehan KH, Amorim P, Janavs J, Weiller E, Hergueta T, Baker R, 
Dunbar GC. (1998). The Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.): the 
development and validation of a structured diagnostic psychiatric interview for DSM-IV 
and ICD-10. J Clin Psychiatry Suppl 20, 22-33. 
Soares JM, Sampaio A, Ferreira LM, Santos NC, Marques F, Palha JA, Cerqueira JJ, Sousa N. 
(2012). Stress-induced changes in human decision-making are reversible. Transl 
Psychiatry 2, e131. 
Starcke K, Tuschen-Caffier B, Markowitsch HJ, Brand M. (2010). Dissociation of de- cisions in 
ambiguous and risky situations in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Res. 
175: 114-120 
Symmonds M, Moran RJ, Wright ND, Bossaerts P, Barnes G, Dolan RJ. (2013). The chronometry 
of risk processing in the human cortex. Front Neurosci. 7:146. 
Westenberg HG, Fineberg NA, Denys D. (2007). Neurobiology of obsessive-compulsive disorder: 
serotonin and beyond. CNS Spectr. 12 (2 Suppl 3): 14–27. 
 
  
90 
Tables 
 
Table 1. Socio-demographic and clinical characteristics of patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder 
and healthy comparison subjects. 
Characteristics Subjects with OCD (n=20) Healthy comparison 
subjects (n=20) 
Statistics 
Age, years 
[mean ± S.D. (range)] 
28.05 ± 7.22 (19-42) 26.60 ± 4.90 (20-40) P = 0.86 
Male/female 6/14 6/14  
Education, years 
[mean ± S.D. (range)] 
13.15 ± 3.76 (6-24) 14.60 ± 3.75 (9-24) P = 0.158 
Age of onset 
[mean ± S.D. (range)] 
21.65 ± 7.26 (9-35)   
Y-BOCS (total score) 24.55 ± 8.03 (12-30)   
HDRS (global score) 6.90 ± 2.82 (4-15)   
HARS (global score) 4.75 ± 3.50 (0-18)   
PSS-10 22.05 ± 7.53 (6-33) 12.55 ± 4.10 (7-20) P < 0.01* 
Medication Only SSRI – 16 (80%) 
SSRI with TCA – 4 (20%) 
  
OCD = obsessive–compulsive disorder, Y-BOCS = Yale–Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale, HDRS = Hamilton 
Depression Rating Scale, HARS = Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale, SSRI = Serotonin Selective Reuptake Inhibitors, 
TCA = Tricyclic Antidepressant. 
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Table 2. Response rate during the decision phase of the experimental paradigm. Comparison between 
high and low risk choices (significance: p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons with Monte Carlo 
(ppeak<0.005 cluster size>130). 
Condition Regions Peak MNI 
coordinates 
Cluster size 
(voxels) 
Maximum Z 
score 
Decision phase  Putamen (left) -16, 14, -2 462 6.41 
(high>low) Ant Cingulum (right) 10, 28, 26 2037 5.84 
 Ant Cingulum (left) -2, 26, 28 2037 5.04 
 Caudate (right) 12, 10, 6 441 5.00 
 Frontal Sup Medial (left) 2, 28, 48 2037 4.73 
 Pallidum (left) -10, 0, 0 462 4.11 
 Supplementary Motor Area (left) 0,10, 62 2037 4.53 
 Thalamus (right) 14, -10, 16 441 4.51 
 Caudate (right) 16, -4, 2 441 4.28 
 Precentral (left) -56, 4 , 18 229 4.26 
 Med Cingulum (right) 14, 20, 36 2037 4.23 
 Frontal Inf Tri (right) 50,24, 12 221 4.29 
 Parietal Superior (left) -24, -70, 58 229 4.05 
 Parietal Inferior (right) 40, -46, 50 401 4.04 
 Insula (left) -24, 20, -8 172 3.94 
 Parietal Inferior (left) -48, -58, 44 504 3.91 
 Parietal Superior (right) 38, -48, 62 401 3.91 
 Med Cingulum (left) 0, 16, 48 2037 3.70 
 Frontal Inf Opercularis (left) -48, 6, 28 229 3.28 
 Orbitofrontal Inferior (left) -44, 18, -6 172 3.27 
     
Decision phase  Calcarine (left) -12, -66, 16 157 3.64 
(high<low) Precuneus (left) 0, -64, 24 157 3.30 
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Table 3. Response rate during the outcome phase of the experimental paradigm. Comparison between 
high and low risk choices with positive (A) or negative (B) outcomes (significance: p<0.05 corrected for 
multiple comparisons with Monte Carlo (ppeak<0.005 cluster size>130). 
Condition Regions Peak MNI 
coordinates 
Cluster size 
(voxels) 
Maximum Z 
score 
Positive Outcomes Med Cingulum (right) 6, 32, 36 279 5.39 
(high > low) Ant Cingulum (right) 8, 32, -4 198 4.72 
 Insula (left) -26, 16, -14 151 4.52 
 Olfactory (right) 4, 24, -4 198 4.44 
 Frontal Sup Medial (left) 4, 54, 26 325 4.01 
 Orbitofrontal Inferior (right) 28, 30, -18 159 3.67 
 Ant Cingulum (right) 8, 52, 8 325 3.63 
 Orbitofrontal Inferior (left) -20, 8, -22 151 3.12 
     
Positive Outcomes Postcentral (left) -18, -30, 64 253 -4.77 
(high < low) Postcentral (right) 12, -40,68 203 -4.25 
 Precentral (right) 34, -22, 66 162 -4.24 
 Precuneus (left) -12, -42, 62 253 -4.04 
     
Negative Outcomes Temporal Superior (right) 48, -24, -2 134 5.09 
(high > low) Occipital Superior (left) -20, -66, 36 283 4.91 
 Precuneus (left) -14, -56, 40 283 4.31 
 Temporal Medium (right) 58, -28, 0 134 3.63 
 Temporal Inferior (right) 50, -64, -8 362 3.49 
     
Negative Outcomes - - - - 
(high < low) - - - - 
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Table 4. Response rate during negative outcomes. Comparison between OCD patients and 
controls. [significance: p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons with Monte Carlo (ppeak<0.005 cluster 
size>119)]. 
Condition Regions Peak MNI 
coordinates 
Cluster size 
(voxels) 
Maximum Z 
score 
Negative Outcomes - - - - 
(Controls > OCD) - - - - 
     
Negative Outcomes Postcentral (left) -18, -30, 64 253 -4.77 
(Controls < OCD) Postcentral (right) 12, -40,68 203 -4.25 
 Precentral (right) 34, -22, 66 162 -4.24 
 Precuneus (left) -12, -42, 62 253 -4.04 
 Temporal Inferior (right) 64, -28, -20 244 -5.43 
 Temporal Mid (right) 66, -28, -6 244 -5.32 
 Frontal Mid (left) -24, 22, 34 293 -4.89 
 Frontal Inferior Opercularis (left) -58, 6, 6 167 -4.60 
 Parietal Superior (right) 20, -56, 64 384 -4.36 
 Frontal Superior (left) -16, 64, 26 220 -4.21 
 Putamen (left) -20, 6, 10 135 -4.18 
 Frontal Mid (right) 38, 33, 54 133 -4.10 
 Frontal Sup Medial (left) 2, 50, 34 203 -4.09 
 Putamen (left) -18, 6, 12 135 -3.96 
 Occipital Inf (right) 26, -96, -8 149 -3.58 
 Frontal Superior (right) 30, 32, 54 133 -3.56 
 Cingulum Mid (left) -2, 6, 38 337 -3.49 
 Cingulum Mid (right) 12, 4, 42 337 -3.48 
 Frontal Sup Medial (right) 12, 54, 40 203 -3.46 
 Parietal Sup (left) -32, -48, 64 187 -3.42 
 Obritofrontal Mid (left) -4, 42, -12 146 -3.36 
 Pallidum (left) -18, 4, 0 135 -3.16 
 Temporal Sup (left) -60, 2, -6 167 -2.81 
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Figure 1. Gambling task. (A) Temporal structure of a single gambling trial. Each trial was 
divided into three phases: information, decision and outcome. (B) Possible choices with 
associated risk levels and rewards. Choices 1 and 2 were categorized as high-risk, 3 and 4 as 
medium-risk, 5 and 6 as low-risk. [from Macoveanu et al. (2013) with permission]. 
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Figure 2. Pattern of responses. (A) Distribution of choices across the six risk levels (odds). 
No significant differences were found among groups. (B) Distribution of response times across 
the three risk levels in the last block (High Risk: 1/7 and 2/7 odds; Intermediate risk: 3/7 and 
4/7 odds; Low Risk: 5/7 and 6/7 odds); OCD patients spend more time to make choices in all 
different odds, with significantly higher times in high risk choices (C) Variation of response times 
between last and first block; OCD patients displayed smaller variations in all different odds, 
mainly in the low risk ones. Results are present as mean + SEM (n=20, per group). *, P < 0.05. 
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Figure 3. Volumetric data. OCD patients display atrophy of left insular cortex and areas of 
inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis and pars opercularis). Results are present as mean + SEM 
(n=20, per group). *, P < 0.05. 
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Figure 4. Pattern of activation during the decision phase. (A) Controls display a higher 
activation in the right caudate nuclei [significance: p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons 
with Monte Carlo (ppeak<0.005 cluster size>119)]. (B) Paradoxical pattern of amygdalar 
activation among three different odds were found between OCD patients and healthy controls. 
[significance: p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons with Monte Carlo (ppeak<0.005 cluster 
size>130)].   
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Figure 5. Pattern of activation during negative outcomes. OCD patients display a higher 
activation in several brain areas [significance: p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons with 
Monte Carlo (ppeak<0.005 cluster size>119)]. 
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3. DISCUSSION 
 
Decisions based in the probability of future events (e.g. assuming risks) are routine in our lives. 
Importantly, the algorithm of decision-making processes in adaptive organisms is dynamic as the 
subject, based on previous experiences, is able to weigh the risks and benefits of each option, 
selecting the alternative that is most valuable. Exposure to stress, which is known to affect brain 
structure and function and have important consequences in our behaviour, is also a feature of 
our lives that can influence, positively and/or negatively, decisions. Chronic stress was found to 
bias behavior from goal-directed to habit-based in tasks where outcomes are easily predicted 
(Dias-Ferreira, 2009). However, an ongoing challenge lays in the exploration of how chronic 
stress influences choice processes when consequences are unknown, that is, decision-making 
under risk. 
The primary aim of the present work was to analyze the impact of chronic stress on decision-
making processes, particularly those involving risk, using both a variety of animal paradigms and 
exploring specific features of psychiatric conditions in which patients characteristically present 
impaired decision-making abilities. We first explored the impact of chronic stress on two 
paradigms of decision-making in rats: the pavlovian to instrumental transfer (PIT - presented in 
Chapter 2.1.) and a newly developed task to assess decisions involving uncertainty and risk 
(presented in Chapter 2.2). We then assessed the relationship between the stress response and 
decision-making in patients with OCD (presented in Chapter 2.3.) and started to explore the 
neural networks involved (Chapter 2.4.). 
 
3.1. Animal decision-making paradigms 
Throughout this work we aimed at further characterizing the impact of chronic stress in decision-
making, analyzing underlying cerebral mechanisms that might explain the behavioral changes 
encountered. In order to pursue this goal, the use of decision-making animal models, allowing a 
detailed dissection of the different decision-components and a complete analysis of the brain 
mechanisms involved, was of the utmost importance. Indeed, the use of animal models in the 
field of neuroeconomics has been extensively validated (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010), driven 
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mainly by methodological considerations, since several research techniques leading to important 
physiological and biochemical insights cannot be used in humans, for ethical or practical 
reasons. Importantly, with the recent developments in non-invasive techniques, particularly in the 
field of MRI and EEG/MEG, this is a changing scenario, as can be gleaned from the preliminary 
results presented in Chapter 2.4. 
The first animal paradigm to be tested was PIT (Chapter 2.1.), a well characterized task that 
evaluates the ability of environmental cues (conditioned stimuli) to modulate instrumental 
actions. The influence of cues on instrumental behavior underlies many aspects of everyday life 
and could guide decisions in many adaptive situations, such as cues that guide behavior to 
obtain food or water when hungry or thirsty (Perks and Clifton, 1997). Additionally, this 
mechanism has been implicated in the genesis of pathological behaviors in some psychiatric 
disorders such as addiction (Robinson and Berridge, 2008) and compulsive over-eating (Volkow 
et al., 2008). 
Performance on instrumental decision-making tasks is dependent on two different learning 
processes: one, responsible for goal-directed actions, encodes the relationship between actions 
(response, R) and its consequences (outcome, O); other, responsible for habit learning, is 
governed by stimulus-response (S-R) associations, not incorporating changes in outcome value 
(tested by outcome devaluation tasks) neither changes in the casual relationship between an 
action and its consequences (tested by contingency degradation tasks) (Balleine and O’Doherty, 
2010). In addition, instrumental behavior is also influenced by environmental cues (stimuli, S) 
that, by means of a pavlovian associative mechanism, signal the presence or absence of a 
reward (outcome, O) (Doya, 2008). It is the influence of such associative learning (SO) on 
instrumental actions (mainly RO) that is the focus of PIT tasks (Holmes et al., 2010). 
PIT was firstly described in several animal species, including rodents (Estes, 1943), and only 
more recently has been demonstrated in humans (Paredes-Olay et al., 2002). Using a natural 
reward, such as food or water, animal models of PIT were shown to be highly reliable as a model 
of cue-controlled behavior, in which decisions are highly influenced by environmental or internal 
cues (Holmes et al., 2010). This is of relevance for the study of addictive and/or compulsive 
disorders, of which these behaviors are a hallmark (Hogarth et al., 2013). 
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The neuronal networks that mediate the PIT effect are diverse and include several brain regions 
such as amygdala, nucleus accumbens, striatum and prefrontal cortex (reviewed by Holmes et 
al., 2010). Importantly, Basolateral Nucleus of Amygdala (BLA), rather than the Central Nucleus 
(CN), is critically involved in the assignment of each cue to a particular outcome (Schoenbaum et 
al., 1998; Holland et al., 2002; Pickens et al., 2003) whereas the CN appears to be more 
involved in appetitive arousal and general motivation (Wallace et al., 1992; Balleine and Killcross, 
2006; Kaufling et al., 2009). It has been also demonstrated that, while the NAcore mediates the 
general excitatory effects of reward-related cues, the NAshell mediates the effect of outcome-
specific reward predictions on instrumental performance. These areas interact with cortical 
regions, such as the mPFC and the OFC, integrating affective stimuli with executive commands 
(Christakou et al., 2004; Kelley, 2004; Pasupathy and Miller, 2005; Saddoris et al., 2005; 
Stalnaker et al., 2007). Indeed, Homayoun and Moghaddam (2009) demonstrated that OFC and 
mPFC orchestrate the integration of Pavlovian and instrumental processes during PIT. 
Secondly, we used a new decision making paradigm for rodents, designed to explore specific 
features of risk-based decisions (Chapter 2.2.). Animals, like humans, have to make “economic 
decisions”, adapting their choice behavior to maximize benefits while minimizing resource 
expenditure (in most animal cases amounting to energy). Indeed, several studies have shown 
strong similarities between human and animal models of decision-making, including those related 
with decision under risk (Kalensscher and Wingerden, 2011). However, there are some 
differences that should be discussed and taken into account when analyzing results of decision-
making tasks in rodents: first, humans are usually verbally informed about rules, times and 
probabilities in a one-shot scenario while animals learn those determinants of decision in multi-
trial settings; second, in human gambling tasks the incentive is usually money while rodent 
models of decision making often use food and/or water as a reinforcer, thus requiring previous 
food and/or water deprivation; third, animals cannot finish the session with less than what they 
had at beginning and, as a consequence, they cannot work to restore the initial budget as it could 
happen in human gambling tasks (Champbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2007). Despite all of these 
limitations, however, behavior observed in animal models of decision-making tends to mimic the 
behavior observed in human subjects (Wallis, 2011). 
Given the interest in neuroeconomics, the dissection of the neural substrate of economic 
decisions, and the possibility of studying such behaviors in animals, including rodents, several 
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experimental paradigms of gambling and/or risky decision-making in rats have been put forward 
in the past years. One of the most popular is the rodent equivalent of the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT), developed for humans by Bechara and collaborators (1994) and adapted for rodents by 
van den Bos (2006), Pais Vieira (2007), Rivalan (2009) and Zeeb (2009). In IGT, the subject has 
to choose between four options (cards in humans; levers, maze arms or nose poke apertures in 
rodents), two of which yield higher rewards but also, randomly presented, higher losses than the 
other two, resulting in an overall net loss when choosing the former (disadvantageous options) 
comparing with an overall net gain when choosing the latter (advantageous options). Choices in 
this paradigm depend on the factoring of value, uncertainty and, particularly, time-discount, with 
near sighted subjects more sensitive to immediate gains that to long-term losses, constituting an 
interesting model of complex economic decisions. Extensive research has shown that 
performance of the IGT depends on the activity of several brain areas including the ventro-medial 
prefrontal cortex (Bechara et al., 1999; Fellows and Farah, 2005), the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (Manes et al., 2002; Bolla et al., 2004; Fellows and Farah, 2005), the orbitofrontal cortex 
(Manes et al., 2002, Bolla et al., 2004; Hsu et al., 2005), anterior cingulate cortex (Tucker et al., 
2004), the amygdala (Hsu et al., 2005) and the striatum (Hsu et al., 2005). Additionally, IGT 
performance was shown to be negatively affected by stress both in humans (van den Bos et al., 
2009) and rodents (Koot et al., 2013) and highly vulnerable to dopaminergic manipulations 
(Zeeb et al., 2009). 
Besides IGT, other paradigms have been developed. These include: (1) risk-discounting task 
(Cardinal and Howes, 2005; Floresco et al., 2008), where subjects have to choose between 
small certain rewards and large probabilistically delivered rewards presented in a crescent 
and/or descendent manner which allows the evaluation of preference for risky vs. certain 
rewards (in the equal rewards condition), and preference for large vs. small rewards (in the equal 
probabilities condition); (2) delay-discounting task, supported by the observation that the value of 
a reward is discounted over time (Mazur, 1987), is characterized by choice between smaller 
rewards available immediately versus larger rewards available after a varying delay and has 
frequently been used for study impulsive choice both in humans (Dixon et al., 2003; Johnson 
and Bickel, 2002) and in rodents (Green and Estle, 2003; Ito and Asaki, 1982; Kobayashi and 
Schultz, 2008); (3) risk punishment decision task where rats choose between a small safe 
reward and a large reward advocated with punishment (Simon et al., 2007; Simon et al., 2009); 
(4) effort-discounting tasks (Floresco et al., 2008; Cocker et al., 2012) that evaluates cost/benefit 
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decision-making and where animals choose between a small reward obtainable after a low 
amount of physical effort and a larger reward after considerably more work. Although these tasks 
were developed to assess decision-making under uncertainty and risk, none isolates this factor 
from value and/or time-discounting, which makes interpretation of the results difficult. In order to 
overcome this difficulty, and contribute to the dissection of the neural substrates factoring 
uncertainty in the process of decision-making, we developed a novel risk-based decision-making 
task, presented in Chapter 2.2.. In each trial of this task animals have to choose between making 
a nose poke in a hole (which randomly varies from trial to trial and where no light is turned on) 
that always triggers the delivery of a reward (certain/safe option), or in one of four holes (where a 
light is turned on) that trigger the delivery of a 4 times bigger reward only 1 in 4 times 
(uncertain/risky options). Importantly, due to their design, both choices yield, on the long run, 
the same amount of reward, thus isolating uncertainty from both value and time-discounting. In 
addition, our newly developed task has other important differences when compared with 
previously described ones (Cardinal and Howes 2005, van den Bos, 2006; Floresco and Whelan, 
2009; Boulougouris et al., 2009; Zeeb et al., 2009; Simon et al., 2009): i) different options 
randomly vary across different holes, thus attenuating the interference of spatial reference 
memory in the choice processes; ii) in basal conditions, animals have a similar preference for the 
safe and each of the risk options, making analysis of behavior more informative. 
In the optimization of our protocol, we realized that small manipulations could have a profound 
impact in the behavioral pattern of choice displayed by rats. As an example, we found that when 
risk and safe options remain in the same position during the entire session, rats significantly 
increased their preference for safe choices (Annex I). This can just reflect the acquisition of an 
habitual behavior (always doing the nose poke in the same hole) or suggest that spatial reference 
memory (regarding the position of the different options) can strongly bias behavior, with either 
mechanism playing a relevant role in the performance of risk-based decision-making tasks and 
confounding the interpretation of results. To solve this limitation, we randomly changed the 
position of the “safe” hole from trial to trial and signalized it by turning on a small light inside. 
However, by testing this design, we found that the association between light and safe option also 
biased choices to safe holes (Annex I). Interestingly, this was an example of the modeling of 
operant actions by environmental cues, as discussed above, where the appetitive value of the 
light stimulus is transferred to the association between doing the nose poke in the safe hole and 
receiving a reward, promoting this decision in detriment of doing the nose poke in any of the risky 
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(non illuminated) holes. We dealt with this effect by keeping the random allocation of the safe 
hole in each trial, but turning on the light in each of the risky hole while keeping the safe hole in 
the dark. As expected, this, although it did not completely eliminate the impact of the 
environmental cues in the decision process, made animals evenly choose certain and uncertain 
options, without biases towards any of the holes, thus providing a neutral baseline from where 
variations in each way could be easily detected and analyzed (Chapter 2.2). In order to test the 
ability of our paradigm to discriminate differences in preference between risk and safe options, 
we decided to manipulate the value of each option, and found that animals were able to 
recognize such changes and shift their preference accordingly, as revealed by an increased 
preference to risky options when risk profit was doubled and to safe options when amount of 
reward was increased (Chapter 2.2). Importantly, the above-mentioned observations support the 
task design adopted in the subsequent studies of this thesis.  
Having optimized the protocol, we decided to analyze its neuroanatomical substrate by analyzing, 
using c-fos expression data, the regions whose activation was triggered by performance of the 
task. C-fos is an immediate early gene, whose expression and subsequent translation are 
triggered by neuronal activity, in a time dependent manner. In most brain regions, where the c-
fos protein is barely detected in basal conditions, neuronal activation is accompanied by a rapid 
and transient expression of the gene, detectable by an increased expression of its mRNA 30 to 
60 min latter and/or the presence of its protein product 60 to 90 min latter (Bisler et al., 2002). 
C-fos expression is widely used to map the brain regions whose activation is triggered by a 
stimulus or performance of a task, being particularly useful for cortical regions, where its 
expression is more abundant (delta-fos being more relevant when analyzing the activation of 
subcortical regions) (Bisler et al., 2002; Solinas et al., 2009). Our results demonstrate that our 
task recruits several brain regions known to be crucial for decision-making behaviors, including 
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the insular cortex, the 
nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and the dorsal striatum. In this regard, although the processing of 
uncertainty has been attributed to the loop between the NAcc and the OFC (Doya, 2008), it does 
not differ from similar tasks such as the ones previously described. 
An interesting extension of these studies would be the analysis of inter-subjects variability. As 
already mentioned, in basal conditions, animals showed a similar preference for risk and safe 
options. However, analysis of their individual performance revealed a high between-subjects 
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variability in risk or safe preference that, importantly, was relatively stable among sessions 
(Annex II). Of relevance, these inter-individual differences in preference for risk were also 
described in human risk-based decision-making tasks (DeVito et al., 2008; Gianotti et al., 2009; 
Parasuraman and Jiang, 2011), which additionally backs the validity of our behavioral model and 
can provide useful insights for future studies on behavioral and neurobiological correlates of 
decision-making. 
 
3.2. Stress induced behavioral impairments on decision making 
Several animal models of stress have been described in the literature. Differences between them 
are related with duration of treatment (acute or chronic), frequency of exposure to stressors 
(continuously, one-shot per day, two-shots per day), type of stressor (physical or psychological) 
and variability of stressor (only one stressor or series of several stressors). In this work, we used 
the chronic unpredictable stress (CUS) protocol in the rat, an animal model of stress extensively 
used in our lab that mimics the persistency and variability of stressful daily life-events. In CUS, 
the chronic and unpredictable nature of the stressful stimuli induces a persistent hyper-activation 
of the physiological stress response that in turn leads to a disruption of the coping mechanisms 
usually triggered by stress (Sousa and Almeida, 2002). Over the last years, our lab has shown 
that this disruption contributes to disturbed anxiety responses (Pêgo et al., 2006), impairments in 
spatial reference and working memory and behavioral flexibility (Cerqueira et al., 2007) and 
habit-based instead of goal directed decision-making (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009), and has 
explored its neurobiological substrates. In the work presented in this thesis, we complement 
these earlier works by showing that CUS further impairs decision-making, having an impact in PIT 
and risk-taking behavior.  
In Chapter 2.1 we showed that chronic stress impairs PIT and that this effect is reversible after 
six weeks of recovery from stress. The PIT task is composed of three phases: a pavlovian phase, 
in which stimulus-outcome (S-O) associations are established; an instrumental phase, in which 
actions to obtain reward (R-O) are trained and a test phase, in which the impact of the 
conditioned stimuli on instrumental actions is assessed (Holmes et al., 2010). As consistently 
demonstrated in the literature, impairments of PIT can arise from a disruption of each of the 
three phases (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Holland, 2004; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). However, 
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in our experiments, both pavlovian and instrumental learning were unaltered, which led us to 
postulate that the chronic stress-induced PIT impairment reported in chapter 2.2 results most 
probably from a deficit in the transfer between the two learning processes. Importantly, as 
already mentioned, this is critically dependent on the function of the prefrontal cortex, a key 
target of chronic stress, in both animals and humans.  
During decades, the enhancing effect of the conditioned stimulus on the instrumental response 
observed in PIT was attributed to the general motivating role of the conditioned stimulus (Estes, 
1943; Rescorla and Solomon, 1967; Holland and Gallagher, 2003). However, although this 
reasoning fits with data from a generalized form of PIT, it does not account for the response 
observed in specific outcome PIT protocols, such as the one employed in our experiments, in 
which a conditioned stimulus only enhances a specific action (that associated with the same 
outcome) and not any other. Taking into account this difficulty, Balleine and Ostlund (2007) 
recently proposed that PIT elicits a stimulus-outcome-response (S-O-R) associative chain that is 
the basis of the observed behavior. According to this hypothesis, while the pavlovian learning 
period promotes S-O associations, two different outcome representations are established during 
the instrumental training: the outcome as the consequence of a response (R-O) and the outcome 
as a stimulus preceding the (next) response (O-R). When these conditions occur in series, as in 
the final PIT period, the stimulus activates an S-O association which elicits the corresponding O-R 
representation, thus promoting the respective action. This interpretation highlighted the fact that, 
besides motivation, which is crucial for both types of PIT (general and specific), outcome value is 
also indispensable for specific outcome PIT. Importantly, since outcome valuation is a hallmark 
of decision-making processes, this fact brings specific PIT under influence of the same networks 
and into the realm of goal-directed actions. As a consequence, stress-induced impairments on 
specific outcome PIT could be due to a relative inability to upgrade outcome values, an effect that 
could be related with the previously reported bias to habit-based actions promoted by chronic 
stress (Dias-Ferreira, 2009). Interestingly, similar impairments of specific PIT were found after 
treatment with dexamethasone (DEX), a selective glucocorticoid receptor (GR) agonist that 
mimics aspects of the normal arousal and/or stress response of animals (Zorawski and Killcross, 
2003). Importantly, we showed that stress-induced effects on PIT are transient which is in 
accordance with several observations on structural, functional and behavioral recuperation after 
stress recovery (Sousa et al., 1998). 
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Along with described impairments in PIT, we demonstrated, for the first time, that chronic stress 
induces a risk-aversive pattern of choices in all three different conditions studied (basal, risk 
favorable and safe favorable) (Chapter 2.2.). Although it is has been clearly shown that chronic 
stress has a strong impact in decision-making abilities, impairing behavioral flexibility (Cerqueira 
et al., 2007) and goal directed behaviors (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009), no study had already 
explored its effect on risk-based decision-making. Our results are in line with two previous studies 
in which it was found that acute stress exposure could induce a risk-aversive behavior in water 
foraging choice task (Graham et al., 2010) and decrease preference for rats to work harder to 
obtain a larger reward (Shafiei et al., 2012). On the contrary, a recent human decision-making 
study found that acute stress exposure can increase the preference for risk options, which seems 
to be related with higher levels of cortisol (Pabst et al., 2013) and a study in a rat gambling task 
has shown that an acute injection of corticosterone, an endogenous GR/mineralocorticoid 
receptor (MR) agonist which is one of the key players of the stress response, induced a 
preference for risky options (Koot et al., 2013). In comparison with our experimental approach, it 
is important to note that these studies: i) focused only on the effects of acute stress, which 
seems to be critical, since opposing effects of acute and chronic stress have been described in 
several other behavioral domains, including cognition (Lupien, 2009) and ii) assessed choices 
between advantageous and disadvantageous options, which made the evaluation of the risk 
preference more complex, since other factors such as potential gains and losses had also to be 
factored in. On the contrary, our task is mainly dependent on risk preference, since the 
expectations (balance between value and effort) and the predictability (time until reward delivery) 
associated with the different options are leveled off (in the neutral condition) or tightly controlled. 
In addition, as already discussed, our task highlighted the fact that, despite their risk aversion, 
animals submitted to chronic stress could keep their ability to flexibly adapt their behavior 
according to the reward associated with each option, further supporting the identification of the 
observed behavioral changes with “willingness to risk” and not any kind memory-based process. 
Despite these considerations, more studies are necessary to clarify whether the reported risk-
aversion is due to continuous responding to the previously reward reinforced option (“habit based 
behavior”) or avoidance of the previously unrewarded choice (“learned avoidance”). Interestingly, 
human studies have shown that acute stress could enhance learning of positive outcomes and 
weaken learning of negative outcomes of choices (Petzold et al., 2010; Lighthall et al., 2013) but 
110 
the underlying processes that may explain these behavioral effects of stress were not addressed 
in these works. 
In summary, we have shown that chronic stress impairs the ability to incorporate relevant 
environmental cues in guiding instrumental behavior and biases risk-based decision making to 
safe/certain options. Since relevant decisions are often made under stress, these findings could 
have a profound impact, which led us to further analyze and discuss possible mechanisms 
underlying these changes. 
 
3.3. Reorganization of neural systems of decision making 
After characterizing stress induced impairments induced by chronic stress in PIT (Chapter 2.1.) 
and risk-based decision making (Chapter 2.2.) we searched for functional, anatomical and 
neurochemical alterations that could explain reported behavioral biases. Having previously shown 
which areas were activated by performance our risk-based decision-making paradigm, as 
discussed above, we used c-fos labeling to further identify those that were differentially activated 
in chronically stressed and control rats. Our main finding was a significant overactivation, in the 
former, of the lateral OFC and the insular cortex (Chapter 2.2.), which is in accordance with 
observations by Koot and colleagues (2013) in a rat gambling task performed under an acute 
corticosterone injection and strongly suggests these areas to be key players in risk-based 
decision-making under stress. 
The OFC is known to be involved in the representation of stimulus-reward value (Izquierdo et al., 
2004; Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005), the update of relative values of selected and non-
selected outcomes (Wallis 2007), the mounting of appropriate responses to motivationally salient 
stimulus (Osteund and Balleine, 2007), the factoring of efforts associated to each option (Roesch 
and Olson, 2005, Kennerley et al., 2009) and the processing of confidence in the decision 
(Kepecs et al., 2008). Rodent lesion studies have highlighted that the OFC encodes specific 
information about the outcome rather than its general affective value (Burke et al., 2008). 
Importantly, this region integrates an OFC-striatal-amygdala circuitry that could be affected by 
peripheral states of arousal, such as stress, and that competes with a more cognitive network, 
dependent on the medial PFC (Ongur and Price, 2000; Barbas and Zikopoulos, 2007). Indeed, 
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the findings we present in this thesis, including the hyperactivation of the OFC and a tendency, 
albeit non significant, for a hypoactivation of the mPFC (Chapter 2.2) in stressed individuals 
performing the risk-based task, are in accordance with previous observations from our laboratory 
suggesting that chronic stress promotes a shift from a prefrontal loop, depicting atrophy after 
CUS exposure, to a hypertrophied OFC loop that controls choice behaviors and biases decisions 
to habits (Yin et al., 2004, Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). In addition, although it was not addressed 
by this thesis, the shift between these two cortico-striatal loops could also be implicated in the 
observed PIT impairments. In fact, a recent study demonstrates that OFC and mPFC orchestrate 
the integration of Pavlovian and instrumental processes during PIT (Homayoun and Moghaddam, 
2009) backing previous observations that the mPFC and OFC encode distinct components of 
both Pavlovian and instrumental processes (Gallagher et al., 1999; Chudasama and Robbins, 
2003; Ostlund and Balleine, 2007; Homayoun and Moghaddam, 2008). 
Similarly to the OFC, the insular cortex seems to be critically involved in decision-making. Several 
studies, mainly in humans and primates, implicated the insular cortex in the processing of 
representations of bodily internal states and needs (Naqvi and Bechara 2009) and signaling risk-
aversion (Clark et al., 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2008). Interestingly, the magnitude of insular 
activation as a correlate of risk avoidance was found to increase with age (Paulsen et al., 2011) 
and lesion studies have shown that insula shut-down is associated with risk-taking behaviors 
(Clark et al., 2008) which is in accordance with our observation that insular cortex over-activation 
in the adult stressed rodent is related with a risk-aversive pattern of choice (Chapter 2.2.). 
Obviously these changes in the activity of distinct brain regions under stress are underlied by 
changes in neurotransmission. Amongst others, stress is known to induce a dopaminergic 
dysfunction in several brain areas that correlates with behavioral impairments (Mizoguchi K et al., 
2000; Tseng and O’Donnell 2004, Gruber et al., 2010; Rodrigues et al., 2012), and dopamine 
transmission has been involved in several decision-making tasks (Rogers, 2011). Bearing this in 
mind, we characterized the dopaminergic system in the OFC and the insular cortex and found 
that, in chronically stressed animals in which these regions are overactivated upon performance 
of the task, dopamine levels are reduced in the former and present a trend towards an increase 
in the latter region (Chapter 2.2.), whereas expression of D2 receptors mRNA is significantly 
increased in the OFC (Chapter 2.2.). 
112 
Dopaminergic activity in the OFC is known to be crucial to decision-making, being implicated in 
incentive motivation (Schultz, 2002; Cetin et al., 2004, Kheramin et al., 2004) and in the 
stabilization of internal representations of the S-O associations (Robbins and Roberts, 2007). 
Indeed, dopaminergic depletions in the OFC had been associated with insensitiveness to 
conditioned reinforcers and persistent responding in the absence of reward in extinction, a 
pattern of deficits that may reflect basic deficits in the associative processing of reward (Walker et 
al., 2009). Moreover, a loss of OFC dopamine may disrupt prefrontal control over the striatum, 
resulting in the potentiation of habitual responses, an effect that seems to be specifically 
modulated by an over-responding dopamine-depleted OFC (Walker et al., 2009). In further 
support of our view of a stress-induced hypodopaminergic overactivated OFC being crucial for the 
observed risk-aversive behavior, dopaminoceptive neurons were found crucial for social aversion 
induced by chronic stress (Barik et al., 2013). 
As already mentioned, our study also included a morphological analysis of pyramidal neurons of 
lateral part of OFC and insular cortex (Chapter 2.2.). We found that chronic stress induces a 
hypertrophy of apical dendrites of lateral OFC neurons that, importantly, is also present in the 
neurons activated during the risk-based task, but does not seem to affect insular pyramidal 
neurons. These findings are in accordance with previous published data (Dias-Ferreira et al., 
2009) and, since dendrites are targets for ingrowing axonal fibers derived from cortical and 
subcortical regions, may reflect the stress-induced structural rearrangement of neural circuitry 
involving OFC. 
Summing all the previous findings, the present studies on neurochemical and structural effects of 
chronic stress add relevant insights on the relevance of dopaminergic dysfunction for the 
reported impairments on decision-making processes. Driven by these observations, we proposed 
a pharmacological intervention with a specific D2/D3 agonist quinpirole to ameliorate decision-
making impairments induced by stress. This intervention provided one of the most surprising 
observations of our studies: quinpirole reverted stress-induced risk-aversion, making behavior of 
rats indistinguishable from non-stressed controls (Chapter 2.2.). As previous studies have 
described that dopaminergic agents could, by themselves, increase risk choices in gambling 
tasks (Onge and Floresco, 2009; Riba et al., 2008; Onge et al., 2010) it could be argued that the 
observed effect was related with a generalized increase in risk choices induced by quinpirole, and 
not a specific reversal of the stress-induced risk-aversive behavior. However, the latter seems not 
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to be the case, as quinpirole was shown to have no effect on non-stressed animals, at least in the 
doses used in our study. Of notice, this pharmacological reversion of risk-aversion induced by 
stress could pave the way for new therapeutical approaches to disorders, such as obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD), gambling disorders or schizophrenia, in which patients are known to 
display decision-making dysfunctions, 
 
3.4. Obsessive-compulsive disorder and decision-making: insights from stress 
response dysfunction 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychiatric disorder characterized by obsessions 
(persistent, intrusive and inappropriate thoughts, as well as impulses or images that cause 
anxiety) and compulsions (repetitive behaviors or thoughts performed in order to decrease the 
anxiety caused by the obsessions). Importantly, this disorder is also characterized by severe 
impairments in decision-making processes (Gillan et al., 2011) and several reports implicate 
environmental influences, including stressful events, in the onset and exacerbations of disease 
(Lochner et al., 2002; Forray et al., 2007; Cromer et al., 2007; Gershuny et al., 2003; Real et 
al., 2011; Jordan et al., 1991). Thus, we decided to explore the specific features of the stress 
response and decision-making in a cohort of OCD patients. 
In the work presented in this thesis, we found that OCD patients report significantly higher levels 
of perceived stress than healthy controls, and that these are accompanied by higher serum 
cortisol levels (Chapter 2.3.). Additionally, we found that perceived stress levels were positively 
correlated with the severity of obsessive symptoms but not with the severity of the compulsive 
component of disease (Chapter 2.3.). These observations are in accordance with previous 
studies (Coles et al., 2005; Cougle et al., 2011, Gehris et al., 1990; Kluge et al., 2007) and 
support the theory that animal models of chronic stress could provide relevant information over 
mechanisms underlying some OCD features. Indeed, dysfunction in orbitofronto-striatal circuits, 
whose implication in the pathophysiology of OCD has been extensively documented, can be 
easily induced by chronic stress exposure in humans (Soares et al., 2012), highlighting the 
relevance of our findings. Importantly, stress-induced shift in decision making behaviors from 
goal directed to habits might be of interest for the knowledge of underpinning mechanisms 
involved in compulsive symptoms of OCD (Gillan et al., 2011) whereas  the impaired ability to 
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associate environmental cues to goal-directed behaviors (Chapter 2.1.) and the risk-aversion 
associated with orbitofrontal and insular over-activation (Chapter 2.2.) described in this thesis  
might be of interest for further exploration of clinical features often described in OCD patients 
such as risk avoidance (Admon et al., 2012) and impaired sensibility to environmental cues 
(Ristvedt et al., 1993). 
Risk-based decision-making was also assessed on OCD patients using an fMRI paradigm. 
Behavioral results did not show differences in the frequency of risk and safe choices, but 
significant differences were found in decision-making strategies and in the time used to take risky 
decisions (Chapter 2.4.). Additionally, increased activation of (orbito)fronto-striatal regions and 
the anterior cingulate cortex after negative outcomes were found among OCD patients when 
compared with healthy volunteers (Chapter 2.4.). This finding is in accordance with reported risk-
aversion (Lagemann et al., 2012; Admon et al., 2012) and helps understanding the genesis of 
the conflict in the decision-making process, pointing for future areas of therapeutic interventions. 
 
3.5. Chronic stress and obsessive related disorders: a new translational approach 
The idea that Obsessive Compulsive Spectrum Disorders can be viewed along a dimension of 
compulsivity versus impulsivity is widely accepted. The compulsive end, represented by OCD, 
body dysmorphic disorder and anorexia nervosa, is characterized by risk avoidance related with 
an exaggerated estimation of harm and a tendency to avoid harm or reduce anxiety by 
performing compulsive behaviors. In contrast, the impulsive end, represented by pathological 
gambling and sexual compulsivity, is characterized by an underestimation of risk, seeking of 
pleasure, arousal or gratifications and actions can be aggressive and out of control (Hollander, 
1995). Impulsive-like disorders are usually considered as “addictive disorders”. 
Summing up our findings with previous reports in the literature, it is possible to characterize CUS 
exposed animals as risk-aversive (Chapter 2.2.), habit-based (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009), PIT-
impaired (Chapter 2.1.) and less addictive prone (Kabbaj and Isgor, 2007; Kabbaj et al., 2002). 
This stress-induced phenotype shares several nuclear features with compulsive-end disorders 
(including OCD) highlighting the role of stress in the pathophysiology of OCD and making rodent 
CUS paradigm a putative animal model for the study of such disorders. On the contrary, animals 
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submitted to chronic stress on developmental periods of life (pre-natal to adolescence) displayed 
a phenotype characterized as risk-prone (Toledo-Rodriguez and Sandi, 2011), goal-directed 
(Rodrigues et al, 2012), impulsive (Rodrigues et al, 2012) and addictive prone (Rodrigues et al., 
2012; Hollis et al., 2013), a phenotype similar to that described for impulsive-end disorders. 
These observations suggest that the detrimental effects of chronic stress vary according to the 
lifetime period of its exposure. Interestingly, as observed in humans, early life stress seems to 
bias behavior to impulsive-like disorders while stress later in life seems to favor the establishment 
of a compulsive-like behavior (Chapter 2.1.; Chapter 2.2.; Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Rodrigues et 
al., 2012). Intriguingly, low cortical dopamine levels were found in both stress models which 
suggests that other mechanisms may underlie this changes. Early disruption of the dopaminergic 
system was shown to affect brain maturation (Lauder, 1988; Lauder, 1993), playing an 
important role in division, migration and differentiation processes of cortical neurons, namely in 
prefrontal cortex (Lewis et al., 1998). Thus, depletions in dopamine during neurodevelopment 
could impair the development of mechanisms of behavior control (Nieoullon, 2002). 
In the last decades, theories focused on the role of serotonin on compulsive-impulsive spectrum 
disorders and proposed a parallel pathophysiological scheme with compulsive disorders 
associated with increased frontal activity and impulsive disorders associated with decreased 
frontal lobe activity. Importantly, we have shown that a pharmacological intervention with 
dopaminergic agents could also be useful for the restoration of detrimental effects of stress on 
behavior, which, in light of the above discussed relationship between stress and OCD spectrum 
disorders, brings dopamine to the centre of discussions on such disorders. In line with this, 
aripiprazole, a D2 specific agonist, has been recently shown to be effective in the treatment of 
OCD (Sayyah et al., 2012; Abdel-Ahad and Kazour, 2013), despite the lack of a clear 
neurobiological hypothesis underlying its utility. 
In conclusion, the studies presented in this thesis provided evidence that chronic stress disrupts 
decision-making behaviors, in particular those associated with the processing of risk, and that 
these behavioral changes, which seem to be related with rearrangements of the neural circuitry 
and low dopamine levels in brain regions targeted by stress, can be completely reverted by 
treatment with a D2/D3 dopamine receptor agonist, quinpirole. Additionally, we provided new 
insights on OCD as a stress-related disorder and, in light of the previous findings, suggested a 
role for dopamine dysfunction in the ethiopathogenesis of this disorder. This new 
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conceptualization could be of interest not only to the comprehension of mechanisms underlying 
OCD but also to the research on new therapeutical approaches directed to this chronic and, 
frequently, incapacitating disorder. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present work has characterized the impact of chronic stress on decision-making, exploring its 
neural substrates, and analyzed the stress response and decision-making in obsessive 
compulsive disorder, proposing potential pharmacological interventions that can be translated in 
the clinical settings. By doing so, we are able to conclude that: 
 
1) Chronic stress transiently disrupts the ability of conditioned cues to influence 
instrumental behaviors, as assessed by pavlovian to instrumental transfer; 
 
2) Chronic stress induces a risk-aversive pattern of choice in a new rodent risk-based 
decision-making paradigm, which is associated with over-activation of the orbitofrontal 
and insular cortices and low dopamine levels and high expression of D2 dopamine 
receptor mRNA in the orbitofrontal cortex; 
 
3) Treatment with the D2/D3 selective agonist quinpirole reverts the stress-induced risk-
aversion; 
 
4) Obsessive compulsive patients display higher levels of perceived stress which are 
positively correlated with the severity of obsessive symptoms; this suggests that OCD can 
be considered a stress-related disorder and opens avenues for further research in the 
field, including on the use of dopaminergic treatments. 
 
5) Obsessive compulsive patients have difficulties in risk-based decision-making which are 
associated with decreased activity in the caudate when deciding, hypoactivation of the 
amygdala before making high-risk choices and increased activity in several areas of the 
(orbito)fronto-striato-thalamic circuit implicated in decision upon loosing. 
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5. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
 
Despite the increasing relevance decision-making processes, their underlying mechanisms are 
largely unknown. By crossing evidence from neurosciences and clinical psychiatry, the present 
work aimed to answer some questions in this field but raised a significantly higher number of 
questions that should be further investigated. 
First, future work should be directed to clarify neuroanatomical and functional correlations of the 
stress-induced behavioral changes described. To achieve this goal, techniques that assess brain 
activation in real-time, such as electrophysiology studies, should be used to better characterize 
the involvement of brain regions in the described behavioral tasks. In addition, the role of the 
increased orbitofrontal and insular cortices activation in the genesis of stress-induced risk-
aversion could be studied by specifically inactivating each of these regions, either with a local 
injection of drugs or, more elegantly with the use of optogenetic approaches; the latter, could 
even allow a better characterization, by transiently silencing or activating only certain neuronal 
types (such as dopaminergic or glutamatergic cell, for example) in specific regions of the brain.  
Decisions are not only modulated by reward quantity. Thus, the stress induced risk-aversive 
behavior should be further detailed using behavioral tasks, in the same decision-making 
paradigm, that evaluate how stress impacts on probability and on reward quality changes, since 
as we only focused on changes on reward quantity.  
Third, mechanisms underlying quinpirole treatment could be further detailed by direct injection of 
a D2/D3 agonist on orbitofrontal cortex and, eventually, on insular cortex, to avoid the non-
specificity of system administration. While other dopaminergic agents, with higher D2 receptors 
specificity, could be tested, another approach could be the use of viral gene delivery to selectively 
drive an increased expression of D2 receptors or enhance its activity. 
On the clinical grounds, an interesting question that rose from our experiments with OCD patients 
was related with characterization of additional biological markers of stress response, such as 
ACTH and NK cells activation. Certainly, the dopaminergic insights on OCD should be further 
explored using PET/MRI techniques that allow in vivo quantification of dopamine levels in 
138 
different brain regions and characterizing, using pharmacological MRI, the brain response to 
approved dopaminergic agents.  
And, finally, the characterization of other pathologies of the OCD spectrum regarding their 
relationship with stress and their decision-making profile would be fundamental. 
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Annex 1 
 
Optimization of the risk-based decision-making task described in Chapter 2.2 
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Optimization of the risk-based decision-making task described in Chapter 2.2  
(A) Comparison between fixed and a random placement of the safe nose-poke hole. Using a fixed 
placement design, animals increase their preference for safe choices to more than 80%, whereas 
with a random placement design their preference remains rather stable at around 20% (chance 
levels). The latter was the design adopted in the final version of the task. *p<0.05. (B) 
Comparison between the use of light to signal safe or risky choices. When the only illuminated 
nose-poke hole was the safe/certain option - light signaled safe - animals consistently increased 
A 
B 
144 
their preference for these option to more than 60%. On the contrary, when the nose-poke holes 
corresponding to risk/uncertain options were illuminated (and safe option hole was left in the 
dark) – light signaled risk – performance remained stable at around 20% (chance levels). The 
latter was the design adopted in the final version of the task. *p<0,05. 
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Annex 2 
 
Inter-individual variation in the risk-based decision-making task described in Chapter 2.2. 
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Inter-individual variation in the risk-based decision-making task described in Chapter 2.2. 
Rats display different, individual, preferences for safe/certain and risk/uncertain options. All 
animals are controls and were tested at the same time, under the neutral condition, on the final 
protocol. 
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Chronic Stress Causes
Frontostriatal Reorganization and
Affects Decision-Making
Eduardo Dias-Ferreira,1,2,3 João C. Sousa,1 Irene Melo,1 Pedro Morgado,1 Ana R. Mesquita,1
João J. Cerqueira,1 Rui M. Costa,2,4* Nuno Sousa1*
The ability to shift between different behavioral strategies is necessary for appropriate
decision-making. Here, we show that chronic stress biases decision-making strategies, affecting
the ability of stressed animals to perform actions on the basis of their consequences. Using two
different operant tasks, we revealed that, in making choices, rats subjected to chronic stress
became insensitive to changes in outcome value and resistant to changes in action-outcome
contingency. Furthermore, chronic stress caused opposing structural changes in the associative and
sensorimotor corticostriatal circuits underlying these different behavioral strategies, with atrophy
of medial prefrontal cortex and the associative striatum and hypertrophy of the sensorimotor
striatum. These data suggest that the relative advantage of circuits coursing through sensorimotor
striatum observed after chronic stress leads to a bias in behavioral strategies toward habit.
I
n everyday life, we constantly have to select
the appropriate actions to obtain specific out-
comes. These actions can be selected on the
basis of their consequences (1, 2), e.g., when we
press the elevator button to get to the particular
floor of our new apartment. This goal-directed
behavior is crucial to face the ever-changing en-
vironment, but demands an effortful control and
monitoring of the response. One way to balance
the need for flexibility and efficiency is through
automatization of recurring decision processes as
a rule or a habit (3). Habitual responses no longer
need the evaluation of their consequences and
can be elicited by particular situations or stimuli
(1, 2), e.g., after living for some time in that
apartment, we automatically press the button of
our home floor when we enter the elevator. The
ability to shift between these two types of strat-
egies is necessary for appropriate decision-making
(2), and in some situations, it may be crucial to
be able to inhibit a habit and use a goal-directed
strategy, e.g., if we are visiting a new building,
we should not press the button for our home
floor.
Chronic stress, mainly through the release of
corticosteroids, affects executive behavior through
sequential structuralmodulation of brain networks
(4, 5). Stress-induced deficits in spatial reference
and working memory (6) and behavioral flexibil-
ity (7) are associated with synaptic and/or den-
dritic reorganization in both the hippocampus
(8) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (9).
However, the effects of chronic stress on action-
selection strategies have not been investigated.
Here, we examinedwhether previous exposure to
chronic stress would affect the ability of animals
to select the appropriate actions, based on the con-
sequences of their choice. Because associative
corticostriatal circuits involving the prelimbic (PL)
cortex (10) and the dorsomedial striatum (DMS)
(11) have been implicated in the acquisition and
execution of goal-directed actions, whereas sen-
sorimotor circuits, namely, the dorsolateral striatum
(DLS) (12), are necessary for habit formation, we
examined the effects of chronic stress on these
brain areas.
In an attempt to mimic the variability of
stressors encountered in daily life, adult rats as-
signed to the stress group were exposed to a well-
established stress paradigm (13) that combines
different stressors in an unpredictable manner to
1Life and Health Sciences Research Institute (ICVS), School of
Health Sciences, University of Minho, 4710-057 Braga,
Portugal. 2Section on In Vivo Neural Function, Laboratory for
Integrative Neuroscience, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse
and Alcoholism, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD
20852–9411, USA. 3Ph.D. Programme in Experimental
Biology and Biomedicine (PDBEB), Center for Neuroscience
and Cell Biology, University of Coimbra, 3004-517 Coimbra,
Portugal. 4Champalimaud Neuroscience Programme at Instituto
Gulbenkian de Ciência, Rua da Quinta Grande, 2780-901
Oeiras, Portugal.
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail:
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Fig. 1. Chronic stress biases behavioral responding
to become insensitive to outcome devaluation. (A)
Acquisition of the lever-pressing task in control and
chronically stressed rats. The rate of lever pressing is
depicted for each daily session. Reversible de-
valuation tests performed early and late in training
are indicated. (B andD) Devaluation test performed
(B) after the first day of RR-20 and (D) after the last
training day. Lever pressing in absolute number and
normalized to the lever pressing of the previous
training day is compared between the valued and
the devalued condition for each group. (C) Amount
of reinforcer consumed by control and stressed rats
during the ad libitum devaluation sessions. Error
bars denote SEM. *P < 0.05.
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avoid the resilient effect of behavioral control over
stressors (14). Twenty-one days of stress exposure
decreased body-weight gain (fig. S1A), reduced
the thymus/body-weight ratio (fig. S1B), and re-
sulted in persistently raised serum corticosterone
levels (fig. S1C), when compared with attributes
of handled controls. After stress exposure, we
testedwhether chronic stress affected the ability of
animals to perform actions, based on the conse-
quences of their behavior, using two different
instrumental tasks.
We first examined whether previous exposure
to chronic stress affected the ability of animals to
perform actions based on the expected value of
predicted outcomes (1, 15). Rats (n = 8 per group)
were trained to press a lever for a particular out-
come (pellets or sucrose, counterbalanced) under
a random ratio schedule that was previously shown
to bias for goal-directed behavior (3, 15, 16). Train-
ing started with 2 days of continuous reinforcement
(CRF) and progressed under increasing random
ratio (RR) schedules of reinforcement to RR-20
(on average one reinforcer every 20 lever presses).
Both groups increased lever pressing across train-
ing days (F12,168 = 95.489, P < 0.001), and there
was no interaction with (F12,3 = 1.089, P = 0.372)
or main effect of (F1,14 = 3.094, P = 0.100) stress
treatment (Fig. 1A). To evaluate whether animals
could learn to press for the specific outcome deliv-
ered contingent on lever pressing, we performed
an early devaluation test after the first day of RR-20
(Fig. 1B). Both stressed animals and controls
significantly reduced their responses after the out-
come they pressed for during trainingwas devalued
by sensory-specific satiety (devalued condition),
when compared with the situation when a different
outcomewas devalued (valued condition) (13) (lever
presses permin: control, t7=3.197,P=0.015; stress,
t7 = 2.931, P = 0.022; normalized lever pressing:
control, t7 = 3.106, P= 0.017; stress, t7 = 2.694, P=
0.031). With increased training and in accordance
with previous studies (3, 15, 16), the actions of
control animals became highly sensitive to sensory-
specific satiety [(Fig. 1D) lever presses permin: t7=
3.672, P = 0.008; normalized lever pressing: t7 =
3.042, P = 0.019]. In contrast, the actions of
stressed animals became insensitive to the expected
value of the outcome, as indicated by the lack of a
devaluation effect [(Fig. 1D) lever presses per min:
t7 = 0.984, P = 0.358; normalized lever pressing:
t7 = 1.095, P = 0.310]. It is noteworthy that the
early devaluation test demonstrates that this in-
sensitivity did not arise from an inability of the
stressed animals to learn the relation between the
action and the outcome or from changes in moti-
vation, food valuation, or hedonics (17), but rather
because stressed animals rapidly shift to a habitual
strategy as training progresses. The amount of re-
inforcer consumedduring the ad libitumdevaluation
sessions was similar in stressed and control animals
[(Fig. 1C) pellets: t14 = −1.072, P = 0.302; sucrose:
t14 = −0.252, P = 0.805].
Although it seems unlikely that the results
obtained in the test above were due to differences
in hedonics or value processing, we used a dif-
ferent task to confirmwhether animals previously
exposed to chronic stress really had impairments
performing actions on the basis of the conse-
quences of their behavior. We therefore inves-
tigatedwhether the behavior of chronically stressed
animalswould depend on the contingency between
getting the outcome and the previous execution
of the action (1, 18). We trained a separate group
of rats (n = 15 per group) in a task in which one
action (pressing the left lever) would lead to a par-
ticular outcome (i.e., pellets), and another action
(pressing the right lever) would lead to a different
outcome (i.e., sucrose). Every day animals had two
training sessions, one for each action-outcome pair
(counterbalanced). Both groups increased lever
pressing as training progressed across days under
increasing ratio schedules of reinforcement (pellets:
F11,308 = 138.213, P < 0.001; sucrose: F11,308 =
88.578, P < 0.001), and there was no interaction
with stress (pellets: F11,18 = 0.419, P = 0.947;
sucrose: F11,18 = 0.831, P = 0.609), or main effect
of stress (pellets:F1,28 = 2.742,P= 0.109; sucrose:
F1,28 = 0.781, P= 0.384) on acquisition (Fig. 2A).
Similar to the previous task, both controls and
stressed animals were able to learn the action-
outcome relation as shownby their clear preference
toward the valued lever in an early devaluation test
after the first day of RR-20 (lever presses per min:
control valued, 15.73 T 2.24; devalued, 4.88 T
0.95; t14 = 4.150, P= 0.001; stress valued, 11.19 T
1.40; devalued, 5.33 T 0.77; t14 = 4.262,P= 0.001;
normalized lever pressing: control valued, 0.41 T
0.04; devalued, 0.14 T 0.03; t14 = 5.167,P< 0.001;
stress valued, 0.34 T 0.04; devalued, 0.18 T 0.03;
t14 = 4.133, P = 0.001; results are means T SEM).
After the last day of acquisition, we tested whether
stressed animals were performing actions because
they were necessary to obtain the outcome or not.
For each animal, we degraded the contingency
between one of the actions and the respective
outcome (degraded condition: to get this outcome,
the animals no longer needed to press the lever),
but not between the other action-outcome pair
(non-degraded: to obtain this outcome, the ani-
mals needed to press the lever) (13). After 2 days
of forced-choice degradation training in which
Fig. 2. Chronic stress predis-
poses choices to be insensitive
to changes in action-outcome
contingency. (A) Acquisition of
the lever-pressing task in con-
trol and chronically stressed
rats. The rate of lever pressing
is depicted for each daily ses-
sion for pellets and for sucrose.
(B) Performance for each group
during forced-choice sessions in
whichone instrumental outcome
continued to be obtained in a
RR-20 schedule (non-degraded)
and the other outcome was de-
livered noncontiguously or freely
(degraded). (C) Critical choice
test between the lever for which
the action-outcome contingency
was preserved and the lever that
had the contingency degraded.
Lever pressing in absolute num-
bers and normalized to the lever
pressing of the last acquisi-
tion training day is compared
between levers for each group.
Error bars denoteSEM. *P<0.05.
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both groups changed their behavior [(Fig. 2B)
degradation effect: control, F1,28 = 4.342, P =
0.046; stress, F1,28 = 2.189, P = 0.150; training ×
degradation interaction: control,F1,28= 2.396,P=
0.133; stress, F1,28 = 5.580, P = 0.025], animals
were given a free-choice test between the
degraded and non-degraded lever, in extinction
[to avoid the confounding effects of consumption
and reinforcement (11)] (Fig. 2C). Control
animals significantly reduced their responses on
the degraded lever compared with the non-
degraded (lever presses per min: t14 = 2.552, P =
0.023; normalized lever pressing: t14 = 2.645, P =
0.019). However, stressed animals pressed both
levers similarly (lever presses permin: t14 = 0.808,
P = 0.433; normalized lever pressing: t14 = 1.330,
P = 0.205), which indicated that they failed to
choose the action that was necessary to obtain the
outcome and that their behavior was habitual.
These data indicate that previous exposure to
chronic stress biases decision-making and pre-
Fig. 3. Chronic stress results in selective atrophy within the external
layers of both PL and IL mPFC subregions. Several structural measure-
ments of control and chronically stressed rats are compared. (A and B)
Stereological estimations of (A) volumes and (B) neuronal densities. (A,
right) Outlining between regions and layers is represented; diagram was
adapted from (31) and corresponding brain slice stained with Giemsa
(2.20 mm from bregma). Cg, cingulate cortex; SMC, sensorimotor
cortices; cc, corpus callosum; DS, dorsal striatum; AcbC, core, and AcbSh,
shell, of nucleus accumbens; ac, anterior commissure. Scale bar, 800 mm.
(C to F) Morphometric analysis in 3D of Golgi-stained pyramidal neurons
of superficial layers (II/III). (C) Computer-assisted reconstructions of
representative neurons depicted in the XY orthogonal plane. (D) Length,
(E) spine density, and (F) differential rearrangement of apical dendrites.
Error bars denote SEM. *P < 0.05.
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disposes animals to more readily shift between
goal-directed and habitual behavioral strategies as
training progresses, similar to the effects observed
after manipulations of the associative (10, 11) or
sensorimotor (12,16) corticostriatal circuits (19–21).
Therefore, in a separate cohort of animals (n = 5
per group, submitted to chronic stress or handling
but not submitted to instrumental training), we
investigated the effects of chronic stress on the
structure of cortical and striatal circuits known to
be required for goal-directed actions and habits.
Within the mPFC, the PL and infralimbic (IL)
subregions have been implicated in instrumental
behavior (10, 19). Volumetric estimations showed
a selective atrophy of external cortical layers in
both mPFC subregions of stressed animals [(Fig.
3A) PL: layer I, t8 = 4.066, P= 0.004; layer II, t8 =
3.697, P = 0.006; layer III-VI, t8 = 1.725, P =
0.123; IL: layer I, t8 = 6.225, P < 0.001; layer II,
t8 = 4.743, P= 0.001; layer III-VI, t8 = 1.411, P=
0.196]. Consistently, we observed an increase in
neuronal density in these layers in the same ani-
mals [(Fig. 3B) PL: layer II, t8 = −2.602, P =
0.032; layer III-VI, t8 = −1.383, P = 0.204; IL:
layer II, t8 = −2.488, P = 0.038; layer III-VI, t8 =
−1.688, P = 0.130]. Three-dimensional (3D)
morphometric analysis of dendritic arbors of layer
II/III pyramidal cells in the mPFC indicated that
these changes in volume and density could be
ascribed to dendritic atrophy (PL: t8 = 6.457, P <
0.001; IL: t8 = 7.021, P < 0.001), particularly in
terminal branches (PL: t8 = 3.851, P = 0.005; IL:
t8 = 6.389, P < 0.001) of the apical tree (Fig. 3, C
and D). These effects suggest a loss of neuronal
connectivity that does not seem to result from
spine loss [(Fig. 3E) PL: proximal, t8 = 2.290, P =
0.051; distal, t8 = 1.960, P = 0.086; IL: proximal,
t8 = 1.270, P = 0.240; distal, t8 = 0.669, P =
0.522] or maturation (fig. S2A), but rather to an
impoverished arborization confined to distal por-
tions [(Fig. 3F) PL: stress effect, F1,8 = 12.150,P=
0.008; post hoc 140, 200 to 280 mm, P < 0.05; IL:
stress effect,F1,8= 17.117,P= 0.003; post hoc 120
to 220 mm, P < 0.05] of the apical tree. No conse-
quences were observed in basal dendrites (fig. S3).
Note that this atrophy was not generalized to all
the regions of the frontal cortex. The orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), which is also a target of stress (22)
and has been implicated in decision-making (23),
showed a different pattern of change, with the
most medial portions (medial orbital, MO) show-
ing no alteration, whereas the most lateral regions
(lateral orbital, LO) displayed a clear structural
hypertrophy (fig. S4). In addition, no differences
were found in the motor and somatosensory
cortices (fig. S5).
We next examined the effects of chronic stress
on the projection areas of these cortices into the
dorsal striatum (DS), which has been previously
implicated in controlling goal-directed and habit-
ual strategies. We investigated more specifically
the DMS,which receives input from the PL cortex
(24) and has been implicated in goal-directed
Fig. 4. Chronic stress induces opposing modulating effects in DMS and
DLS networks. Several structural measurements of control and chronically
stressed rats are compared. (A) (Left) Stereological estimation of neuronal
densities. (Right) Sampling of the DMS, DIS, and DLS regions is illustrated;
diagram was adapted from (31) and corresponding brain slice stained with
Giemsa (1.00 mm from bregma). Abbreviations are as in Fig. 3. Scale bar,
800 mm. (B to E) Morphometric analysis in 3D of Golgi-stained MSNs
[sampling following the same approach as for neuronal densities; for
illustration, see (A)]. (B) Computer-assisted reconstructions of representa-
tive neurons depicted in the XY orthogonal plane. (C) Length, (D) spine
density, and (E) differential rearrangement of dendrites. Error bars denote
SEM. *P < 0.05.
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actions (11), and theDLS or sensorimotor striatum,
which is critical for habit formation (12) and
receives input from the sensorimotor cortices (24)
and,more laterally, from the LO cortex (25). Given
the lack of precise anatomical landmarks delimit-
ing these subregions in the DS, which could bias
volumetricmeasures, wemeasured neuronal den-
sities within the areas previously shown to be
important for goal-directed and habitual behavior
(Fig. 4A) (11–13) and found opposing effects of
chronic stress in DMS andDLS. Neuronal density
decreased in the DLS (t8 = 2.970, P = 0.018) and
increased in the DMS (t8 = −2.343, P = 0.047)
(Fig. 4A); these findings indicate atrophy of DMS
and hypertrophy of DLS after stress exposure.
These differences were not the result of gener-
alized changes in the DS, because no differences
in neuronal density were found in the intermediate
area between medial and lateral regions (DIS: t8 =
−0.802, P = 0.446). To determine whether these
changes in densitywere due to changes in dendritic
arborization, we performed a 3D morphometric
analysis of the medium spiny neurons (MSNs)
within the same conservative limits for these DS
subregions (Fig. 4, B, C, and E). We found a
significant increase in dendritic arbors of DLS
neurons [(Fig. 4C) length, t8 = −2.527,P= 0.035;
terminal branches length, t8 = −2.563, P = 0.033;
(Fig. 4E) F1,8 = 5.016, P = 0.055] and a non-
significant trend toward a reduction in the den-
drites inDMSneurons [(Fig. 4C) length, t8=1.682,
P = 0.131; terminal branches length, t8 = 1.550,
P = 0.160; (Fig. 4E) F1,8 = 2.820, P = 0.132] of
stressed animals. No significant effects of stress
were observed in spine density [(Fig. 4D) DMS:
proximal, t8 = 1.504, P= 0.171; distal, t8 = 0.221,
P = 0.831; DLS: proximal, t8 = 0.451, P = 0.664;
distal, t8 = 1.267, P = 0.241] or morphology (fig.
S2B). Taken together, the neuronal density and
dendritic measures suggest a bidirectional mod-
ulation of neuronal connectivity in theDS expressed
by a global hypertrophy of the DLS and shrink-
age of the DMS.
The present results show a divergent struc-
tural reorganization of corticostriatal circuits after
chronic stress, with atrophy of the associative corti-
costriatal circuits and hypertrophy of the circuits
coursing through the sensorimotor striatum. This
frontostriatal reorganization is accompanied by a
shift toward habitual strategies, affecting the ability
of stressed animals to perform actions based on
their consequences. These data are consistent
with previous studies showing that lesions of the
PL cortex (10) and theDMS (11) can bias behavior
to be more habitual, whereas inactivation of the
DLS (12) can render the behavior of habitual
animals goal-directed again, which suggest that
competing corticostriatal circuits underlie the abil-
ity of animals to switch between these two modes
of responding (1). Our results, using a natural
model, indicate that the relative advantage of the
sensorimotor network after chronic stress biases
behavioral strategies toward habit and offer fur-
ther insight into how chronic stress can lead to
dysfunctional decision-making.
In addition to the role of the PL cortex (10),
DMS (11), and DLS (12), the role of other brain
regions affected by chronic stress in the behav-
ioral bias herein described should be further
investigated. For example, we did not observe
changes in the sensorimotor cortices projecting to
DLS but did find that the LO cortex, which also
projects to the more lateral parts of the dorsal
striatum (25), presents a clear hypertrophy. [The
MO that projects to more medial striatal areas
(25) does not.] Therefore, the role of the different
subregions of the OFC in instrumental condi-
tioning should be further explored, especially be-
cause although the atrophy of the PL cortex could
contribute to the observed effects, the atrophy of
IL cortex does not easily explain the bias toward
habitual strategies, because lesions of this region
have been shown to impair habit formation (19).
Another possibility is that changes in the sensori-
motor striatum relative to the associative striatum
without parallel changes in the projecting cortices
are sufficient to readily shift the behavioral strat-
egies as training progresses. This is an interest-
ing possibility given that more ventral striatal
areas like the nucleus accumbens seem to have a
more prominent role in appetitive Pavlovian re-
sponses than in control of instrumental behavior
(26, 27). Furthermore, a potential role of thalamic
inputs to the sensorimotor striatum in mediat-
ing habitual strategies should not be discarded.
Finally, the effects of chronic stress on the hip-
pocampus (8) and amygdala (28) cannot easily
explain the behavioral bias observed, because
the early devaluation tests revealed that chroni-
cally stressed animals can learn action-outcome
relations, and their behavior becomes biased as
training progresses.
Optimization of decision-making processes
confers an important advantage in response to a
constantly changing environment. The ability to
select the appropriate actions on the basis of their
consequences and on our needs at the time of the
decision allows us to respond in an efficient way
to changing situations. However, the continuous
control and attention that this process demands
can result in an unnecessary expenditure of re-
sources and can be inefficient in many situations.
For instance, when behavior is repeated regularly
for extensive periods without major changes in
outcome value or contingency, or under uncertain
situations where we cannot manipulate the prob-
ability of obtaining an outcome, general rules and
habits can be advantageous (3). Thus, the more
rapid shift to habits after chronic stress could be a
coping mechanism to improve performance of
well-trained behaviors, while increasing the bio-
availability to acquire and process new information,
which seems essential for adaptation to complex
environments (4, 5). However, when objectives
need to be re-updated in order to make the most
appropriate choice, the inability of stressed sub-
jects to shift fromhabitual strategies to goal-directed
behavior might be highly detrimental. Such im-
pairment might be of relevance to understand
the high comorbidity between stress-related
disorders and addictive behavior or compulsiv-
ity (29, 30), but certainly has a broader impact
spanning activities from everyday life decisions
to economics.
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Mechanisms of initiation and reversal of drug-seeking
behavior induced by prenatal exposure to glucocorticoids
AJ Rodrigues1,2,4, P Lea˜o1,2,4, JM Peˆgo1,2, D Cardona1,2, MM Carvalho1,2, M Oliveira1,2, BM Costa1,2,
AF Carvalho1,2, P Morgado1,2, D Arau´jo1,2, JA Palha1,2, OFX Almeida3 and N Sousa1,2
1Life and Health Sciences Research Institute (ICVS), School of Health Sciences, University of Minho, Braga, Portugal;
2ICVS/3B’s–PT Government Associate Laboratory, Braga/Guimara˜es, Portugal and 3Neuroadaptations Group, Max Planck
Institute of Psychiatry, Munich, Germany
Stress and exposure to glucocorticoids (GC) during early life render individuals vulnerable to
brain disorders by inducing structural and chemical alterations in specific neural substrates.
Here we show that adult rats that had been exposed to in utero GCs (iuGC) display increased
preference for opiates and ethanol, and are more responsive to the psychostimulatory actions
of morphine. These animals presented prominent changes in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc),
a key component of the mesolimbic reward circuitry; specifically, cell numbers and dopamine
(DA) levels were significantly reduced, whereas DA receptor 2 (Drd2) mRNA expression levels
were markedly upregulated in the NAcc. Interestingly, repeated morphine exposure signifi-
cantly downregulated Drd2 expression in iuGC-exposed animals, in parallel with increased
DNA methylation of the Drd2 gene. Administration of a therapeutic dose of L-dopa reverted
the hypodopaminergic state in the NAcc of iuGC animals, normalized Drd2 expression
and prevented morphine-induced hypermethylation of the Drd2 promoter. In addition, L-dopa
treatment promoted dendritic and synaptic plasticity in the NAcc and, importantly, reversed
drug-seeking behavior. These results reveal a new mechanism through which drug-seeking
behaviors may emerge and suggest that a brief and simple pharmacological intervention can
restrain these behaviors in vulnerable individuals.
Molecular Psychiatry advance online publication, 4 October 2011; doi:10.1038/mp.2011.126
Keywords: DNA methylation; dopamine receptor 2; levodopa; nucleus accumbens; mesolimbic
circuit; prenatal glucocorticoids
Introduction
Stressful events during critical developmental peri-
ods have long been considered as etiological factors in
psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, depres-
sion and drug-seeking behavior.1–4 The programming
effects of stress are most likely mediated by endogen-
ous glucocorticoids (GC), whose ability to produce
structural re-organization and dysfunction of the
neural substrates that underpin these stress-related
pathologies are well known.1,5–7 Although adminis-
tration of prenatal GC does not mimic prenatal stress,
synthetic GC such as dexamethasone (DEX) are
widely used in obstetrics, for example, to ensure
fetal lung maturation during late pregnancy in
humans.8 DEX is not biodegraded in the same way
as its naturally occurring congeners, and crosses the
maternal-placental barrier to a greater extent than
endogenous GC;9,10 it can thus pose additional risk for
the developing brain.
We previously demonstrated that fetal exposure to
GC leads to hyper-emotionality in adulthood.11 In
addition, we showed that prenatal DEX/GC targets
the mesolimbic dopaminergic system;12 this system
comprises projections from the ventral tegmental area
(VTA) to the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and is
strongly implicated in motivational and reward
aspects of addictive behaviors.13–15 Specifically, the
NAcc of adult rats exposed to GC in utero (iuGC)
display reduced neuronal numbers and fewer dopa-
mine (DA) inputs from the VTA.12 Further, early life
stress is known to influence DA receptor expression
in the adult NAcc16,17 and changes associated
with increased behavioral responses to stress and
cocaine.1,4,18,19 Together, these observations suggest
that prenatal exposure to elevated levels of GC can
program the mesolimbic circuit. In the present study,
a multimodal analysis was used to further define the
molecular neurobiological mechanisms that underlie
the initiation and reversibility of drug-seeking beha-
vior by prenatal exposure to GC.
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Materials and methods
Animals and behavioral tests
Pregnant Wistar rats were individually housed under
standard laboratory conditions (light/dark cycle of 12/
12h with lights on at 08:00h; 22 1C); food and water
were provided ad libitum. Subcutaneous (s.c.) injec-
tions of DEX at 1mgkg1 (DEX; iuGC animals) or
saline (control) were administered on gestation days
18 and 19. All manipulations were done in accor-
dance with the local regulations (European Union
Directive 2010/63/EU) and NIH guidelines on animal
care and experimentation.
Male offspring (nX8) derived from four different
litters were subjected to behavioral tests when they
were 3–4 months old.
Open field
Locomotor behavior was investigated using the open-
field test. Briefly, rats were placed in the center of
an arena (MedAssociates, St Albans, VT, USA) and
their ambulation was monitored online over a period of
15min. Total distances traveled were used as indicators
of locomotor activity. Animals were injected with
saline or morphine and tested 30min after injection.
Conditioned place preference (CPP)
The place preference apparatus consisted of two
compartments with different patterns on floors and
walls, separated by a neutral area (MedAssociates).
Animals were placed in the central neutral area and
allowed to explore both compartments, allowing
definition of the preferred compartment (day 1).
During the conditioning phase (day 2–4), rats were
confined to the pre-test preferred compartment for
20min after saline injection (1ml kg1, s.c.) and, after
a 6-h gap, to the other compartment for 20min after
injection of morphine (10mgkg1, s.c.). CPP was
assessed on day 5 (20min) when all compartments
were accessible to the animal. Results are expressed
as the difference of time spent in the drug-paired to
saline-paired side.
Ethanol consumption
The two-bottle choice protocol was carried out for
15 days as described previously.20 Briefly, after 3 days
of taste habituation (one bottle with 10% ethanol
and other with 5% sucrose), rats were offered both
bottles. Each bottle was weighted daily; bottle posi-
tions were changed every day to control for position
preference. Corrections were made for daily evapora-
tion and spillage.
Cross-fostering and maternal behavior
For cross-fostering experiments, litters from five
control and five DEX-treated mothers were exchanged
on postnatal day 1. Maternal behavior was assessed
every second day, over a period of 30min. Both, pup-
directed (nursing, non-nutritive contact, licking
and nest building) and self-directed (self-grooming,
resting, vertical activity and carrying) behaviors were
registered.
Drugs
Morphine hydrochloride (Labesfal Pharmaceutical,
Campo de Besteiros, Portugal) was administered s.c.
at a dose of 10mgkg1; sesame oil was used as the
vehicle. L-dopa/carbidopa (Sinemet, Merck, NJ, USA)
at a dose of 36.0/9.0mg/kg (in water) was adminis-
tered daily by oral gavage.
Tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) immunohistochemistry
Animals were deeply anesthetized and transcardially
perfused with 4% paraformaldehyde. Cerebral hemi-
spheres were separated by a longitudinal cut in the
midsagittal plane. Sections of 30 mmwere treated with
3% H2O2 and blocked with 4% bovine serum albumin
in phosphate-buffered saline. Sections were then
incubated overnight at 4 1C with rabbit anti-TH serum
(1:2000; Affinity Reagents, CO, USA). Antigen visua-
lization was carried out by sequentially incubating
with biotinylated goat anti-rabbit antibody, ABC1
(Vector, Burlingame, CA, USA) and diaminobenzidine
(DAB, Sigma, St Louis, MO, USA). The density of
TH-positive fibers impinging upon the NAcc was
estimated as previously described.12
Structural analysis
Rats were transcardially perfused with 0.9% saline
under deep pentobarbital anesthesia and processed as
described previously.21 Briefly, brains were removed
and immersed in Golgi–Cox solution22 for 14 days;
brains were then transferred to a 30% sucrose
solution (7 days), before being cut on a vibratome.
Coronal sections (200mm thick) were collected and
blotted dry onto cleaned, gelatin-coated microscope
slides. They were subsequently alkalinized in 18.7%
ammonia, developed in Dektol (Kodak, Rochester,
NY, USA), fixed in Kodak Rapid Fix (prepared as per
package instructions with solution B omitted), dehy-
drated through a graded series of ethanols, cleared in
xylene, mounted and coverslipped. For each selected
neuron, all branches of the dendritic tree were
reconstructed at  600 magnification, using a motor-
ized microscope with oil objectives (Axioplan 2,
Carl Zeiss, Thornwood, NY, USA) that was attached
to a camera (DXC-390, Sony, Tokyo, Japan) and
Neurolucida software (Microbrightfield, Williston,
VT, USA). A 3D analysis of the reconstructed neurons
was performed using NeuroExplorer software (Micro-
brightfield). Twenty neurons were studied in each
animal, and results from the same animal were
averaged. To assess differences in the arrangement
of dendritic material, a 3D version of a Sholl
analysis23,24 was performed. For this, we counted
the number of intersections of dendrites with con-
centric spheres positioned at radial intervals of 20mm;
in addition, we also measured dendritic tree lengths
located between two consecutive spheres. The meth-
od for sampling dendritic branches for spine density
was designed as follows: only branches that (1) were
either parallel or at acute angles to the coronal surface
of the section and (2) did not show overlap with other
branches that would obscure visualization of spines
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were considered. Because treatment-induced changes
in the apical dendritic branches varied with distance
to soma, segments were randomly selected in the
proximal parts of the tree; selection of basal dendrite
was done at radial distances between 50 and 100 mm.
To assess treatment-induced changes in spine mor-
phology, spines in the selected segments were
classified according to Harris et al.25 in mushroom,
thin, wide and ramified categories. Thin spines were
considered immature, whereas the other spine types
were considered to be mature spines.
Macrodissection
Animals were anesthetized, decapitated, and heads
were immediately snap-frozen in liquid nitrogen.
Brain areas of interest were rapidly dissected on ice
under a stereomicroscope, observing anatomical land-
marks. Samples were snap-frozen (dry ice) and stored
at 80 1C until use.
Neurochemical evaluation
Levels of catecholamines were assayed by high-perfor-
mance liquid chromatography, combined with electro-
chemical detection (HPLC/EC) using a Gilson instru-
ment (Gilson, Middleton, WI, USA), fitted with an
analytical column (Supleco Supelcosil LC-18 3mM,
Bellefonte, PA, USA; flow rate: 1.0mlmin1). Samples
were stored overnight in 0.2N perchloric acid
at 20 1C, sonicated (5min on ice) and centrifuged at
5000 g. The resulting supernatant was filtered through
a Spin-X HPLC column (Costar, Lowell, MA, USA) to
remove debris and 150ml aliquots were injected into
the HPLC system, using a mobile phase of 0.7M
aqueous potassium phosphate (pH 3.0) in 10%
methanol, 1-heptanesulfonic acid (222mg l1) and
Na-EDTA (40mg l1). A standard curve using known
concentrations of all catecholamines was run each day.
Molecular analysis
For real-time PCR analysis, total RNA was isolated
using Trizol (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) and
DNase treated (Fermentas, Burlington, Canada) fol-
lowing recommended protocols. Two mg of RNA was
converted into cDNA using the iSCRIPT kit (Biorad,
Hercules, CA, USA). Reverse transcription PCR
was performed using Quantitec SyberGreen (Qiagen,
Venlo, The Netherlands) and the Biorad q-PCR CFX96
apparatus. Hprt was used as a housekeeping gene.
Relative quantification was used to determine fold
changes (control vs iuGC), using the DDCT method.
Primer sequences are shown in Supplementary Table 1.
For western blotting procedures, ice-cold lysis
buffer (50mM Tris-HCl pH 7.4, 50mM NaCl, 1mM
phenylmethylsulfonyl fluoride, complete protease
inhibitors (Roche, Basel, Switzerland)) was added to
each frozen area. After disruption of the tissue using a
23G needle, 0.1% SDS and 1% Triton X-100 was
added to each sample. After incubation on ice for 1h,
samples were centrifuged at 13 000 r.p.m. for 10min at
4 1C; the supernatant was quantified using the
Bradford method. Forty mg of total protein was loaded
into SDS-polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis and then
transferred to nitrocellulose membranes. After incu-
bation with the primary antibodies: rabbit anti-
Dopamine receptor D1 (1:2500, ab20066, Abcam,
Cambridge, UK), rabbit anti-Dopamine receptor
D2 (1:2000, ab21218, Abcam) and mouse anti-
alpha-tubulin (1:200, DSHB, Iowa, USA); the second-
ary antibodies were incubated at a 1:10 000 dilution
(Santa Cruz Biotechnologies, Santa Cruz, CA, USA).
Detection was done using ECL kit (Pierce, Rockford,
IL, USA). Band quantification was performed using
ImageJ (http://rsbweb.nih.gov/ij/) as advised by
the software manufacturers, using a-tubulin as the
loading control. At least six animals per group were
analyzed.
For epigenetic analysis, four animals per group
were analyzed. Genomic DNA of 2 mg were bisulfite-
converted (EZDNA Methylation Kit, Zymo Research,
Irvine, CA, USA) and amplified with primers CpG-
Drd2_F and CpG-Drd2_R (designed using Methpri-
mer), using AmplitaQ Gold (Applied Biosystems,
Carlsbad, CA, USA). Bands were purified using
innuPREP Gel extraction kit (Analytik Jena, Jena,
Germany). After elution, 2 ml of product were used in
a TOPO cloning reaction (Invitrogen) following
recommended procedures. XL1-blue competent cells
were transformed with the TOPO reaction and plated
onto LB–50mgml1 kanamycin plates, suplemented
with X-GAL (5-bromo-4-chloro-3-indolyl-beta-D-ga-
lacto-pyranoside). A total of 10 clones were isolated
per animal; plasmid DNA was purified using innu-
PREP Plasmid Mini Kit. Plasmids were sequenced
using standard M13 primers.
Results
In utero GC exposure triggers increased drug-seeking
behavior in adulthood
To test the hypothesis that prenatal GC exposure
would increase drug preference, we compared all
experimental groups in a CPP paradigm. As compared
with controls, iuGC-treated animals developed a
stronger preference for morphine, spending more
time in the compartment previously associated with
morphine reward (Figure 1a; t=4.623, P=0.0036).
Whereas control and iuGC animals did not differ in
their intake of sucrose solution (Supplementary
Figure S1), iuGC animals demonstrated an approxi-
mately two-fold greater preference than controls for
ethanol in a two-bottle free-choice paradigm over a
period of 2 weeks (Figure 1b; t=3.523, P=0.0048). As
locomotor activity is considered to predict suscept-
ibility to drug abuse,1,26 it was interesting to note that
morphine stimulated locomotor activity (open-field
arena) to a greater extent in iuGC animals than in
controls (B160% vs B35%; F(3,15) = 67.94, P<0.0001;
Figure 1c). To exclude the potentially confounding
effects of inadequate maternal care, itself a suspected
etiological factor in stress-related psychiatric disor-
ders,27–29 we analyzed the maternal behavior of
control and GC-treated dams, and also performed a
Drug-seeking behavior induced by prenatal exposure to GC
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cross-fostering experiment. Neither self- nor pup-
directed behaviors were significantly influenced by
GC treatment (Supplementary Figure S2). Identical
behaviors were observed when iuGC offspring raised
by natural and fostered mothers were compared in the
CPP (Figure 1a; t=6.877, P<0.0001) or ethanol
consumption (Figure 1b; t=12.58, P<0.0001) tests.
Although the hypolocomotor profile observed in non-
fostered iuGC animals in the open field test was not
seen in cross-fostered iuGC rats (Figure 1c), morphine
elicited a hyperlocomotor response in both cross-
fostered and non-fostered iuGC animals as compared
with control rats raised by foster mothers (Figure 1c;
t=2.737, P=0.021). Collectively, these findings
indicate that exposure to prenatal GC increases
vulnerability to drug-seeking behavior.
Morphological and neurochemical changes in the
NAcc after in utero GC exposure
Increased sensitivity to the psychomotor-stimulatory
actions of drugs such as morphine reflects increased
DA release into the NAcc.1,26 Furthermore, the
dopaminergic system seems particularly sensitive to
the effects of GCs.5,12,30 Thus, we next assessed
the impact of prenatal GC upon the number of
TH-positive fibers, DA and DA metabolite levels,
as well as DA turnover in the NAcc (Figure 2).
The number of TH-positive fibers in both the core and
shell divisions of the NAcc were significantly
reduced in iuGC animals (Figure 2a, shell: t=2.827,
P=0.022; Figure; core: t=10.48, P<0.0001; Supple-
mentary Figure S3), in parallel with markedly
reduced NAcc levels of DA (t=2.567, P=0.0247)
and the DA metabolite 3,4-dihydroxyphenylacetic
acid (DOPAC; t=2.362, P=0.0376; Figure 2c); inter-
estingly, the levels of norepinephrine and epinephr-
ine, two other catecholamine transmitters whose
synthesis indirectly depends on TH, as well as of
the unrelated monoamine serotonin (5-HT), were not
affected by prenatal GC exposure. Importantly, besi-
des the reduced availability of DA in the NAcc,
iuGC-treated animals also displayed increased DA
turnover (Figure 2d; t=2.835, P=0.0196). Moreover,
as no remarkable neurochemical changes were obser-
ved in the VTA or other DA projection fields (pre-
frontal cortex, hippocampus; data not shown), the
Figure 2 Prenatal glucocorticoid (GC) reorganizes dopaminergic innervation and dendritic structure in the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc). In utero GC-exposed (iuGC) animals presented reduced tyrosine hydroxylase (TH)-positive fibers in the
shell (a) and core (b) subdivisions of the NAcc when adults. (c) High-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC)
measurements confirmed reduced levels of dopamine (DA), 3,4-dihydroxyphenylacetic acid (DOPAC) and homovanilic acid
(HVA) in the NAcc of iuGC animals in comparison with controls in parallel with increased turnover of DA in this brain
region (d). Stereological assessment revealed a volumetric atrophy (e) in the NAcc shell in iuGC animals together with
reduced number of cells (f). We observed no changes in dendritic length (g), but there was an increase in the total number of
spines in the medium spiny neurons of iuGC animals when compared with controls (h), as a result of increased number of
immature spines (i). (j) Representative reconstruction of medium spiny neurons of NAcc shell in control and iuGC animals.
The NAcc core of iuGC animals also presented volumetric atrophy (k) and reduced number of cells (l), but preserved
dendritic length; spine numbers and mature/immature spine ratio (m–o). (p) Representative reconstruction of a medium
spiny neuron from NAcc core in control and iuGC animals. Data is presented as mean±s.e.m. CONT, controls; NE,
norepinephrine; EPI, epinephrine; 5-HT, serotonin. *P<0.05, **P<0.01,*** P<0.001.
Figure 1 Prenatal in utero glucocorticoid (iuGC) exposure enhances drug-seeking behaviors. (a) In the contingent
conditioned place preference paradigm (CPP), iuGC animals spend significantly more time in the morphine-associated
compartment than controls. (b) In the non-contingent two-bottle preference paradigm, total ethanol consumption was higher
in iuGC animals than in controls. Similar results were obtained for cross-fostered animals in both paradigms. (c) Locomotor
activity was assessed in the open field. Although in basal conditions, iuGC animals presented reduced locomotor activity,
after morphine administration (MOR), iuGC rats displayed increased locomotor activity when compared with controls.
Cross-fostered iuGC-animals no longer present the basal hypolocomotor phenotype, but after MOR, they still presented
increased locomotor activity. Data is presented as mean± s.e.m. CONT, controls; MOR, morphine (10mgkg1) s.c. injection.
*P<0.05, **P<0.01,*** P<0.001.
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NAcc is seemingly most sensitive to the effects of
prenatal GC.
Extending our previous finding that prenatal GC
treatment leads to reduced neuronal proliferation in
the NAcc,12 we now report that iuGC results in
volumetric atrophy (Figure 2e, shell: t=4.340,
P=0.0025; Figure 2k, core: t=5.906, P=0.0004) and
a reduction of total cell numbers in both the shell and
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core divisions of the NAcc in iuGC adult animals
(Figure 2f, shell: t=3.018, P=0.0166; Figure 2l, core:
t=3.760, P=0.0055). Subsequent 3D morphological
analysis of dendrites and spines showed that whereas
prenatal GC did not influence dendritic lengths of
neurons in the NAcc (Figure 2g and m), the treatment
produced significant increases in the number of
spines within the shell (Figure 2h; t=3.775,
P=0.0069), but not the core division (Figure 2n).
The increase in spine number was accompanied by a
significant increase in the relative number of im-
mature spines in the shell (Figure 2i; t=3.108,
P=0.017), which, presumably, serve to compensate
for the loss of cells in the NAcc and for the reduced
amounts of DA reaching the NAcc from the VTA.
Notably, although iuGC treatment was associated
with increased total spine numbers in the VTA,
the treatment did not alter the ratio of immature to
mature spines in this region (Supplementary Figure
S4). These morphological data, together with the
neurochemical data described above, suggest a link
between a hypodopaminergic state in the NAcc
and the behavioral phenotype observed in animals
exposed to prenatal GC.
Altered expression of DA receptor 2 (Drd2) is
associated with differential methylation of Drd2 gene
in iuGC-treated animals
We next used quantitative reverse-transcription PCR
and immunoblotting to identify molecules that might
be responsible for the observed behavioral, morpho-
logical and neurochemical phenotypes. Expression
levels of the mRNAs encoding the GC receptor and
corticotropin releasing factor receptors 1 and 2 (all
implicated in the neuroendocrine adaptation to stress
as well as in drug-seeking behavior1), did not differ
between controls and iuGC subjects (Supplementary
Figure S5). Likewise, no significant differences were
found in the expression levels of the synaptic
plasticity-related genes Bdnf, synapsin-1, Cdk5, Creb
and NCAM (Supplementary Figure S5). However,
there was a significant upregulation of Drd2 mRNA
(Figure 3a; t=2.764, P=0.028) and DRD2 protein
(Figures 3b and c; 35 kDa precursor, t=3.740,
P=0.0028; 47kDa isoform, t=3.372, P=0.005; 72 kDa
glycosylated DRD2, t=2.177, P=0.050) in the NAcc of
iuGC animals. Prenatal GC exposure did not influence
either Drd1 or Drd3-5 mRNA expression levels
(Figure 3a) or the levels of DRD1 protein (50 kDa
and glycosylated 74 kDa isoforms; Supplementary
Figure S5). In the VTA of iuGC animals, Drd5 levels
were downregulated (Supplementary Figure S5), but
the expression of other DA receptors was unchanged
(data not shown).
Strikingly, repeated exposure to morphine and
ethanol in prenatal GC-treated adult rats led to a
significant decrease in the expression of Drd2 mRNA
in the NAcc (Figure 3d; morphine: t=2.346, P=0.043;
ethanol: t=3.330, P=0.0021). As recent studies
reported that psychostimulant treatment induces
epigenetic changes in the NAcc,31–33 we next analyzed
the pattern of methylation (strongly correlated with
transcriptional repression) in a conserved (human
and rodent) CpG island within the Drd2 gene, cover-
ing part of the promoter region and exon 1 (Figure 3e).
Our analysis shows that whereas the general DNA
methylation profile did not differ between controls
and iuGC subjects under basal conditions, overall
methylation of the CpG island was significantly
increased after chronic morphine administration in
adult iuGC-treated animals (Figure 3f–h; t=3.085,
P=0.0215). These changes in DNA methylation are
consistent with the finding that Drd2 expression is
downregulated after morphine treatment (Figure 3d).
Further, the observation that voluntary ethanol con-
sumption (Figure 3d) also downregulates Drd2 sug-
gests Drd2 DNA methylation as a potentially
important mechanism in response to substances of
abuse.
Restoration of DA levels reverts the molecular,
cellular and behavioral phenotype of iuGC animals
The results presented up to this point indicate a
strong association between the hypodopaminergic
state that prevails in the NAcc of iuGC-exposed
subjects and their likelihood to seek drugs of abuse.
We next examined whether the phenotype produced
by iuGC could be rescued using a simple pharmaco-
logical approach. To this end, we administered
the DA precursor L-dopa (together with carbidopa
to prevent peripheral degradation) for 3 days. This
treatment regimen resulted in concomitant increases
in DA levels (Figure 4a; F(3,21) = 23.79, P<0.0001)
and correspondingly, decreases in Drd2 expression
(Figure 4c; t=2.982, P=0.038) in the NAcc of
controls and iuGC-treated animals. Interestingly, the
dynamic Drd2 response to morphine was normalized
after restoration of DA in the NAcc by L-dopa treat-
ment, with iuGC-treated and control animals showing
similar patterns of Drd2mRNA expression (Figure 4c)
and Drd2 promoter methylation (Figure 4d–f). Inter-
estingly, the neurochemical adjustments induced
by L-dopa were accompanied by signs of structural
plasticity in the NAcc. These were particularly
marked in the core division of the NAcc, where
L-dopa-treated animals displayed increased den-
dritic lengths (more pronounced in iuGC-exposed
animals; Figure 4j; F(3,12) = 4.587, P=0.023) and
spine numbers (Figure 4k; F(3,12) = 10.01, P=0.0014),
though the type of spines were similar between
the two groups (Figure 4l). In contrast, increased
spine numbers was the only noticeable morphological
change observed in the NAcc shell (Figure 4h;
F(3,10) = 14.86, P=0.0005).
Remarkably, acute (3 days) L-dopa treatment also
reversed the vulnerability of iuGC-exposed animals to
drug-seeking behaviors, in both contingent (t=1.851,
P=0.101) and non-contingent (t=0.0192, P=0.985)
paradigms (Figures 4m and n), and rescued the
hyperlocomotor phenotype displayed by iuGC-treated
animals after morphine administration (Figure 4o;
t=2.292, P=0.05). Reversal of these behaviors by
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acute L-dopa administration however proved to be
only transient; the reversal was not sustained when
animals were tested 3 weeks after the last dose of
L-dopa (Supplementary Figure S6). On the other
hand, when the L-dopa treatment regimen was exten-
ded to 3 weeks, reversal of the behavioral, morpho-
logical and molecular anomalies associated with
a hypodopaminergic state was observable for at
least 3 weeks after discontinuation of the drug
(Supplementary Figure S6).
Discussion
Work over the last two decades has identified the
dopaminergic mesolimbic ‘reward pathway,’ of which
the NAcc is a crucial component, as essential for
drug-seeking behaviors.13,14,34,35 The central role of DA
released into the NAcc in the generation of enhanced
feelings of pleasure and satisfaction15 and, thus, in
the timing of the initiation of response patterns (e.g.,
drug-seeking behavior) within the frontocortico-
Figure 3 Impaired dopamine receptor 2 (Drd2) response in in utero glucocorticoid-exposed (iuGC) animals under basal
conditions and after exposure to substances of abuse. (a) Drd2 mRNA expression was augmented in iuGC animals when
compared with controls, but no changes were found in the expression of other dopamine receptors. (b) Representative
immunoblot of DRD2 in five control and five iuGC animals. The levels of the putative DRD2 percursor (35 kDa), the non-
glycosylated form (B50 kDa) and the glycosylated receptor (74 kDa) were higher in iuGC animals (c). (d) Although in a basal
situation, Drd2was upregulated in iuGC animals, after four injections of morphine (MOR) or 15 days of ethanol consumption
(EC), the levels of this receptor were significantly lower in iuGC animals when compared with controls. (e) Scheme of the rat
Drd2 CpG island that covers part of the promoter, and exon 1 and respective amplicon with the 16 potential methylation sites
are marked (small squares). Also shown is the sequence conservation in humans and mouse (chr8: rat chromosome 8; bp:
base pairs). (f) Percentage of total Drd2 CpG methylation in the NAcc of control and iuGC animals revealed a trend for a
reduction in the methylation pattern of Drd2 CpG island in basal conditions, but in opposite pattern after exposure to
morphine. (g) Percentage of methylation of each dinucleotide in the Drd2 CpG island in a basal situation. (h) After drug
exposure, iuGC animals presented an increase in the methylation status of several dinucleotides. Data is presented as
mean±s.d. CONT, controls; *P<0.05, **P<0.01.
Drug-seeking behavior induced by prenatal exposure to GC
AJ Rodrigues et al
7
Molecular Psychiatry
striatal loop,36 is well established. Current views
suggest that repetitive exposure to drugs of abuse
evolve from goal-directed behaviors into habit-based
actions.37,38 We previously demonstrated that stress,
associated with increased GC secretion, alters the
structure of the corticostriatal loops and steers the
development of instrumental behavior into habitual
behavior.39 The present demonstration of GC-induced
programming of the structure and function of the
NAcc provide, on the other hand, new insights into
the mechanisms that underlie the transfer of condi-
tioned behavior to instrumental behavior. Notably, the
NAcc (the core in particular) is a crucial deter-
minant of the efficiency of response-outcome
associative learning40 and thus, of the rewarding
effects of drugs of abuse;34 the NAcc modulates
motivational drive (‘wanting of a reward’) and thus,
drug-craving. In all these processes, DA seems to have
an essential role.
An intricate relationship between stress, the GC
released in response to stress, and dopaminergic tone
in the regulation of vulnerability to drug and
substance abuse has been suggested.1,5,14,26,41 Stress
and drugs of abuse appear to activate dopaminergic
synapses in a similar manner,41 culminating in DA
release in the NAcc.1,4,42 Stress induces sensitization
to the psychomotor effects of a number of drugs of
abuse and GC have been shown to have an essential
role in this process.1 Specifically, GC are known to
modulate the reinforcing properties of drugs and, in
fact, have positive reinforcing properties of their
own.43 Adding a new perspective, the present study
demonstrates that iuGC triggers an impoverishment in
dopaminergic inputs and DA levels in the NAcc,
leading to increased drug-seeking behavior in adult-
hood; notably, hypodopaminergic status is a hallmark
of the ‘addicted brain.’44,45 Associated with their
lower intra-NAcc levels of DA, animals exposed to
prenatal GC expressed more Drd2 in the NAcc,
potentially indicating a compensatory mechanism in
this structure. The finding that morphine and ethanol
downregulated Drd2 expression is consistent with the
DA-releasing abilities of these substances. The fact
that this downregulation is more pronounced in iuGC
subjects most likely reflects receptor hypersensitivity
due to the hypodopaminergic state previously in-
duced by iuGC.
The regulation of Drd2, implicated in different
phases of addiction, is seemingly complex;44 although
the short DRD2 isoform interacts with DA transporters
and functions as a presynaptic autoreceptor to
regulate dopaminergic tone, the long DRD2 isoform
is largely localized in postsynaptic targets and
mediates the effects of psychostimulants.46 The
present study reveals that vulnerability to substance
abuse depends on the dynamic range response of
Drd2 to increased DA release in the NAcc, rather than
simply on the expression of Drd2 at a given time
point. Such dynamic regulation is likely to depend on
different levels of transcriptional control.
Epigenetic mechanisms are being increasingly im-
plicated in the stable programming by early life
events of a spectrum of psychopathological states,
including anxiety and depression,29 impaired cogni-
tion47 and drug abuse,31–33,48,49 and transient epige-
netic modifications have been shown to underlie
neural processes such as learning and memory.50
Such epigenetic changes could imprint dynamic
environmental experiences on the unchanging gen-
ome, resulting in stable and adaptive alterations in
the phenotype. Our results demonstrate that exposure
to high GC levels during uterine development
increase the risk of drug-seeking behavior in associa-
tion with altered methylation status of a conserved
CpG island in Drd2 gene and therefore, interfering
with the dynamics of Drd2 expression. Further, they
show that repeated administration of morphine to
iuGC animals results in marked epigenetic modifica-
tions of the Drd2 gene promoter. These modifications,
together with the induced hypodopaminergic state in
iuGC-exposed animals, may be considered as key
mechanisms that underpin increased susceptibility to
drug abuse on one hand, and the dysregulated Drd2
response to drugs of abuse on the other.
Intriguingly, we found that reduced levels of Drd2
expression are not necessarily coupled to hyper-
methylation of Drd2 gene. Although Drd2 expression
was downregulated after morphine administration in
Figure 4 Restoration of dopamine (DA) levels by L-dopa reverts the molecular, structural and behavioral phenotypes of
in utero glucocorticoid (iuGC) animals. (a) Acute (3 days) treatment with L-dopa increased DA levels in the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) of both experimental groups; although iuGC animals still exhibited less DA than controls. In fact, iuGC
animals given L-dopa presented DA levels similar to those of controls without treatment. (b) No differences were found in DA
turnover after L-dopa treatment in iuGC animals. (c) Dopamine receptor 2 (Drd2) expression was diminished after L-dopa
treatment both in a basal situation and after morphine exposure (values normalized to controls given water). (d) L-dopa
treatment did not change Drd2 methylation status in a basal situation (e), but was able to revert the increased methylation in
iuGC animals after morphine exposure (f). L-dopa supplementation had no significant effect on NAcc shell dendritic length
(g), but triggered an increase in the number of spines, albeit similarly in control and iuGC animals, and reverted the altered
ratio of mature to immature spines observed in iuGC animals (h and i). (j) In contrast, L-dopa treatment increased dendritic
length in the NAcc core of both groups. An increase in the number of spines was also observed in both groups with no
changes in the type of spines (k and l). (m) L-dopa treatment reverted the higher vulnerability of iuGC animals to morphine-
induced CPP and also reverted the ethanol preference displayed by these animals (n). (o) In agreement, the higher locomotor
pattern after morphine displayed by iuGC rats was completely reverted by L-dopa treatment. No differences were found in
the locomotion between L-dopa treated control and iuGC animals in a basal situation. Data is presented as mean±s.e.m.
CONT, controls; MOR, after morphine injection 10mgkg1; 3d: 3 days; *P<0.05, **P<0.01,***P<0.001.
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both control and iuGC animals, Drd2methylation was
observed to a greater extent in the iuGC group. This
observation suggests that DNA methylation is not the
sole mechanism involved in transcriptional repres-
sion of Drd2 gene. Consistent with this, recent studies
have demonstrated interdependence and cooperation
between DNA methylation and histone modifications
in the regulation of gene silencing and activation.51
More extensive studies are needed to decipher the
precise mechanisms underlying the ‘epigenetic po-
tential’ of iuGC animals, namely the complex regula-
tion of Drd2 gene expression, which facilitates
adaptation to specific physiological states and
demands.
In exploring whether the dynamic epigenetic
mechanisms that regulate susceptibility to drug-
seeking behavior can be exploited in a therapeutic
context, we found that systemic administration of
L-dopa reverts drug-seeking behavior in iuGC-treated
animals. The latter occured in association with
morphological plasticity and significant decreases in
Drdr2 expression levels in the NAcc. Accordingly, we
suggest that susceptibility to drug-seeking behavior by
iuGC exposure results from the sequential depletion
of DA, upregulation of Drd2 and synaptic impover-
ishment of dopaminoceptive neurons in the NAcc
(Supplementary Figure S7). In this scenario, when
DA levels are stimulated by substances of abuse,
increased methylation of the Drd2 gene results in
downregulation of Drd2 expression albeit only in
iuGC animals. Strikingly, restoration of DA in the
NAcc of iuGC-treated animals also normalizes their
Drd2 responses to subsequent morphine and ethanol
exposure, a finding that most likely underlies the
above-mentioned reversion of drug-seeking behavior.
If translatable to humans, our findings suggest that a
simple reinstatement of dopaminergic homeostasis
may be sufficient to control addictive behaviors in
vulnerable individuals.
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